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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on either knowledge flows, international 
economics, or entrepreneurship. The first chapter focuses on knowledge flows 
and foreign direct investment. The second chapter aims to understand the 
pattern of cross-country equity portfolio allocations. The third chapter focuses 
on how entrepreneurship practices across countries is affected by bureaucratic 
circumstances.
Chapter I investigates whether FDI is a channel through which knowledge 
spills over from the foreign multinational to the host country. I analyse whether 
patents developed by local inventors in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) cite 
the stock of patents of FDI multinationals more often after these companies 
have established themselves in CEE. Using a newly hand-collected data sample 
on privatisation cases resolved during the 1990s, I find that winning bidders 
experience a 20% greater increase in citations received by the host country 
compared to the losing bidder.
Chapter II presents a model of international portfolio choice based on cross­
country differences in relative factor abundance. The change in factor prices 
after a positive shock in a particular country provides insurance to countries that 
have dissimilar factor endowment ratios. The main prediction is that countries 
with similar relative factor endowments have a stronger incentive to invest in 
one another for insurance purposes. Empirical evidence supports our theory.
Chapter III presents a model of corporate finance that incorporates bureau­
cratic start-up costs and where sectors differ in their need of external capital. 
The main theoretical prediction is that a reduction in start-up costs leads to an 
increase in the share of value added and number of firms in sectors with greater 
external finance. Intuitively, the sector with high external finance experiences 
a greater improvement in economies of scale, thereby making it more attractive 
to consumers. Using sector-country level data on manufacturing production, I 
find support for the predictions of the model.
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Chapter 1
Knowledge Flows Through FDI 
Activity: The Case of Privatisations in 
Central and Eastern Europe
1.1 Introduction
With the development of endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas 
1988; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1995), the economic profes­
sion came to accept the view that innovation, knowledge spillovers, and R&D were key 
factors for self-sustained, long-term economic growth and industrial development.
A key driver for a country to benefit from innovation generated abroad is its ab­
sorptive capacity, that is, the ability to tap into the world technology pool. Trade flows, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and labour mobility are among the best conduits for 
absorbing and diffusing knowledge and technology from abroad. FDI not only exposes 
local firms to global best practice technology and management techniques, but also 
exerts competitive pressure on corporate governance.
Policy makers in many transition and developing economies place FDI inflows high
12
on their agenda, expecting it to bring new technologies and management skills, apart 
from generating productivity spillovers to domestic entities. Many governments even 
offer foreign companies more favourable conditions than those granted to domestic 
firms through subsidies and tax holidays.
Despite being very important from a policy perspective, there is little evidence sug­
gesting that domestic firms benefit from FDI. Rodrik (1999) concluded that "today’s 
policy literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers from FDI but 
the evidence is sobering", and ten years later the picture is not much more optimistic: 
"what is rarer is evidence of productivity spillovers to domestic firms" (World Bank, 
2008a). As a conclusion, empirical research based on firm-level panel data tends to 
produce mixed results and the question is far from solved.
While these statements hold in general across all regions, they are particularly true 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Before 1990 these countries were almost com­
pletely closed to foreign activity. They had a well educated population and a very 
important legacy of scientific knowledge compared to most of non-OECD countries. 
Among the enormous structural changes that these countries have undergone during the 
1990s, there has been a growing presence of FDI activity. Figure (1.1) shows the evo­
lution of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP1 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. Before 1990, FDI was non-existent, but by the year 2000 the three countries 
had FDI inflows above 5% of GDP on a fairly stable basis.
In this paper, I use a new methodological approach and identification technique to 
analyse whether the knowledge pool of foreign multinationals becomes more accesible 
to local firms in CEE after FDI takes place. While the previous literature on FDI in CEE 
follows the convention of estimating a production function, this paper rather uses patent 
citations as an indicator of knowledge flows.2 I analyse whether patents generated by
1 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (Internet download June 2009)
2 For evidence that patent citations incorporate a substantial signal component reflecting patterns of 
knowledge flows, see Jaffe et al. (1998) and Jaffe et al. (2000).
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foreign FDI firms experience a relative increase in citations received by local CEE in­
ventors, compared to foreign non-FDI firms. In other words, I address the question of 
whether patents generated by local CEE inventors cite the stock of patents of foreign 
FDI multinationals more often after these enterprises have established themselves in 
CEE.
In the first part of the paper, I make extensive use of two datasets: a patents dataset 
and an ownership database. I use the patents data from the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and the United States Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1978 and 
2007 that can be found in PATSTAT (April 2008). In particular, I select the universe 
of patents developed by inventors located in either the Czech Republic, Hungary, or 
Poland, and identify all the citations made to patents belonging to foreign companies. 
Then, I construct measures of yearly citations received by each foreign company.3
In order to identify which foreign firms are doing FDI, we use the ownership in­
formation provided by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD)’s Amadeus/Orbis datasets.4 They pro­
vide information on firm ownership, including the identification of the ultimate owner, 
which identifies the one single firm/person/entity that ultimately owns the firm. Vari­
ables available for the ultimate owner include, among others, the country of origin and 
the BvD identification number. To identify which foreign companies do FDI in CEE, 
we take the population of BvD firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and 
identify their ultimate owner. The subsample of ultimate owners coming from foreign 
countries are, by definition, doing FDI in CEE.5
After a matching process by which each firm is allocated the same BvD identifica­
tion number in both PATSTAT and Amadeus/Orbis datasets, our group of foreign FDI
3 We limit our sample to foreign companies that have been cited at least once by inventors in our three 
CEE countries.
4For more detailed information on the patents and ownership databases, see Appendix.
5 Since our panel of ownership information starts in 1995 and some firms might have started their FDI 
activities in earlier years, we have completed the information with two datasets on changes in ownership: 
Thomson Financial SDC and BvD’s Zephyr. Additionally, we went to the national accounts of each of 
these three host countries to obtain the starting year of FDI for the remaining FDI companies.
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firms is characterised by doing FDI in at least one of the CEE countries, apart from 
receiving at least one citation by inventors from this same CEE country.6
In the second part of the paper, this study goes beyond the existing literature in terms 
of the identification technique by selecting the comparison group of non-FDI firms in 
a more precise way. One of the main challenges of the literature on FDI firms and 
knowledge flows is the choice of an appropriate comparison group. FDI firms are not 
a random sample of foreign multinationals, and the reasons to undertake FDI are often 
unobserved to the econometrician. Since it is very hard to identify a non-FDI firm that is 
as similar as possible to an FDI firm, the coefficient estimates obtained from a standard 
difference-in-difference methodology can be misleading.
In order to circumvent this concern, I collected data on the privatisation processes 
that took place in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland during the 1990s, which 
included a variety of privatisation methods. An important number of state-owned com­
panies were privatised through an open tender or competitive bid in which foreign com­
panies could place bids to acquire the control of the company about to be privatised. 
Among all the bids received, the national authority usually proceeded with a selection 
process until two or three final bids were still considered in the final round. Finally, the 
authorities chose the winning bidder among the final remaining bids. The identifying 
assumption is that losing bidders are the closest possible firms to the winning bidders, 
and thereby form a valid counterfactual. We rely among the revealed ranking of firms 
to identify a valid counterfactual.
The main finding is that patents generated by foreign FDI firms experience a relative 
increase in citations received, compared to foreign non-FDI firms, after FDI takes place. 
That is, patents generated by local CEE inventors cite the stock of patents of foreign FDI 
multinationals more often after these enterprises have established themselves in CEE, 
compared to the stock of patents developed by foreign non-FDI firms. Interestingly,
6 Similarly, our group of foreign non-FDI firms receives at least one citation by CEE countries, but is 
not the ultimate owner of any company in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
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starting FDI in itself does not lead to a substantial increase in citations received in 
all of our econometric specifications. Rather, what is needed is that the FDI firm has 
spent enough time in the host country, thereby allowing for its ideas and knowledge to 
be diffused and absorbed by local inventors. In other words, the increase in citations 
received by the FDI firms is positively related to how long the firm has been present in 
the host country.
This paper is related to four streams of the literature. First, the empirical literature 
on FDI and knowledge spillovers runs a production function equation7 in which the re­
gressor of interest is the share of FDI in a given sector or region. A number of survey 
papers have concluded that the evidence supporting these positive knowledge spillovers 
is either non-existent or very weak.8 This is also true for studies that focus particularly 
on CEE. Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find rather a negative effect of FDI on domestic 
firms in the Czech Republic; Konings (2001) casts doubt on horizontal FDI spillovers 
in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland; Damijan et al. (2003) look at a number of transition 
economies and conclude that FDI does not generate positive intra-industry spillovers 
for domestic firms. Bosco (2001) similarly claims that the evidence for technologi­
cal spillovers in Hungary does not allow for clear-cut conclusions. More optimistic 
is the message of Javorcik (2004) who finds backward spillovers in Lithuania, and of 
Kinoshita (2001) who reports that some Czech manufacturing sectors benefit from hor­
izontal spillovers of FDI.
Compared to this literature, we focus on patent citations instead of estimating a pro­
duction function equation. Apart from shifting the analysis from knowledge spillovers 
to knowledge flows, our approach will rather focus on the larger companies of these 
economies, given that our focus is on firms active in R&D. An interesting fact to sup­
port the patent citation approach is that the contribution of multinationals’ R&D to total
7As a general benchmark, firm-level output levels or growth rates are regressed on inputs (e.g. capital, 
labour, materials), leading to a residual interpreted as total factor productivity. FDI spillovers are found 
if multinational presence are positively correlated with the productivity residual.
8See Gorg and Strobl (2001), Crespo and Fontoura (2007), Gorg and Greenaway (2004).
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R&D is substantial in our countries of interest, reaching more than 60 percent in Hun­
gary (World Bank, 2008b).
Even though the previous literature has almost unanimously rejected any positive ef­
fect of FDI on local firms in CEE, some anecdotal evidence on absorptive capacity still 
suggests the possibility of some positive effect that the previous literature was unable 
to capture. First, Kinoshita (2001) finds that the learning effect (i.e. absorptive capac­
ity) of R&D in Czech manufacturing firms is far more important than the innovative 
effect in explaining the productivity growth of a firm. Second, Javorcik and Sparateanu 
(2005) find that in a survey of enterprises, almost a quarter of respondents in the Czech 
Republic and 15% in Latvia learned from multinationals about new technologies.9
Secondly, there is a very limited literature on FDI and patent citations. We highlight 
Branstetter (2006), who does a before-after analysis of 200 Japanese multinationals. 
He tests the hypothesis that FDI is a channel of knowledge spillovers for Japanese 
multinationals undertaking FDI in the U.S. and finds that FDI increases the flow of 
knowledge spillovers both from and to the investing Japanese firms.10
Thirdly, the literature on patent citations and geography started with the seminal 
paper by Jaffe et al. (1993). Inventors cite other inventors living in geographical prox­
imity more than proportionally. Griffith et al. (2007) examine the "home bias" of inter­
national knowledge spillovers measured by the speed of patent citations and find that 
the geographical localisation of knowledge spillovers has fallen over time. Griffith et 
al. (2006) analyse the relationship between U.S. and U.K. and provide evidence of 
knowledge spillovers associated with technology sourcing.11
Finally, the identification strategy used in the second part of this paper is closest
9On theoretical literature related to FDI and absorptive capacity, see Javorcik and Saggi (2003), and 
Leahy and Neary (2007).
10 Singh (2005) uses patent citations to understand the role of multinational subsidiaries in the diffusion 
of knowledge. Greater subsidiary activity increases cross-border knowledge flows between host and 
source country.
11 Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Keller (2002) give evidence in favour of the fact that mobility of 
engineers across firms matters for localised spillovers.
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to Greenstone and Moretti (2004) and Greenstone et al. (2007). In these papers, U.S. 
counties compete for a large plant to locate within their boundaries, and the authors 
compare the winning county to one or two runner-up counties to analyse the effect on 
property values, productivity, and welfare.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the data and provides 
summary statistics. Section 1.3 explains the econometric methodology, while Section
1.4 shows results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data and Summary Statistics
1.2.1 Data
The database on patents comes from the European Patent Office (EPO) and the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and is included in the Worldwide Patent Statis­
tical Database (PATSTAT). The PATSTAT database contains information on all patent 
applications to the EPO and USPTO, including information about applicant (name and 
location), inventors (name and location), granted status, technology class, year of ap­
plication, and citations made and received. The data dates back to 1978 for EPO (i.e. 
the year when EPO was launched) and much earlier for the USPTO.12 We are able to 
track the number of patents awarded and citations received for each firm over time. Of 
particular interest for this project is the fact that for each citation we can identify both 
the citing applicant and the cited applicant, apart from the year in which the citation 
takes place.
The database on ownership comes from BvD’s Amadeus and Orbis. For European 
countries, we use firm-level data from the Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Databases from 
EUropean Sources) database. This standardised commercial data is collected by about
12These DVDs are provided twice a year, and the version used for this paper is April 2008, which 
incorporates all the population of patents since the beginning of EPO in 1978. For the USPTO, we will 
also use data from 1978 onwards.
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50 vendors (generally the office of register of companies) across Europe. The database 
contains financial information on about 8 million firms from 34 countries, including all 
the European Union countries and Eastern Europe. Additionally, for other major for­
eign investors in CEE, we obtain the equivalent information from BvD’s Orbis dataset, 
which is the extension of Amadeus to the rest of the world.13 Amadeus/Orbis also 
provides information on firm ownership, including the ultimate owner. In particular, it 
identifies the one single firm/person/entity that ultimately owns the firm.14 To define an 
ultimate owner, BvD analyses the shareholding structures of companies that, accord­
ing to the independence indicator, are not independent from their shareholders. BvD 
looks for the shareholder with the highest percentage of ownership. If this shareholder 
is independent, it is recognised as the ultimate owner. If the highest shareholder is not 
independent, the same process is repeated until the ultimate owner if found.
For this particular project, it is necessary to identify the foreign companies that do 
FDI in CEE. We take the population of firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland, and identify their ultimate owner, specifically by the ID number provided by 
BvD. All the ultimate owners coming from foreign countries are, by definition, doing 
FDI in CEE.15
For the dataset on the bidders of privatisation cases in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland during the 1990s, we needed to collect the data ourselves. The information 
is not archived or available from any central governmental agency, so that public or 
official channels were only marginally helpful. Given the diverse nature of privatisation 
methods chosen by each country, we had to resort to a variety of procedures to gather the 
data. A number of research assistants were allocated to each host country to perform
13 While we obtain Amadeus information from a number of DVDs over time, for Orbis we used the 
web interface download available to LSE since 2008/2009.
I4Variables available for the ultimate owner include: country of incorporation/origin; ID number (if 
the ultimate owner is present in the Amadeus/Orbis database); type (e.g., family, industrial firm, employ­
ees/managers, financial institution, state).
15For a description of how the matching was done between Patstat and Amadeus/Orbis, see Appendix
A.
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preliminary research and investigation. After the preparatory work, we begun inter­
viewing numerous academic scholars and national officials who played a role during 
the privatisations undertaken during the 1990s. The interviewees either participated in 
the decision making process carried out by the “Evaluation Committee” or contributed 
to academic literature on privatisation. We also conducted further interviews with spe­
cific company managers, and gathered valuable information from national archives, 
privatisation agencies, state audit departments, magazines and journals providing gen­
eral privatisation information or industry-specific case-studies, or daily financial papers 
focusing on Central and Eastern Europe, among others.
1.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table (1.1) provides broad descriptive features of the data. Based on Table (1.1)A, 
the total number of citations in the sample is approximately 13,000.16 While only 8% 
of the cited foreign firms do FDI according to our ownership information, these firms 
obtain 21% of the citations. This percentage rises to 33% in the case of Poland, where 
11% of the firms in our sample do FDI. In Table (1.1 )B, the correlation between a firm’s 
stock of patents and its citations received from outside the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland is 0.75. Interestingly, this correlation goes down to 0.31 between the stock 
of patents and the citations received from the three host countries analysed in this paper. 
The correlation between citations received from the three CEE countries and citations 
received from the rest of the world is only 0.39.
In Table (1.2) we provide separate information for FDI and non-FDI firms. A higher 
fraction of European firms does FDI compared to U.S. firms, which makes intuitive 
sense due to the fact that the barriers to FDI (e.g. geographical and cultural distance) 
are smaller for European companies. In terms of technology classes, six IPC classes 
cover the whole group of firms, each of these classes covering less than 25% of firms in
16 Self-citations have been excluded.
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our sample. Consequently, it is reassuring that our results will not be driven by a single 
technological category.
In Table (1.3), we compare FDI firms to non-FDI firms in terms of their main vari­
ables used in our empirical analysis. In all host countries, we observe that FDI firms 
have a higher stock of patents and receive more citations on a yearly basis compared to 
non-FDI firms. These differences are especially important for Poland.
Figure (1.2) shows the evolution over time of the average citations received per firm, 
decomposed into FDI firms and non-FDI firms. Until the beginning of the 1990s, we 
do not observe substantial differences. It is only from the mid-1990s onwards that the 
gap widens substantially: FDI firms start to receive many more citations compared to 
non-FDI firms.
What remains to be seen is for whom these citing inventors located in CEE work 
for. Figure (1.3) provides an answer to this question. Until the beginning of the 1990s, 
almost all citations were made by inventors working for local CEE companies. This 
is due to the fact that foreign ownership was almost non-existent. But during the mid- 
1990s we observe a huge increase in citations made by inventors employed in foreign 
companies, which shows that FDI did not only aim at CEE for lower wages, but also 
targetted a new location to start R&D activity. Before 2000, we already observe that 
most of the citations are made by inventors working for foreign companies, and this 
trend intensified during the following years.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
1.3.1 Broad Sample
In our first specification, In (Cat) is (the log of) the number of citations made by 
inventors of host country c to the patent stock of firm i in year t:
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where FD Id  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when firm i does FDI in 
country c at any point in time. Postcit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
FDI firms i in the subsample of years in which FDI is actually taking place in country 
c.17 Our interest will be on the coefficient (32. Do inventors of country c increase the 
number of citations made to firm i after this firm started doing FDI in country c? A 
positive and significant value of fi2 would support this prediction.
In our second specification, we expand the formulation in the following way:
In (Cdt) =  PQ +  ( 3 ^ D id  +  P2Postdt +  TotYearsdt +  (1 *2)
where T otY  earsdt is the cumulated number of years that firm i has been doing FDI 
in country c until time L18 This specification allows for additional flexibility to assess 
whether the increase in citations received happens right after FDI starts to take place, 
i.e. f 2 > 0, or whether it rather only increases gradually with time, i.e. > 0.19
From a statistical viewpoint, for both (1.1) and (1.2) one observes a large number of 
observations for which the dependent variable is zero, so that the log of the dependent 
variable remains undefined. I deal with this concern in two ways. First, when using 
an OLS specification, I rewrite the dependent variable as In (1 +  ccit).20 Second, in our 
preferred econometric specification we use the Poisson estimator, which is especially 
suitable for count data.21 Figure (1.4) illustrates the probability density function of both
17Therefore, F D Ici =  1 is a necessary condition for observing P ostdt =  1.
18Therefore, TotYear scit >  0 whenever P ostcit =  1. TotY  ear scit takes the value of 5 when the 
firm is in its fifth year of FDI, and so on.
19One can think of 0 2 as the intercept and {3S as the slope.
20This solution has been widely adopted in the international economics literature when regressing a 
gravity-type equation.
21 See Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2005) in support of the Poisson estimator when the dependent vari­
able has a large amount of zeroes. When using the Poisson estimator, our dependent variable will not 
appear in logarithms.
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the observed values in the dependent variable and the predicted values of the Poisson 
estimated values. We see that the Poisson fits very well the distribution of the true data.
In terms of control variables, four types of fixed effects are incorporated: (i) year; 
(ii) source country; (iii) host country; (iv) technology. Among other things, year fixed 
effects should control for the fact that in later years we observe many more citations. 
The (source and host) country fixed effects control for the average number of citations 
made and received by a firm of a certain country. Furthermore, the PATSTAT dataset 
provides an IPC code identifying the technology class of each patent. By aggregating 
this measure to the firm level, we can also control for the average number of citations 
received by a firm in each technology class.22 In addition to these four types of fixed 
effects, we will also have fixed effects at the firm level for each host country separately, 
i.e. firm-host dummies.23 Since source, host, and technology dummies are constant at 
the firm-host level, we will rather interact them with year dummies whenever firm-host 
dummies are present.
An additional control variable will be (the log of) the stock of patents that a firm 
has accumulated at each point in time. This should control for the fact that the number 
of citations received by a firm might depend on how much R&D investment has been 
done by this firm in the past.
Even though in our most complete specification we already incorporate firm-host 
fixed effects, apart from source*year, host*year, and technology*year dummies, it could 
still be the case that a firm decides to do FDI as a consequence of having been very suc­
cessful in their R&D activity in previous years.24 If high success in a firm’s R&D 
activities leads to both a higher firm-level productivity level together with greater ex­
22We allocate a technology class to each firm in the following way: first, we allocate an IPC code to 
each patent among eight possible codes. Second, we identify the most common IPC code for the patents 
belonging to a firm, and allocate this code to this firm.
23 In other words, if a company does FDI in both Hungary and Poland, this company will be allocated 
two different firm-level fixed effects.
24 In the framework by Helpman et al. (2004), the sunk cost of FDI is larger than the one of exporting, 
so that only the most productive firms will choose to do FDI.
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pected profits from expanding their activities to other countries, it might be that only the 
most innovative and profitable firms self-select to doing FDI. In that case, an increase in 
citations received would partly be the consequence of great innovative success, rather 
than of doing FDI. In order to rule out this alternative explanation, for each firm-year 
observation, we control for the citations received by this firm from the rest of the world.
1.3.2 Privatisation Cases
The number of observations in the second part of the paper is substantially reduced. 
We will only use information about privatisation cases that underwent a competitive bid 
procedure and for which we know both the winning and the losing bidders. Therefore, 
any case of greenfield FDI or foreign companies investing in CEE through stock market 
investments will not be used. The benefit of this new strategy is to use a difference-in- 
difference econometric specification in which a comparison group (losing bidders) is 
carefully selected and allocated to each treatment group (winning bidders).
The econometric specifications will be very similar to the ones used for the broader 
sample and for simplicity we will follow previous notation. In the simplest specifi­
cation, a dummy variable Postdt equals one to indicate the subset of years after the 
privatisation decision has taken place:
(Cctrit) Pq  "f f i lF D I c b i  $2Postcbit T @3 (F P ^ ctri * Postcdt) T &cbit' 0 *3)
A positive value of the new coefficient of interest can be interpreted in the fol­
lowing way: after the competitive bid of case b was resolved, the winning bidder ex­
periences a greater increase in citations received from host country c, compared to the 
increase in citations received by the losing bidder. Apart from this new coefficient, all 
the remaining coefficients keep the same interpretation as in the regressions used for
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the broader sample.
In our second specification, we drop the dummy variable P o std t and instead use 
the variable T o tY  earsCbit, which takes the same value as the cumulated number of years 
passed since the privatisation tender was resolved:
In (ccKt) =  PQ +  (3xF D Icbi +  (3 2T o tY  earscbn +  (33 (F D I M * T otY  ear scbit) +  ecbit.
(1.4)
The new interpretation of coefficient (33 is slightly different. A positive and statis­
tically significant value would suggest that the greater increase in citations received by 
the winning bidder is especially observed after the foreign company has been present in 
the host country long enough for its knowledge stock to be diffused.
Our final specification simply combines the previous two expressions,
In — {3q “I- p 1F D Icbi “I- /?2 Post chit 4- f33TotYearscbj.t
+/34 (FDIcbi * Postcut) T- /?5 (FDIcbi * T o tY  ear S d n t)  +  £cbit-( 1.5)
The goal is to assess which of the previous two effects has a stronger impact from a 
statistical viewpoint. A positive /?4 would suggest that the increase in citations received 
by the winning bidder already expresses itself shortly after the privatisation tender was 
resolved. Rather, a positive (35 would provide support for the fact that it takes time for 
the knowledge stock of the winning bidder to diffuse across the investors located in the 
host country.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Broad Sample
Table (1.4) provides results of our benchmark specification using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimator. Equations (1 )-(4) include year, host and source country, and 
technology fixed effects, while equations (5)-(8) rather incorporate interactions of year 
dummies with the last three dummy categories. Throughout all eight specifications, 
our coefficient of interest on "Dummy for post-FDI years" is approximately 0.1, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, it means 
that FDI firms experience a 10% increase in citations received from inventors located 
in host country after they start doing FDI in that country. The coefficient on "Dummy 
for firms doing FDI" changes sign once we add the control variables on the stock of 
patents and citations received in the rest of the world. It seems to suggest that even 
though FDI firms are cited more often than non-FDI firms at all times, it is completely 
driven by their greater size in terms of patents and citations. In addition, the coefficient 
on citations received by the rest of the world is positive and very strongly statistically 
significant in all specifications. Nevetheless, the coefficient on "Dummy for post-FDI 
years" is greater in absolute value.
As it was expected from the correlation between these two variables, companies that 
receive more citations in the rest of the world also receive more citations in our three 
host countries. But the increase in citations received by FDI firms in CEE is robust to 
controlling for how "attractive" these firms are from an innovation viewpoint to the rest 
of the world. It rules out the possibility that the increase in citations is a consequence 
of very productive R&D efforts in recent years, that in turn has led these firms to start 
FDI activities.
Table (1.5) presents OLS results allowing for the change in citations received to 
depend on the cumulated years that the FDI firm has been present in the host coun­
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try. Under this new specification, the coefficient on "Dummy for post-FDI years" is 
still positive and statistically significant, but is about half in size. This reduction in the 
coefficient is now captured by the coefficient on "Stock of years doing FDI". Even in 
the most demanding specification with firm-level fixed effects, and year dummies in­
teracted with host country, source country, and technology class, we observe a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient implying that each additional year of FDI leads 
to an increase in citations received of half a percentage point. In terms of the remain­
ing control variables, we do not observe any substantial change, neither in size nor in 
significance.
Table (1.6) presents the equivalent regressions to Table (1.4), but rather uses the 
Poisson estimator. In equations (l)-(4), our coefficient of interest is still positive and 
strongly statistically significant. But as opposed to the OLS estimations, equations
(5)-(8) do not consistently provide evidence on FDI leading to an increase in citations 
received. Similarly to Table (1.4), the coefficient on "Dummy for firms doing FDI" 
changes sign once we add our two main control variables, and the coefficient on cita­
tions received by the rest of the world is positive and very statistically significant.
Table (1.7) presents results for the Poisson estimator including the variable "Stock 
of years doing FDI". The picture is very clear throughout all specifications: starting FDI 
in itself does not lead to an increase in citations received. Rather, what is needed is that 
the FDI firm has spent enough time in the host country, thereby allowing for its ideas 
and knowledge to be diffused and absorbed by local inventors. This conclusion also 
explains why in equations (5)-(8) of Table (1.6) we rather struggled to find support for 
our prediction. It is remarkable that the coefficient on "Dummy for post-FDI years" is 
always close to zero and never statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient 
on "Stock of years doing FDI" is always positive and statistically significant.
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1.4.2 Privatisation Cases
Before we describe the results of the main regressions with bidders, let us first get 
a visual idea of the data. Figure (1.5) shows the average yearly citations per firm de­
composed into winning and losing bidders. Until the starting year of FDI, i.e. the year 
in which the privatisation case was resolved, both types of firms seem to receive more 
or less the same number of citations from inventors located in our CEE countries. In­
terestingly, once the winning bidder enters the host country, the number of citations it 
receives rises substantially, while the citations received by the losing bidder follows a 
much flatter trend. This result still holds in Figure (1.6) once we include dummies for 
years, host countries, and source countries.
Table (1.8) provides descriptive information about the sample of firms. We have 
47 winners and 89 losers, and the main represented countries are the U.S., France, 
and Germany. Table (1.9) compares both the level and the growth rate of citations 
received by winners and losers. The first two rows provide information about the level 
effect. On average, winning bidders receive more citations overall in the EPO/USPTO 
datasets, and also receive more citations when we limit the sample to citations made 
by inventors located in CEE countries. Notice that the econometric specification will 
already control for differences in levels, so that these differences do not undermine our 
identification technique. Rather, losers form a valid counterfactual if we do not observe 
any differences in growth rates (or trends), compared to the winning bidders.
The third and fourth rows of Table (1.9) use overall citations available in EPO/USPTO. 
Before the privatisation process has been resolved, winning bidders seems to have a 
slightly higher growth rate in citations received, while the opposite is true after FDI has 
starts to take place. But these differences are not statistically significant.
In the last two rows of Table (1.9) we restrict the sample to citations made by inven­
tors located in either the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland. Before the year in which 
the privatisation case is resolved, we do not observe any statistically significant differ-
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ence between the growth in citations received by winning bidders and losing bidders.25 
On the other hand, after the privatisation resolution the winning bidder experiences a 
growth rate in the number of citations received that is substantially greater than the one 
of the losing bidder. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table (1.10) provides OLS results for the three specifications described previously. 
Equations (l)-(3) provide benchmark results with the following economic interpreta­
tion: winning bidders experience a 20% greater increase in citations received by the 
host country after the privatisation case was resolved, compared to losing bidders. In­
terestingly, most of this effect does not seem to take place right after the foreign com­
pany starts its FDI activity in the host country. Rather, every additional year of FDI 
seems to increase the gap between citations received by the two bidders at a rate of 2% 
with strong statistical significance. Equations (4)-(6) show the same regressions after 
additionally including fixed effects for years, host countries, and source countries. Both 
the statistical and the economic significance does not seem to be affected, while the R- 
squared has risen from 0.16 to 0.22. In terms of control variables, the (log of the) stock 
of patents enters with a positive and statistically significant sign. The dummy variable 
for FDI firms enters with a negative sign, suggesting that at all times these firms are 
cited less than the losing bidders. While our descriptive statistics suggest the opposite, 
once we control for the stock of patents we also observed a similar result in our broader 
sample. A possible interpretation is that foreign firms with very little exposure to CEE 
before FDI takes place are especially interested in having access to this new region.
Table (1.11) presents the same results as Table (1.10), except that we also include 
case-specific dummies. The idea is to control for the possible impact that particular 
characteristics or circumstances of privatisation cases could have on the citations re­
ceived by these companies. The coefficient values of our interaction terms of interest
25 The growth rate is measured in the following way: we take the citations received by each firm in the 
first five years of our dataset, and compute the growth rate by taking the citations received by this same 
firm in the five years before the privatisation case is resolved.
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remain almost unaffected. The main difference compared to Table (1.10) is that the 
dummy variable for FDI firms is not statistically significant anymore, implying that 
winning and losing bidders seem to receive approximately the same number of cita­
tions at all times. In our more demanding specification, Table (1.12) substitutes case 
dummies for firm dummies. The R-squared reaches 0.32 and our interaction term be­
tween the FDI firms and the variable capturing the cumulated number of years of FDI 
presence in the host country is still statistically significant at the 1% level.
Tables (1.13)-( 1.15) present results for the identical specifications as in Tables (1.10)- 
(1.12), except that now the Poisson estimator is used instead of OLS. Equations (l)-(3) 
provide a familiar result. When included separately, the interaction terms for both of 
our variables of interest are positive and strongly statistically significant. Once the two 
interaction terms are included in the same regression, the main driver of our result is 
again the interaction term including the cumulated stock of years that the winning bid­
der has been present in the host country. Equations (4)-(6) include dummies for years, 
host countries, and source countries, and provide the same intuition, except for a lower 
statistical significance in the last equation. Finally, Tables (1.14) and (1.15) present 
results with case dummies and firm dummies, respectively. Both the economic and 
statistical significance of our results is unaltered, while the R-squared reaches 0.41.
1.5 Conclusion
I have used patent citations data to evaluate whether foreign direct investment is an 
important channel by which knowledge flows are transmitted from the foreign multi­
national to the host country. Apart from presenting results for a broad sample of FDI 
multinationals in CEE countries, I also use a novel identification technique with hand- 
collected data from the privatisation processes that took place in these countries during 
the 1990s. In particular, I gather data on winning and losing bidders of the privatisation
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cases that we resolved by a public tender or a competitive bid, whereby the losing bid­
der is assumed to be a valid counterfactual for the winning bidder. Both sets of results 
support the conclusion that patents developed by local inventors in CEE cite the stock 
of patents of FDI multinationals more often after these companies have established 
themselves in CEE.
The literature on knowledge flows and FDI is almost completely silent about the 
precise transmission mechanism by which host inventors benefit from the presence of 
foreign multinationals.26 Furthermore, FDI can take many different forms with poten­
tially very different implications for the host economy, even though this aspect is not 
fully understood yet.
For this reason, in future work I will move from a panel of firms to a panel of 
inventors. By tracking inventors over time and location, apart from identifying their co­
authors and citations pattern, I aim to address the following questions: (i) does it matter 
whether FDI firms just focus on production activities or rather also open an R&D lab in 
the host country?; (ii) how does the interaction between inventors located in the home 
and host countries affect the intensity of knowledge flows?; (iii) Figure (1.3) shows that 
most inventors in CEE are now working for foreign multinationals. How much local 
innovation is crowded out when FDI multinationals hire top local inventors?
26 An exception is Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) who use Belgian survey data and find that foreign 
subsidiaries are not more likely to transfer technology to the local economy as compared to local firms.
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1.A Appendix: Matching between Amadeus/Orbis and 
PATSTAT
The appendix has three sections. The first section gives general information on 
the Amadeus and Orbis databases of financial accounts provided by Bureau Van Dijk 
(BvD). While Amadeus is limited to Europe, from Orbis we additionally gather infor­
mation on other parts of the world. Particularly for this paper, we have added informa­
tion on the United States, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and China, given their important 
role as foreign investors in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
The second section describes the Amadeus/Orbis ownership database. In our con­
text, the ownership structure is crucially to identify foreign firms doing FDI in CEE.
The third section describes the matching process between Amadeus/Orbis and PAT­
STAT. That is, we explain how we aim to allocate a BvD identification number to each 
company that applies for a patent.
l.A .l General information on Amadeus/Orbis
For European countries, we use firm-level data from the Amadeus (Analyse MAjor 
Databases from EUropean Sources) database, created by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). This 
standardised commercial data is collected by about 50 vendors (generally the office of 
register of companies) across Europe. The database contains financial information on 
about 8 million firms from 34 countries, including all the European Union countries 
and Eastern Europe. Additionally, for other major foreign investors in CEE, we ob­
tain the equivalent information from BvD’s Orbis dataset, which is the straightforward 
extension of Amadeus to other parts of the world.27
Among the key advantages of Amadeus/Orbis over other data sources are its large
27 While we obtain Amadeus information from a number of DVDs over time, for Orbis we used the 
web interface download available to LSE since 2008/2009.
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coverage of small and medium sized firms and its unique accounting information on 
private firms. It covers both listed and unlisted firms of a wide variety of size and 
age categories, all industries, and ownership types. Coverage varies by country and 
generally improves over time. The firm and industry coverage of Amadeus is an order of 
magnitude better compared to other existing firm samples as argued by Gomez-Salvador 
et al. (2004).
The accounting database includes items from the balance sheet (22 items) and in­
come statement (22 items). No information is available from the cash flow report (i.e., 
investment or capital expenditure data is not available). The accounting data is harmo­
nized by BvD to enhance comparison across countries. This comparison becomes easier 
over time due to the improvement in the European Union harmonization of accounting 
standards. The main descriptive items are country of incorporation, legal form (public 
vs. private), listing and activity status, date of incorporation, types of accounts (consol­
idated vs. unconsolidated), product market activity codes (primary and secondary). In 
addition, for a relatively large number of firms, we observe the number of employees.
The Amadeus information comes from a number of DVDs that we have been col­
lecting. An important feature of Amadeus is the criteria for dropping firms from the 
database over time. First, the firm’s accounts data are followed for up to ten years; each 
Amadeus DVD contains only the latest 10 years (if available) of financial data. Sec­
ond, as long as a firm continues to file its financial statements, it continues to appear in 
Amadeus. In case a firm stops filling its financial statements, it is kept in the database 
for four extra years. For example, a firm that stops filling its reports in 2003 (i.e., 2002 
is the last year for which a financial statement was reported) remains in the database 
until 2006 included. In 2007 the firm is dropped from the sample (all observations of 
the specific firm are taken out from the Amadeus database in the 2007 update).
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1.A.2 Amadeus/Orbis ownership database
Amadeus/Orbis also provides information on firm ownership. BvD processes the 
raw data to give information along three dimensions:
(i) Independence indicator: Qualifies the degree of independence of a company with 
regard to its shareholders.
(ii) Ultimate owner: Identifies the one single firm/person/entity that ultimately owns 
the firm. Variables available for the ultimate owner include: country of incorpora­
tion/origin; ID number (if the ultimate owner is present in the Amadeus/Orbis database); 
type (e.g., family, industrial firm, employees/managers, financial institution, state). To 
define an ultimate owner, BvD analyses the shareholding structures of companies that, 
according to the independence indicator, are not independent from their shareholders.28 
BvD looks for the shareholder with the highest percentage of ownership. If this share­
holder is independent, it is recognised as the ultimate owner. If the highest shareholder 
is not independent, the same process is repeated until the ultimate owner if found.
(Hi) Shareholders: Lists shareholders of a given company. In addition to variables 
available for the ultimate owner, we observe shareholder’s direct and total percent­
age stakes in the firm. Control relationships are followed rather than patrimonial re­
lationships. When there are two categories of shares voting/non-voting, the percentages 
recorded are those attached to the category voting shares.
A monthly DVD issue of Amadeus contains, for each company, only the last own­
ership data available with the date (month and year) at which BvD verified this infor­
mation as valid. In order to construct the panel of ownership, we use 7 different DVD 
updates from 7 consecutive years to extract ownership data: May 2001 (update 80); 
May 2002 (92); July 2003 (106); May 2004 (116); October 2005 (133); September 
2006 (144); and May 2007 (152). The resulting ownership records dataset spans the
28To be independent, the shareholder must be independent by itself (i.e., having one of the following 
type: Individuals and families, Public authorities, Employees/Managers) or must be an entity with an 
independence indicator A+, A, or A- (i.e., an entity with no shareholder in control of more than 25%).
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period 1995-2007 and gives unique breadth of cross-sectional coverage over time.
1.A.3 The matching process between Amadeus/Orbis and PATSTAT
In this section we describe the matching between each EPO/USPTO patent applicant 
and an Amadeus/Orbis firm. The match is done by a coincidence both in company name 
and country of location. We do not consider patent applicants that are individuals or 
other legal entities like foundations or hospitals, because these will not receive any ID 
number by the BvD datasets Amadeus and Orbis.
A number of difficulties arise during the process, among which we emphasise:
(i) misspelling of company names (e.g. BAYER versus BAYAR)
(ii) same company name can be written in different ways (e.g. BAYER, BAYER 
AG, BAYER A.G., BAYER AKTIENGES., BAYER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT)
(iii) a large number of corporate extensions have to be standardised across coun­
tries (e.g. LIMITED, CORPORATION, GMBH, AG, SA, SL)
In order to account for these matters, the company name of each first patent ap­
plicant is standardised by using an algorithm in order to come up with two different 
versions of the cleaned name:29
(i) standard name: includes the standardized corporate extension
(ii) stem name: excludes the standardized corporate extension
After the company names in Amadeus/Orbis are standardised in the same way, the 
matching by cleaned company name and country takes place. For each match, we 
provide information on whether it was matched by standard name or stem name.30
29The initial algorithm was available to me through the CEP Productivity and Innovation Group, in­
cluding the Derwent (2000) industrial standard for converting corporate extensions to standard formats 
for many different countries, and my task has been to improve this algorithm, especially to increase the 
coverage of matching of Central and Eastern European countries. This meant standardising company 
extensions for the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland, among other tasks.
30Given that the standardisation process cannot correct spelling errors, some minor manual name 
matching has been done by CEP research assistants. The research assistants were allocated countries 
based on their language skills.
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In a number of cases, multiple ID matches were found for a given patent appli­
cant, identified by its name and country. These cases are resolved by supplementary 
information (e.g. ownership or address information), where available.
The match between patent applicants and company names in Amadeus/Orbis in­
cludes the following countries: all European countries, U.S., Japan, Canada, South 
Korea, and China. For the paper, unmatched patent applicants will be excluded from 
the analysis. Consequently, our new population of firms includes only patent applicants 
that have been allocated an ID.
Therefore, the subsample of firms that we identify as doing FDI activity in CEE are 
company names with an ID, and that additionally are the Ultimate Owner of a company 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland.
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Figure 1.1. Evolution of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP
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Figure 1.3. Decomposition of CEE citations by nationality of firm
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Figure 1.4. Comparison of probability distribution functions (observed vs estimated data)
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Figure 1.5. Bidders. Average citations per firm-year (raw data)
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Figure 1.6. Bidders. Average citations per firm-year (with year, host, and source dummies)
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics
A. Summary statistics of aggregate variables
CZ
Citing firms 
Cited firms
658
1321
...out of which doing FDI: 97  (7.3%)
Citing patents 
Cited patents
1309
3337
Citations 4134 
...out of which received by FDI firms: 716(17% )
B. Correlations:
Stock of patents
Citations per firm-year
Citations per firm-year outside CEE
Stock of 
patents 
1
0.31
0.75
45
HU PL Total
902 596 2156
1499 1152 3972
81 (5.5%) 126 (10.9%) 304 (7.7%)
2178 1055 4542
4678 2524 10539
5418 3612 13164
814 (15%) 1218 (33%) 2748(21% )
Citations 
Citations per firm-year 
per firm-year outside CEE
1
0.39 1
Table 1.2. Decomposition of firms
A. Decomposition of firms bv source country
FDI firms non-FDI firms
Total % Total %
Europe 127 42% 979 27%
U.S. 132 43% 2100 57%
Japan 38 13% 503 14%
Rest 7 2% 86 2%
Total 304 100% 3668 100%
B. Decomposition of firms bv technology sector (IPC Class):
FDI firms non-FDI firms
Total % Total %
A 43 14% 638 17%
B 60 20% 619 17%
C 65 21% 775 21%
D 3 1% 62 2%
E 0 0% 85 2%
F 44 14% 331 9%
G 37 12% 594 16%
H 52 17% 537 15%
n.a. 0 0% 27 1%
Total 304 100% 3668 100%
Description of IPC codes:
A Human Necessities 
B Performing Operations: Transporting 
C Chemistry; Metallurgy 
D Textiles; Paper 
E Fixed Constructions 
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating 
G Physics 
H Electricity
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Table 1.3. Summary statistics of key variables, divided by FDI and non-FDI firms:
Variable Mean S.D. Min Median Max Observations
Full Sample
Stock of patents per firm All firms 746.42 2748.69 0 56 70622 94789
FDI firms 2948.13 6298.88 0 757 70622 8382
non-FDI firms 532.84 1980.89 0 42 70622 86407
Citations per firm-year All firms 0.14 0.83 0 0 82 94789
FDI firms 0.33 1.78 0 0 82 8382
non-FDI firms 0.12 0.67 0 0 56 86407
CZ
Stock of patents per firm All firms 762.88 2776.02 0 64 70622 31050
FDI firms 2381.52 4938.85 0 635 51038 2667
non-FDI firms 610.78 2422.78 0 49 70622 28383
Citations per firm-year All firms 0.13 0.76 0 0 50 31050
FDI firms 0.27 0.99 0 0 16 2667
non-FDI firms 0.12 0.73 0 0 50 28383
HU
Stock of patents per firm All firms 662.77 2552.89 0 47 70622 36832
FDI firms 2974.02 6870.32 0 669 70622 2254
non-FDI firms 512.11 1869.65 0 40 51957 34578
Citations per firm-year All firms 0.15 0.76 0 0 56 36832
FDI firms 0.36 1.29 0 0 25 2254
non-FDI firms 0.13 0.71 0 0 56 34578
PL
Stock of patents per firm All firms 841.93 2963.69 0 60 70622 26907
FDI firms 3367.89 6793.45 0 914 70622 3461
non-FDI firms 469.06 1479.26 0 39 31935 23446
Citations per firm-year All firms 0.13 0.99 0 0 82 26907
FDI firms 0.35 2.42 0 0 82 3461
non-FDI firms 0.1 0.52 0 0 17 23446
Table 1.4. OLS. Full sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dummy for post-FDI years 0.108 0.087 0.098 0.105 0.099 0.079 0.090 0.099
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.015]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Dummy for firms doing FDI 0.033 -0.017 -0.028 0.040 -0.010 -0.020
[0.010]*** [0.009]* [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.009] [0.008]**
ln(Stock of Patents) -0.008 -0.007 0.009 -0.005 -0.003 0.010
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]** [0.002]***
ln(Citations received by non-CEE) 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.025
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]***
Observations 84719 84718 84718 84718 84719 84718 84718 84718
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.07
Firm-level RE/FE RE FE RE FE
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Technology Class FE Y Y Y
Year*Host Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Source Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Technology Class FE Y Y Y Y
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The statistical 
significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level; for regressions with firm RE and FE, std. errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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Table 1.5. OLS. Full sample. Includes (Stock of years doing FDI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dummy for post-FDI years 0.067 0.048 0.055 0.057 0.066 0.046 0.054 0.058
[0.019]*** [0.019]** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]** [0.017]*** [0.017]***
Dummy for firms doing FDI 0.032 -0.017 -0.029 0.039 -0.010 -0.020
[0.010]*** [0.009]* [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.009] [0.008]**
Stock of years doing FDI 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.002]***
!n(Stock of Patents) -0.009 -0.008 0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.009
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]** [0.002]***
ln(Citations received by non-CEE) 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.026
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]***
Observations 84719 84718 84718 84718 84719 84718 84718 84718
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.07
Firm-level RE/FE RE FE RE FE
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Technology Class FE Y Y Y
Year*Host Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Source Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Technology Class FE Y Y Y Y
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The statistical 
significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level; for regressions with firm RE and FE, std. errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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Table 1.6. Polsson. Full Sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dummy for post-FDI years 0.715 0.494 0.562 0.440 0.518 0.255 0.259 0.182
[0.193]*** [0.170]*** [0.156]*** [0.147]*** [0.191]*** [0.157] [0.111]** [0.108]*
Dummy for firms doing FDI 0.559 -0.224 -0.440 0.728 -0.012 -0.129
[0.146]*** [0.131]* [0.130]*** [0.143]*** [0.121] [0.099]
ln(Stock of Patents) -0.145 -0.236 0.664 -0.082 -0.163 0.753
[0.035]*** [0.030]*** [0.075]*** [0.035]** [0.029]*** [0.075]***
ln(Citations received by non-CEE) 0.569 0.614 0.592 0.498 0.520 0.490
[0.039]*** [0.034]*** [0.048]*** [0.036]*** [0.031]*** [0.046]***
Observations 84719 84718 84718 85282 84719 84718 84718 84715
R-squared
Firm RE/FE RE FE RE FE
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Technology Class FE Y Y Y
Year*Host Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Source Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Technology Class FE Y Y Y Y
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The statistical 
significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level; for regressions with firm RE and FE, std. errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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Table 1.7. Poisson. Full sample. Includes (Stock of years doing FDI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dummy for post-FDI years 0.385 0.259 0.226 0.100 0.247 0.074 0.009 -0.117
[0.218]* [0.189] [0.152] [0.151] [0.212] [0.177] [0.121] [0.124]
Dummy for firms doing FDI 0.551 -0.229 -0.462 0.722 -0.016 -0.148
[0.147]*** [0.131]* [0.132]*** [0.143]*** [0.122] [0.099]
Stock of years doing FDI 0.043 0.030 0.047 0.052 0.035 0.023 0.035 0.046
[0.018]** [0.014]** [0.015]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]* [0.015] [0.014]** [0.015]***
ln(Stock of Patents) -0.147 -0.241 0.644 -0.084 -0.166 0.740
[0.035]*** [0.031]*** [0.075]*** [0.035]** [0.029]*** [0.074]***
ln(Citations received by non-CEE) 0.570 0.617 0.600 0.499 0.523 0.497
[0.039]*** [0.034]*** [0.049]*** [0.037]*** [0.031]*** [0.046]***
Observations 84719 84718 84718 85282 84719 84718 84718 84715
R-squared
Firm-level RE/FE RE FE RE FE
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Technology Class FE Y Y Y
Year*Host Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Source Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year*Technology Class FE Y Y Y Y
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The statistical 
significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level; for regressions with firm RE and FE, std. errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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Table 1.8. The Bidders' Sample
Number of Companies:
Winning bidders: 47
Losing bidders: 89
Decomposition bv FDI starting year:
1990 2
1991 12
1992 6
1993 9
1994 1
1995 7
1996 4
1997 1
1998 3
1999 2
Decomposition of winners and 
losers bv home country:
Winners: 
AT 1
Losers:
ARG 1
CH 2 AT 2
DE 9 CA 3
FR 6 CH 4
GB 3 DE 16
HU 3 DK 1
KR 2 FI 2
NL 2 FR 19
SE 2 GB 8
US 17 IT 4
Total: 47 JP 3
KR 1
NL 1
SE 2
US 22
Total: 89
Table 1.9. The Bidders' Characteristics by Winner Status
Winners Losers (1 )-(2) t-stat
(1) (2) [p-value]
(1) Levels of Variables: 
Total citations received 11569.6 2748.3 4.3
(18058.9) (4901.4) [0.00]***
Total citations received from CEE 3.1 2.5 0.4
(6.1) (7.5) [0.71]
(2) Growth rates of Variables: 
Growth rate in total citations 15.1 10.2 0.81
before FDI bidding year (29.3) (32.2) [0.42]
Growth rate in total citations 3.9 8.2 1.43
after FDI bidding year (11.4) (24.5) [0.16]
Growth rate in CEE citations 0.5 0.3 1.35
before FDI bidding year (1.1) (1.1) [0.18]
Growth rate in CEE citations 3.4 0.6 3.35
after FDI bidding year (3.4) (1.4) [0.00]***
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Table 1.10. OLS without case dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(FDI firms) -0.060 -0.055 -0.060 -0.067 -0.059 -0.068
[0.030]** [0.032]* [0.030]** [0.033]** [0.033]* [0.033]**
D(post-FDI years) 0.016 0.069 -0.050 0.009
[0.026] [0.036]* [0.042] [0.039]
D(FDI firms)*D(post-FDI years) 0.195 0.043 0.191 0.045
[0.058]*** [0.067] [0.062]*** [0.070]
Stock of years doing FDI -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
[0.002] [0.003]** [0.009] [0.008]
D(FDI firms)*Stock of years doing FDI 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.018
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]**
In (Stock of Patents) 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.061 0.062 0.061
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.22
Year FE Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Case dummies
Firm dummies
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The 
statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 1.11. OLS with case dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(FDI firms) -0.034 -0.030 -0.033 -0.048 -0.041 -0.049
[0.029] [0.027] [0.029] [0.030] [0.027] [0.031]
D(post-FDI years) 0.034 0.073 -0.030 0.019
[0.026] [0.038]* [0.037] [0.036]
D(FDI firms)*D(post-FDI years) 0.180 0.039 0.185 0.045
[0.062]*** [0.070] [0.065]*** [0.071]
Stock of years doing FDI 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
[0.002] [0.003]* [0.009] [0.008]
D(FDI firms)*Stock of years doing FDI 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.018
[0.006]*** [0.007]** [0.006]*** [0.007]**
ln(Stock of Patents) 0.048 0.050 0.048 0.050 0.051 0.050
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]***
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.28
Year FE Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Case dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm dummies
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The 
statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 1.12. OLS with firm dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(FDI firms) -0.023 -0.018 -0.024 -0.019 -0.012 -0.020
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.038] [0.034] [0.038]
D(post-FDI years) 0.017 0.066 -0.044 0.010
[0.032] [0.042] [0.038] [0.038]
D(FDI firms)*D(post-FDI years) 0.196 0.040 0.194 0.043
[0.065]*** [0.070] [0.066]*** [0.072]
Stock of years doing FDI -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007
[0.002] [0.003]** [0.009] [0.009]
D(FDI firms)*Stock of years doing FDI 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.019
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
In (Stock of Patents) 0.053 0.063 0.054 0.047 0.049 0.049
[0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]***
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.32
Year FE Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Case dummies
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The 
statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 1.13. Poisson without case dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(FDI firms) -0.777 -0.590 -0.779 -0.472 -0.403 -0.479
[0.371]** [0.318]* [0.373]** [0.328] [0.300] [0.322]
D(post-FDI years) 0.082 0.509 -0.334 0.029
[0.255] [0.263]* [0.337] [0.313]
D(FDI firms)*D(post-FDI years) 0.954 0.379 0.747 0.199
[0.334]*** [0.421] [0.280]*** [0.459]
Stock of years doing FDI -0.021 -0.053 -0.062 -0.058
[0.018] [0.017]*** [0.059] [0.050]
D(FDI firms)*Stock of years doing FDI 0.079 0.070 0.080 0.068
[0.020]*** [0.027]*** [0.023]*** [0.037]*
In (Stock of Patents) 0.580 0.605 0.581 0.713 0.706 0.705
[0.060]*** [0.065]*** [0.064]*** [0.062]*** [0.061]*** [0.061]***
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.30
Year FE Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Case dummies
Firm dummies
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The 
statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 1.14. Poisson with case dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(FDI firms) 0.080 0.233 0.072 0.183 0.171 0.189
[0.238] [0.209] [0.239] [0.281] [0.258] [0.282]
D(post-FDI years) 0.235 0.542 -0.173 0.268
[0.217] [0.251]** [0.309] [0.322]
D(FDI firms)*D(post-FDI years) 0.654 0.210 0.574 -0.069
[0.246]*** [0.356] [0.265]** [0.372]
Stock of years doing FDI -0.006 -0.040 0.100 0.101
[0.018] [0.021]* [0.065] [0.064]
D(FDI firms)*Stock of years doing FDI 0.055 0.055 0.066 0.071
[0.018]*** [0.029]* [0.027]** [0.038]*
In (Stock of Patents) 0.589 0.632 0.589 0.738 0.735 0.733
[0.068]*** [0.076]*** [0.072]*** [0.091]*** [0.089]*** [0.089]***
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.41 0.41 0.41
Year FE Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Case dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm dummies
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The 
statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.
57
Table 1.15. Poisson with firm dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(FDI firms) 0.172 0.190 0.082 0.303 0.296 0.343
[0.467] [0.493] [0.454] [0.354] [0.379] [0.372]
D(post-FDI years) -0.045 0.351 -0.088 0.187
[0.204] [0.206]* [0.302] [0.295]
D(FDI firms)*D(post-FDI years) 0.503 0.080 0.392 -0.126
[0.254]** [0.327] [0.284] [0.373]
Stock of years doing FDI -0.053 -0.067 0.036 0.030
[0.027]** [0.027]** [0.057] [0.056]
D(FDI firms)*Stock of years doing FDI 0.047 0.052 0.059 0.068
[0.022]** [0.028]* [0.030]** [0.040]*
ln(Stock of Patents) 0.910 1.145 1.037 1.278 1.211 1.210
[0.099]*** [0.188]*** [0.178]*** [0.234]*** [0.215]*** [0.215]***
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.41 0.41 0.41
Year FE Y Y Y
Host Country FE Y Y Y
Source Country FE Y Y Y
Case dummies
Firm dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: The dependent variable is yearly citations received by each firm for the sample period 1978-2007. The 
statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Chapter 2
Relative Factor Endowments and 
International Portfolio Choice
2.1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of international portfolio choice based on cross-country 
differences in relative factor abundance. Countries have varying degrees of similarity 
in their factor endowment ratios, and are subject to aggregate productivity (country- 
specific) shocks. Risk averse consumers can insure against these shocks by investing 
their wealth at home and abroad. In a many-good setup, the change in factor prices 
after a positive shock in a particular country provides insurance to countries that have 
dissimilar factor endowment ratios, but is bad news for countries with similar factor 
endowment ratios, since their incomes will worsen. A positive productivity shock in 
a capital-abundant country, for example, will raise wage rates and reduce the return to 
capital, thus raising the incomes of labour-abundant countries and harming the incomes 
of other capital-abundant countries. Therefore countries with similar relative factor en­
dowments have got a stronger incentive to invest in one another for insurance purposes 
than countries with dissimilar endowments.
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Since our theoretical mechanism works through the effects of shocks on prices, 
the size of the country suffering the shock (and selling assets) is obviously a relevant 
consideration. In a generalization of our model, we study how endowment similarity 
interacts with country size. We show that under standard assumptions a country invests 
relatively more in a large-similar country than in a small-similar country, and relatively 
less in a large-dissimilar country than in a small-dissimilar country.
We first frame this intuition within a complete asset markets setup, in which coun­
tries trade Arrow-Debreu securities prior to the realization of uncertainty. However, 
our results do not hinge on many of the strong assumptions (Arrow-Debreu securities, 
complete asset markets, absence of home bias in portfolios) we make for tractability 
purposes. When we replace the Arrow-Debreu setup with a more ‘realistic’ financial 
side, the model yields predictions similar to those of our stylised model: we assume 
that countries can exchange claims on their GDPs before uncertainty is realised, and 
that investing abroad is subject to frictions that reduce the expected return of foreign 
assets. This obviously generates a home bias in the portfolios of countries. By the same 
line of reasoning as above, investing in countries with similar factor endowment ratios 
provides better insurance to a country with a home-biased portfolio.
Empirical evidence linking bilateral international portfolio investment positions to 
a proxy for relative factor endowment similarity supports our theory: after controlling 
for commodity and asset market frictions, the similarity of host and source countries 
in their relative capital-labour ratios is estimated to have a positive effect on the source 
country’s investment position in the host country. The magnitude of this effect depends 
on the host country’s GDP size, as larger countries have a stronger effect on prices.
Figures (2.1) and (2.2) show the relationship between bilateral equity investment 
(vertical axis) and similarity in factor endowments (horizontal axis), after controlling 
for country fixed effects and a set of standard controls.1 Figure (2.1) illustrates the case
1 Small countries are those with GDP below the median of our sample. The vertical axis is the residual 
of an OLS regression of bilateral equity investment on source- and host- country fixed effects, log of
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of small host countries: the similarity in factor endowments between the source and the 
host country does not seem to be a determinant of equity investment. The coefficient 
describing how changes in similarity affect equity investment is statistically insignifi­
cant and close to zero. In other words, for countries that cannot significantly change 
world relative prices, it does not seem to be relevant whether investor and recipient 
countries are similar or not. Figure (2.2) illustrates the case for large host countries. We 
obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient: conditional on the host country 
being relatively large, increases in factor endowment similarity lead to greater equity 
investment positions of the source country into the host country.
The idea that relative price changes may act as an insurance mechanism can be 
traced back to Cole and Obstfeld (1991), who argued this might explain the lack of 
international diversification of country portfolios. In their model, two completely spe­
cialised countries trade with each other in assets and outputs. But asset trade is almost 
redundant, as changes in the terms of trade after a shock act as insurance. By allow­
ing for many countries with varying degrees of factor endowment similarity, we turn 
this intuition into a theory of international portfolio choice. Unlike Cole and Obstfeld 
(1991), however, the emphasis of our model is not on the terms of trade, but on fac­
tor prices. Think of the standard indeterminacy problem of the production structures 
of countries in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with more goods than production factors. In 
that environment, it is impossible to talk about the terms of trade of countries, as the 
latter depend on the countries’ production structures. But the model does have instead 
unambiguous predictions about the behavior of factor prices, as these do not depend on 
production structures.
On the empirical side, an additional problem associated to terms of trade movements
bilateral trade, log of distance, common legal origin, common border, common language, colony dummy, 
regional trade agreement, correlation in GDP per capita, and a number of controls on equity markets and 
informational frictions. (See the controls used in Table 4, column (12).) The horizontal axis is the residual 
of an OLS regression of similarity in factor endowments (as we define in section 3 below) on the same 
set of control variables.
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is the difficulty to isolate the extent to which the comovement of the terms of trade of 
two countries is due to their similarity in factor endowment ratios from, among others, 
other common sources of comparative advantage; the occurrence of sectoral shocks; the 
correlation of aggregate productivity shocks; or exchange-rate movements. Working 
with proxies for factor endowment similarity, as we do, has the advantage to bypass 
these thorny issues, as it relates our endogenous variable, the portfolio positions of 
countries, to its ‘primitive’ determinant (according to our theory).
Our model consists of endowment economies as in Lucas (1982) and Svensson 
(1988). We allow countries to differ in their patterns of specialization according to 
their relative factor endowments, in a manner similar to Helpman and Razin (1978) 
and Helpman (1988). In comparison with these references, however, we only allow for 
country-specific aggregate productivity shocks in our analysis.
Our work adds to a growing body of research that attempts to explain the interna­
tional portfolio choices of countries. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) and Lane and Milesi- 
Ferretti (2008) have put emphasis on commodity trade costs; Martin and Rey (2000) 
and (2004) have focused on the role of size; and Portes and Rey (2005) have highlighted 
the importance of informational costs for investment flows.2 In comparison with these 
references, our paper highlights that bilateral portfolio positions not only depend on 
frictions between countries, but also on other country-pair specific characteristics: in 
our theory, even when bilateral frictions (and productivity shocks) are equally corre­
lated across all country-pairs is it possible that a country finds it optimal not to invest 
the same amount across countries.
Finally, the causal direction from asset trade to production specialization has been 
addressed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2003) and Koren (2005). Both argue that interna­
tional asset market integration favours specialisation in production, as it enables coun­
tries to insure against sector-specific productivity shocks. Our paper complements this
2For other approaches to international portfolio choice, see also Kraay and Ventura (2000) and (2002), 
Kraay et al. (2005), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and (2002).
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literature by pointing that causality might also run in the opposite direction: the real 
side of the economy also determines the international portfolio positions of countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses a stylised model 
linking production specialisation and international portfolio choice, and lays the ground 
for the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 discusses our empirical strategy, while Section 
2.4 discusses empirical evidence supportive of the model. Some concluding remarks 
follow. Finally, the appendix provides proofs and extensions of the model discussed in 
Section 2.2.
2.2 The Model
Let us denote countries with j  G J. Abusing notation, we will also use J  to de­
note the number of countries. Each country has got a representative consumer, who 
maximises expected utility E  [U (Cj)]. E  (•) is the expectations operator, and U (•) is 
the utility function, which we assume concave: U' (•) > 0, U" (•) < 0. C denotes
i i
consumption of a freely traded final composite good Cj = where Cij denotes
country j ’s consumption of freely traded intermediate good i , i  = 1 ,2.3 Preferences are 
identical across countries.
Technologies in the intermediate good industries are also identical across countries. 
We simplify by assuming linear production functions:4 y\j = AjKj and y2j = A jL j , 
where ytj denotes production of good i in country j , and Aj > 0 denotes country j 9s 
aggregate productivity level. We can think of AjKj and AjLj as production factors 
(capital and labour) measured in efficiency units. We assume perfect competition.
Each country has got exogenously given endowments of the two production factors,
3We constrain the elasticity of substitution to be equal or larger than one, so as to avoid ‘immiserizing 
growth’ issues. The Cobb-Douglas assumption is made here for tractability. As we discuss below, most 
of our results do not depend on it.
4In Appendix B we show that this assumption is harmless: a model with neoclassical production 
functions yields similar insights.
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which are internationally immobile and supplied inelastically. We distinguish two sub­
sets of countries, which we denote with k and I: Jk U Ji = J, Jk D Ji = 0 .5 For all 
k G 17/c, I G t//,
K h =  (j)k (1/2 +  / i ) , (2.1)
Lk =  <£*(1/2-^), (2-2)
K, = 0, (1/2 -  ju), (2.3)
Li = M 1/2 + m) • (2-4)
H G [0,1/2]. Notice this implies countries in Jk have their production structures biased 
towards good 1 relative to countries in J/. For the sake of simplicity, we assume an equal 
number of countries of each type: J* = Ji =  J / 2. The parameter <f>j > 0 is a scaling 
factor that allows for cross-country differences in size. We assume that the distributions 
of this scaling factor within Jk and Ji are symmetric.
Aj is ex-ante uncertain. We assume there are J  states of nature (denoted by s, s = 
1,..., J), each with identical probability ir (s) =  l / J .  States of nature are characterised 
by productivity level vectors A  (s) =  [A\ (s), A 2 (s) ,..., A j  (s)]. In particular,
A ( l )  = (1 +  a, 1,..., 1),
A  (2) -  (1,1 +  a , ..., 1),
A (J )  = (1,..., 1,1 +  a ) ,
where a > 0 is a constant.6
There is a world market in which agents can buy or sell Arrow-Debreu contingent
5To avoid confusion, we will spare the indices j  and j '  for when we refer to any country in J; we will 
use k and k' to refer to countries in and I and I' to refer to countries in J/.
6This is similar to what Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) and Martin and Rey (2000, 2004) assume in 
differents contexts.
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claims before uncertainty is realized. These claims have payoffs that depend on the 
state of nature: the owner (seller) of the security receives (pays) worth one unit of the 
final good if state 5 occurs, but nothing in any other state. We assume asset-market 
completeness.
2.2.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
Given the homotheticity of C  (•), relative demands depend only on relative prices. 
Goods market equilibrium is therefore determined by
yiw _  C\w _  C\j _  p2 _  w 0
where Ciw =  and yuv =  Ylje j y%j- Notice that pi is also the price of the
factor used in industry i when factors are measured in efficiency units. This can be 
seen from the equilibrium pricing conditions: p\ = r  and P2 = w,  where r  and w  
denote, respectively, the price of factor A K  and factor AL. Taking the final good as the 
numeraire,
where K w  =  J2jej A jK j  and L w  =  AjLj. Obviously, w / r  = K w /L w .  No­
tice that free trade and the pricing conditions imply factor price equalization across 
countries, as in Trefler (1993) and Ventura (1997).
y2\v C W  C2j Pi r  ’
w
r (2 .6)
(2.7)
2.2.2 Asset Market Equilibrium
Let Bj (5) denote country j ' s  net purchase of state-5 Arrow-Debreu securities. Let 
p  (5) denote the price of one such security. Each country’s utility maximization problem
can be expressed as
max (4) K  W  +  B, («)] (2.8)
s
subject to budget constraints Y2sp (s) Bj (5) — 0 and Cj (5) =  Yj (s) + Bj (s). Manip­
ulating the first order conditions for states s and s',
Market clearing requires . Bj (5) =  0 and Yw (s) =  Cj (s) for all s, where Yw 
denotes world production of the final good. Finally, we close the model with the no­
arbitrage condition Y1SP(S) = *•
Under log-utility (U (C) = In (C)), for example, the model yields the following 
equilibrium asset prices and portfolio choices:
The intuition underlying these expressions is rather straightforward. The price of a 
security p (s) depends negatively on the relative abundance of the final good in the cor­
responding state of nature. Regarding the first term on the right-hand side of equation 
(2.11), the term in square brackets reflects the fact that the size of country j ’s portfo­
lio will be larger the higher its average output relative to the world’s output. That is, 
a country’s wealth and its consumption posssibilities are a positive function of its ex­
pected output. The term Yw (s) captures the fact that countries will be able to consume 
more in states of nature with high world output. As for the second term, country j ’s pur­
chase of state-s security is inversely related to country j ’s state-s final-good output due
ir (s) U' [Cj (s)] _  v («) (2.9)
7T (S') U' [Cj (s ')] P (S ') ’
(2.10)
(2.11)
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to the representative agent’s interest in smoothing consumption across states of nature.
2.2.3 International Portfolio Choice
We now discuss the effects of ex-ante uncertainty in the goods markets on the port­
folio choices of countries. To build up intuition, we discuss the model’s implications 
on endowment similarity and country size separately. We start by assuming that all 
countries are of equal size. We then relax this assumption.
The Role of Endowment Similarity
Let us initially simplify the model by assuming away country-size effects: 0 • =  1 
for all j  G J. Define a country’s gross domestic product as Yj = rAjKj +  wAjLj. 
Without loss of generality, consider country fcG 4  In states of nature in which any 
country I G Ji has got a high productivity level, country fc’s GDP improves due to a 
price effect, whereas states of nature in which any country k' G Jk, kf ^  k, has got a 
high productivity draw bring about a negative effect on country k ’s income through the 
resulting change in factor prices. Country k ’s GDP is highest when its own productivity 
level is high: the negative effect of the change in factor prices is smaller than the positive 
effect on output induced by the productivity increase. Appendix A shows
Yk (fc) > ~YW > Yk (I) > Yk (V ), (2.12)
where Y\y =  ]T\ Yj (s) is constant across states of nature due to the model’s symme­
try. A country therefore has got a stronger incentive to insure against states of nature 
in which countries with similar factor endowment ratios have got a high productivity 
level. And the obvious provider of such insurance is the country that experiences high 
productivity: the model’s symmetry implies Yk> (kf) > jY w > Yt (k') > Yk (k')?
7Notice that the model points to a negative correlation between the incomes of similar countries. 
However, this is not due to a negative correlation between productivity shocks as a negative correla-
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Given the model’s symmetry and the absence of aggregate uncertainty, we conjec­
ture the equilibrium exhibits full insurance. It is easy to find asset prices, consumption 
and portfolio allocations such that all the equilibrium conditions hold and countries 
manage to fully insure: p (s) = 1 /J , Cj (s) =  jY w ,  and
for all j, s. It is worth noting that this result not only holds for log-utility, but for any 
concave utility function.
We can now characterise the international portfolios of countries. Consider state 
of nature k'. From (2.12) and (2.13), Bk (kf) > Bi (k') >  0 > Bk> (k ') for p > 0:
implies Bk (k ') > Bk {I) > 0 > Bk (k): the share in country fc’s international portfolio 
is larger for assets issued by a country with a similar factor endowment ratio than for 
assets issued by the other type of country. In Appendix A we show Bk (k') — Bi (k') =  
Yi (k') — Yk (kr) = > 0. Thus, for p  =  0, Bk (k') =  Bi (A/): when relative factor
endowment differences are small, countries k and I do not differ in their investment 
decisions regarding country k'. For low values of p, all countries are very similar in their 
relative factor endowments. Thus, a shock to any particular country will hardly have 
an important effect on factor prices; in this case, any two countries will take identical 
positions in any third country.8
Define the following elasticity:
tion between real outputs (that is, outputs measured at constant prices) would show, but to the effect of 
country-specific shocks on world prices.
8For p — 0 (or for e infinite) our model is similar to the one-good standard textbook treatment. See, 
for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), chapter 5.
Bj (s) = j Y w -  Yj (»), (2.13)
country k' sells insurance against state k' to all other countries. The model’s symmetry
Bk(k ' ) -Bk(l)
(2.14)
Bl Bk
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P measures the responsiveness of country fc’s portfolio position to a rise in endowment 
similarity from country-pair kl to country-pair kk'. It is easy to show that the elasticity 
P rises with (i\ d(3/dfi > 0.9 As (i increases, differences in factor endowment similarity 
between country pairs become more pronounced; since in this case the effects of shocks 
on relative prices become stronger, country k invests a larger share of its wealth in 
country k ', and a smaller one in country I.
Finally, one can also show that for /z =  1/2, Bi (kf) — 0 < B k (k'); or, by symmetry, 
Bk (I) — 0 < Bk (kf): with complete specialisation and a unitary elasticity of substitu­
tion, relative prices offer complete insurance against shocks in countries with different 
specialisation patterns. However, this result is particular to the Cobb-Douglas assump­
tion on preferences: when we simulate the model with Cj = 
where e > 1 is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between goods 1 and 2, the model 
yields a positive Bi (kf), as higher elasticities of substitution imply a lower response of 
prices to productivity shocks. The rest of our results, however, are robust to values of e 
larger than one.10
In this two-good two-factor model there is an obvious equivalence between factor 
endowment similarity, production structure similarity, and terms of trade correlations. 
As we discuss in Appendix B, however, this is a particular feature of the 2x2 model that 
breaks down if there are more goods than factors; in this case, the production structures 
of countries and thus their terms of trade are undetermined, but the implications of our 
model for factor prices remain unaltered.11
The Role of Size
We now allow for differences in country size, as we assumed initially. For tractabil- 
ity purposes, we consider the log-utility case (see equations (2.10) and (2.11)). For a
Expressions for (k') and Bk (I) can be found in Appendix A.
10We assumed J  =  4 and a =  0.02, and allowed e and fi to vary in the ranges (1,16] and [1/16,1/2], 
respectively. The corresponding results are available upon request.
11 In our empirical work below, we control for country-pair similarity in production structures anyway.
(Cij) £ +  (C2j)
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given level of endowment similarity, we study how the host country’s size affects the 
positions of investor countries. For this purpose, we compare the portfolio choices of 
two investor countries, k E Jk and I E Ji, with the same size ((f)k = </>z) across host 
countries k \  k" E Jk with different sizes (<j>k, < 4>k»).
From (2.10) and (2.11),
p (AO [Bk (AO -  B t (k')\ =
22s' lYW (S )]
r, (k') -  Yk (k'y 
Yw (k')
(2.15)
where k' € Jk- The term ]T]s, [Yw (s')] is constant. Hence, all we need to analyse is 
the behaviour of the term
Y,m -Ykw  i 
"  1V(fc') = 2 { L ‘ ~ L k ) Lw (k') K w (k') J
> 0, (2.16)
as Li > Lk, and Lw (k ') < K w  (k') for all k' E  J*. (See Appendix A.) Hence, 
p (k') [Bk (kr) — Bi (fc')] > 0. This result simply restates the role of endowment simi­
larity discussed above.
The inequality p (k") [Bk (k") -  Bt (k")] > p (kf) [Bk (k') -  B t (kf)] holds if Lw\k,f) -
1 > ~~ kt •/)• A sufficient condition for this isK w (k”) ^  Lw {k') K w {kf)
\  -  fi2)  a2 < , (2.17)
4 /  <Pk» Yk'
Two opposite effects are at stake here. A shock to a larger country has a stronger 
effect on relative factor prices, leading to a larger difference in the security purchases 
by countries k and 1. Country k will want to take a larger position to insure against the 
negative effect of the shock on its income, whereas country I will take a smaller position 
due to the implicit insurance it receives through the change in relative prices. (We call 
this the quantity effect, since it relates to the term Bk (k") — Bi (k").) At the same time, 
a shock to a larger country raises world output by more in the corresponding state of
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nature, leading to a lower price of the associated security. (We call this the price effect, 
since it relates to the term p (k").)
The sufficient condition (2.17) makes sure that the quantity effect is stronger than 
the price effect. Notice that, for given values of 0., a higher p implies a larger quantity 
effect, as the productivity shock on the large country will translate into a large effect 
on relative factor prices. As p decreases, the highest a compatible with the sufficient 
condition decreases: the less dissimilar countries k and I, the smaller the quantity effect. 
This sufficient condition is very weak, as the term on the right-hand side of equation 
(2.17) is larger than one; the term in parenthesis on the left-hand side is smaller than 
one; and realistic values for a, the percentage increase in productivity experienced by a 
country in the event of a shock, are far less than one.
2.2.4 International Portfolio Choice without Arrow-Debreu Secu­
rities
The model above delivers the key intuitions that explain our empirical findings: 
other things equal, countries with more similar (dissimilar) relative factor endowments 
invest more (less) in one another due to better (worse) insurance possibilities. However, 
many of the modeTs assumptions and implications are at odds with reality. First of all, 
most real-life assets are not Arrow-Debreu. Moreover, international consumption cor­
relations are lower than output correlations, which suggests that actual international risk 
sharing is far from the complete asset market benchmark. (See Backus et al. (1992).) 
Finally, countries tend to invest most of their wealth in their own domestic assets. (See 
French and Poterba (1991).)
In Appendix C, we show that a similar model with a more realistic financial side also 
predicts a positive relationship between factor endowment similarity and international 
portfolio choice. Assume investors can buy ownership claims on countries’ GDPs rather
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than Arrow-Debreu securities. Assume also that holding foreign assets is subject to 
frictions. This creates a home bias in each country’s portfolio, and leads in turn, within 
the portfolio share that is invested in foreign assets, to a bias towards assets issued 
by countries with similar relative factor endowments. This is due to the fact that the 
latter provide a home-biased portfolio with better insurance for the same reasons we 
discussed above.
2.2.5 Sectoral Shocks
A detailed analysis of the implications of sectoral shocks is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, for comparison purposes, we find it worthwhile sketching the 
investment patterns arising in our setup in the presence of sectoral shocks rather than 
country-specific shocks.12 Modeling sectoral shocks is rather straightforward in the 
two-good, two-factor version of the model: consider production functions y\j =  A k K j  
and y2j = A^Lj, where A k  and A l  are now sector-specific productivity levels. Define 
A  (s) =  [Ak ( 5 ) , A l  (5)] and consider states of nature A (1) =  [1 +  a, 1] and A  (2) =  
[1,1 4- a] with probabilities n (1) =  7r (2) =  1/2. The rest of assumptions of our 
benchmark model remain the same.
Notice that the incomes of countries with similar production structures are now 
perfectly correlated. Hence there would be no need for them to invest in one another. 
Regarding the investment flows between dissimilar countries, a number of cases arise 
that depend on the values of /x and e:
1. fi = 0, e > 1: When all countries have got identical factor endowment ratios 
(/x =  0), sectoral shocks do not lead to any portfolio investment, as the incomes 
of all countries are perfectly correlated. (Recall that with country-specific shocks 
there would be some portfolio investment in this case: J  — 1 countries would take
12 In a completely different setup, Campa and Fernandes (2006) argue that country and industry shocks 
are of comparable size.
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the same position in the country suffering the shock.)
2. j i  e  (0,1/2], e = 1: It is easy to show that with a Cobb-Douglas final good 
aggregator countries with different factor endowment ratios need not invest in 
one another for insurance purposes. This is because relative prices offer all the 
necessary insurance. (With country-specific shocks instead, countries with sim­
ilar relative factor endowments would want to invest in one another, as we saw 
above.)
3. /i G (0,1/2], £ > 1 : This is arguably the most interesting case. For a posi­
tive n, as e rises relative prices become less responsive to shocks. This implies 
that countries with different factor endowment ratios would invest more in one 
another as e grows. (With country-specific shocks instead, as e grows, the invest­
ment positions between dissimilar countries catch up with those between similar 
countries: the investment positions between dissimilar countries rises, as relative 
price changes offer little insurance, whereas the investment positions between 
similar countries falls, as less insurance is needed.)
In general, the crisp predictions of the two-good, two-factor model fail to hold when 
there are more goods than factors due to the indeterminacy of production structures. In 
any case, in our empirical work we use a proxy for similarity in production structures so 
as to control, among other things, for the effects of sectoral shocks on portfolio choice.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We estimate an equation that relates the amount invested by source country S  in host 
country H  to a proxy for relative factor-endowment similarity between countries S  and 
H , and other controls, such as proxies for frictions in commodity and asset markets, as
73
well as host- and source-country fixed effects. Consider the following expression:
B sh =  <?DDsHZ as zBuSH, (2.18)
where B sh denotes country S ’s portfolio investment in country H; a  denotes parame­
ters; Dsh denotes a proxy for factor-endowment similarity between countries S  and H; 
Zsh stands for a country-pair control; and ush denotes an error term assumed to be 
statistically independent of the variables on the right-hand side of the equation.13
Notice we are allowing for a non-constant elasticity of country S ’s portfolio invest­
ment in country H , B sh , with respect to the similarity proxy Ds h ' equation (2.18) 
yields an elasticity qldDsh , which is increasing in Dsh in the same way that the re­
sponsiveness P of the source-country’s portfolio positions rises with the similarity of its 
factor endowment ratio to that of the host country. (See equation (2.14).)
2.3.1 Estimation
Apart from using the OLS and Tobit estimators to estimate equation (2.18), we also 
use the Poisson estimator. While equations like (2.18) are usually log-linearised and es­
timated by OLS, this practice may be inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, B sh 
can be zero, in which case log-linearisation is unfeasible. (This problem is often solved 
by adding one to all observations before taking logs.14) Second, as Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro (2005) have recently pointed out, under heteroskedasticity, the expected value 
of the log-linearised error will in general be correlated with the regressors, and OLS 
will therefore be inconsistent. This is because the non-linear transformation changes 
the properties of the error term, as the conditional expectation of In ush depends on the 
shape of the conditional distribution of ush- Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2005) propose
,3This is similar to the regression equation in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
14The Tobit estimator is also often used when the dependent variable takes zero and positive values. 
(Again, a one is added to all observations before taking logs.) However, in the presence of fixed effects, 
the Tobit estimator may be biased due to the incidental parameters problem.
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the following example as an illustration of this problem: assume ush is distributed log­
normal, with E  (uSH \ DSH, ZSh ) =  1 and variance a2SH = f  (DSH, ZSH).15 In uSH 
will thus be distributed normal, with E  (Iuush I Ds h , Zsh ) = In (1 +  which 
is a function of the regressors.
In the face of this problem, it is more appropriate to estimate equation (2.18) in its 
non-linear form. After assessing the properties of a number of alternative estimators, 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2005) propose the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood es­
timator (often used for count data) for this task. This estimator turns out to be consistent 
under relatively weak assumptions (mainly that the model is well specified), and also 
provides a natural way to deal with zero values, as no logarithmic transformation is 
necessary for its implementation.
2.3.2 Accounting for Country Size
Other things equal, a larger country will have a stronger effect on world prices. 
Thus, countries should invest more in a larger country with similar relative endowments 
than in a smaller country; and countries should invest less in a larger country with 
dissimilar endowment ratios than in a smaller country. Country similarity should not 
have a positive effect on a country’s portfolio at all if the host country cannot affect 
world prices.
To capture this intuition, we classify host countries into two categories: ‘small’ 
(those with host GDP’s below the median of the sample) and ‘large’ (those with host 
GDP’s above the median of the sample). We then consider a separate coefficient on Dsh 
for each of these two categories, and test the null hypothesis that the two coefficients 
are equal. We expect the coefficient for large host countries to be larger.
15The characteristics of the data suggest ush will be heteroskedastic. Since B sh  is non-negative, 
when its conditional expectation approaches zero, the probability of Bsh  being positive and its condi­
tional variance must also tend to zero. When the conditional expectation of B sh  is large instead, it is 
possible to observe a greater dispersion, as Bsh can now deviate from its conditional expectation in 
either direction.
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As a robustness check, we interact Dsh with the host country’s log-GDP, ln(Y//). 
The type of equation we estimate in this case has got the following form:
B sh =  eaDDsHeaYHYH)eai[DsHHYH)]ZsfjUSH- (2.19)
Provided that Dsh takes positive values when countries are similar and negative values 
when countries are dissimilar,16 we expect this interaction coefficient to be positive. Let 
us consider the cases of similar and dissimilar country pairs separately to discuss this. 
Countries invest more in each other when they have similar factor-endowment ratios, 
i.e. Dsh > 0. The greater the size of the host country, the greater the investment for a 
given level of similarity. Alternatively, two countries with dissimilar factor-endowment 
ratios (Dsh < 0) want to invest less in one another because of the insurance mechanism 
relative prices provide. The greater the size of the host country, the more it influences 
world relative prices, and the more insurance it provides thereby to the source country. 
Therefore, less investment is required in a host country with dissimilar endowment 
ratios if it is a large country.
2.3.3 Variables and Data
Our dependent variable B sh is taken from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Invest­
ment Survey (CPIS).17 For each participating country, the CPIS reports data on foreign 
asset holdings by residence of the issuer. These include both equity and debt, but the 
CPIS has made an effort to exclude foreign direct investment (FDI) from these data.18 
Following the spirit of our model, we use foreign equity holdings as our dependent 
variable. Data have been released for end-1997 (with only 29 source countries), and
,6The explanation on how D sh  is constructed can be found in section 3.3.
17See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for a detailed description of the dataset, as well as a discussion 
of its potential shortcomings.
See Appendix D for a detailed description of variables and sources.
18 The CPIS considers an investment as FDI (as opposed to portfolio investment) if  the foreign investor 
owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power.
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then yearly from end-2001 (with 67 source countries) to end-2006. According to Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), for those countries that participated in the 1997, 2001 and 
2002 surveys, there is considerable persistence in bilateral equity holdings. We focus 
exclusively on the 2002 edition. Table (2.1) reports some information for the countries 
in our sample.
Our measure of factor-endowment similarity between countries S  and H  is based 
on the following variable:
The source for aggregate capital-labour ratios is Caselli and Feyrer (2007).19 Notice 
that dsH decreases with the similarity of countries and is always positive. For the rea­
sons discussed above, we need our proxy for factor endowment similarity (i) to rise
first compute d'SH — max (dsfi) — dsH- Then, we finally rearrange our variable to
pret Dsh > 0 as the country pair being similar in terms of factor-endowment ratios. 
Equivalently, Dsh < 0 implies the two countries have dissimilar ratios.21
We proxy for commodity and asset trade frictions with distance, and dummies 
for country pairs in which countries participate in the same regional trade agreement, 
share a border, the same currency, a common language, a colonial relationship (past
,9Capital is constructed with the perpetual inventory method from time series data on real investment 
with PWT 6.1 data using a depreciation rate of 0.06. Labor is defined as the number of workers also 
using PWT 6.1. It is obtained as RGDPCH*POP/RGDPWOK, where RGDPCH is real GDP per capita 
computed with the chain method. See Caselli (2005) and Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for more details.
20Normalising D sh  by the mean rather than the median leads to very similar results.
21Using a measure of country similarity based on factor endowments has the additional advantage that 
it is less likely to suffer from endogeneity problems than a measure of production specialization. Recall 
that the results by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) and Koren (2005) point out a causation channel from 
international asset market integration to production specialization.
(2.20)
with similarity, and (ii) to take positive values when countries S  and H  are ‘similar 
enough’ and negative values when they are ‘dissimilar enough’. For this purpose, we
Dsh — d'sH ~  med(dfSH), where med(d'SH) is the sample median of d'SH.20 We inter-
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or present), and a common legal origin. The source for these data is Glick and Rose 
(2001), but for the common legal origin dummy, which is taken from La Porta et al. 
(2003).
Finally, we use a proxy for similarity in the production structures of countries. For 
any pair of countries j ,  f ,  this variable is constructed as
E 'j?  — 2 — ^   ^ ( Si j  — S i j f ) , (2 .21)
i
where s*j denotes country j ’s export share of good i to the world.22 Ejj> is always 
positive and grows with the similarity of the production structures of countries. Data on 
manufacturing exports are obtained from the World Trade Flows Database (see Feenstra 
e ta l  (2005)).
2.4 Results
Tables (2.2)-(2.3) report our estimation results from three different econometric esti­
mators (OLS, Poisson, and Tobit) and two ways of dealing with host-country size (first, 
the division of the sample into two groups of host countries based on GDP size; second, 
the interaction of the country similarity proxy Dsh with the host-country’s ln(GDP)).23
Table (2.2) reports results obtained without including any control variables but 
source- and host-country fixed effects; Table (2.3) reports results from regressions in­
cluding a group of standard controls (related to distance and other trade barriers, cul­
tural and institutional characteristics, etc.) and a proxy for similarity in production 
structures.24
22We use exports by country-industry rather than production, because the former is available at fine 
levels of disaggregation for many more countries than the latter. The correlation between "similarity in 
exports" and "similarity in K/L ratio" is around 0.16.
23All our tables present results with standard errors clustered at the source country level, i.e. investor 
country level.
24To control for outliers, in Tables 3-8 we eliminate single observations that account for more than 
30% of the total equity invested or received by a country. This reduces the sample by around 5%. We
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In each of Tables (2.2)-(2.3) we present eight regressions. Columns (l)-(4) present 
results for the host countries separated by a dummy variable based on size, while 
columns (5)-(8) rather present regressions using the interaction term. Column (1) cor­
responds to the Tobit estimation, column (2) to the OLS estimation with zeroes; finally, 
columns (3)-(4) corresponds to the Poisson estimation without and with zeroes, respec­
tively. For the regressions based on the interaction term, the same sequential pattern 
applies.
In the remaining tables we perform a number of robustness checks to our main 
specification presented in Table (2.3). In Tables (2.4)-(2.5) we only present results for 
the Poisson estimator, since this is our preferred econometric specification.25 Table 
(2.4) presents results for the whole sample, but including additional control variables 
that will be described in the next paragraph. Table (2.5) redoes the same regressions as 
in Table (2.4) by looking at relatively rich source and host countries. The World Bank 
classification for the year 2000 divides countries into four categories: (1) High Income;
(2) Upper Middle Income; (3) Lower Middle Income; (4) Low Income. We restrict our 
attention to countries included in categories (1) and (2).26
In each of Tables (2.4)-(2.5) we present twelve regressions, the first six using the 
dummy separation of host countries, and the last six using the interaction of the log 
of host GDP. Compared to the regressions in Table (2.3), columns (l)-(2) additionally 
include the log of bilateral trade (as an additional proxy for trade frictions)27 and GDP 
growth correlations, which proxy for productivity shock correlations across countries, 
that may affect the portfolio positions of countries.
Columns (3)-(4) additionally include two financial variables that may influence asset 
holdings in an incomplete financial market scenario.The two variables are the correla­
also tried (i) eliminating single observations accounting for more than 70% of the total equity invested or 
received by a country, and (ii) including all outliers. Results are comparable to the ones we report.
25Tables for OLS and Tobit estimators provide similar results, and are available upon request.
26That is, we remove Colombia, Peru, Indonesia, and Thailand from the sample.
27The source for these data is once again Glick and Rose (2001).
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tion in stock returns and the correlation between host-country stock market returns and 
source-country GDP growth, which takes into account the role of the host country’s 
stock market in potentially hedging against the source country’s output fluctuations. 
These two variables, based on data between 1980 and 1996, were constructed by Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), who are confident that the endogeneity of financial corre­
lations to . the size of bilateral financial holdings is not a concern, since most foreign 
equity investment took place since the mid-1990s.
Finally, columns (5)-(6) repeat the same procedure after including two additional 
variables that proxy for informational frictions: the difference in time zone across coun­
tries (to proxy for informational similarities) and the similarity in the log of GDP per 
capita (constructed in a manner similar to Dsh)- For the regressions based on the inter­
action term, the same sequential pattern applies.
2.4.1 Benchmark Correlation
As mentioned above, in the results of Table (2.2) we omit any control variables. In 
columns (l)-(4) we divide the sample in two parts based on the host country’s GDP 
level. We allow each subsample to have its own coefficient, and no interaction terms 
are included. We always test the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for the two sub­
samples. In columns (5)-(8), we interact the similarity in capital-labour ratios with 
In (GDP).
In columns (l)-(4), we observe that the coefficient related to large host countries 
is always greater than the one for small countries, even though the difference is not 
always statistically significant. At this preliminary stage of the empirical analysis, we 
can already expect that most of the action will be concentrated in large host countries. 
In columns (5)-(8) we observe that for all three econometric specifications (Tobit, OLS, 
Poisson) our interaction term is positive. Except for column (5), the estimated coef­
ficient is also statistically significant. However, since the coefficient on the similarity
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of capital-labour ratio is rather negative (and usually statistically significant), we can­
not conclude that the total effect is positive and statistically significant, as our theory 
predicts, until we do not calculate the value of the combined coefficient, hereafter CC. 
This coefficient will depend on the host country’s GDP size, and is determined in the 
following way:
CC  =  coef[DSH] +  In (GDP)  * coef[DSH * In (GDP)],
where coef[DsH] denotes the coefficient corresponding to endowment similarity, and 
coef[Dsn* In (GDP)] denotes the coefficient corresponding to the interaction between 
factor-endowment similarity and host-country size. This combined coefficient becomes 
positive well before the mean and median of \n(GDP)  in our sample.28
2.4.2 Controls
In Table (2.3) we include controls related to international trade frictions. We also 
include the similarity in exports as a proxy for the similarity in production structures. 
In columns (l)-(4), where we divide the sample of host countries by their GDP into two 
groups, the coefficient for small host countries is never significant, while the coefficient 
for host large countries is always positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Additionally, the null hypothesis of same coefficient values is always rejected at the 
1% significance level. In columns (5)-(8), where we interact our factor-endowment 
similarity variable with the log of host-country GDP, the interaction term is always 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level as our theory predicts.
For simplicity, let us address the economic significance by examining the OLS 
columns of Table (2.3). In order to assess the effect of country similarity on equity 
positions, we first focus on the separation of host countries into two groups. For large
28The mean and median of In (GDP) in our sample are 26.8 and 26.6, respectively.
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host countries, an increase in the index of factor-endowment similarity by 10% leads to 
an increase in equity positions towards the host country by 2.6% under a similarity in­
dex value of 0.25.29 Similarly, when looking at the equations that interact the similarity 
index with the log of host country GDP, we find that an increase in the index of factor- 
endowment similarity by 10% leads to an increase in equity positions towards the host 
country by 1.7% when we are at the mean of host country GDP, i.e. In (GDP)  =  26.85, 
and the similarity index takes the value of 0.25.30 When the size of the host country in­
creases to In (GDP) = 28, a typical value for a large host country, then the increase in 
equity positions is of 2.7%, very much in accordance with the value obtained under the 
separation of host countries into two groups. Additionally, the combined coefficient, 
previously defined as CC, is positive for values of In (GDP)  above 24.8.31
2.4.3 Robustness Checks 
Full Sample: Additional Controls
In Table (2.4) we allow for a number of additional controls described previously. 
For the regressions with the dummy separation, columns (l)-(6), we always find that 
the coefficient for large countries is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for the small host countries is never significant. Ad­
ditionally, we test for equality of coefficients and always reject the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients between subsamples.32 For the regressions with the interaction term 
with log of host GDP (columns (7)-(12)), the interaction term is always positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. And as in previous regressions, the combined
29The equation for the non-constant elasticity is: =  mdD s h • Therefore, under D sh  =
0.25 and a coefficent a o  =  1.047, we obtain an elasticity value of 0.26.
30The equation for the non-constant elasticity is: =  (c*d +  <*i In (Yh )) D s h • Therefore,
under D sh  =  0.25, In (Yh ) =  26.8, and coefficents old =  —8.169, a j  =  0.33, we obtain an elasticity 
value of 0.17.
31 See "GDP positive combined coefficient" at the bottom of the table.
32See "HO: coefiKL_small]=coef[KL_large]" at the bottom of the table.
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coefficient becomes positive and statistically significant at the 5% level well before the 
mean and median of In (GDP)  in our sample.
Concerning the role played by the additional control variables, we find that the 
coefficient of the log of bilateral trade is positive and usually statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Two variables that are about to be significant at the 10% level are the 
GDP per capita correlations and the informational variable on time difference across 
countries.
High-income Countries (World Bank)
In Table (2.5) we restrict the sample to countries that belong to the categories High 
Income or Upper Middle Income, based on the World Bank classification for the year 
2000. The main message remains unchanged: similarity in capital-labour ratios matters 
for equity holdings in the way proposed by our theoretical framework, and this effect 
becomes stronger as the size of the host country increases. Additionally, the values of 
the coefficients are similar to the ones with the full sample. For this reason, we can 
conclude that our results are not driven by developing countries.
The Role of Financial Development
As can be seen from Table (2.1), the stock market capitalisation, a proxy for fi­
nancial development, differs substantially across countries in our sample. It could be 
that our results are mainly driven by highly financially developed countries investing 
in similar countries, especially under the reasonable claim that capital-abundance and 
financial development are positively correlated.
To make sure that our results are not driven by a subsample of highly developed 
investor countries, in Table (2.6) we divide the sample of investor countries by the me­
dian of stock market capitalization averaged over the period 1985-2000. Columns (1),
(3), (5), and (7) present results for the subsample of investor countries with financial de­
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velopment above the median of our sample, while the remaining columns show results 
for the ones below the median. Columns (l)-(2) control for the sample variables as in 
Table (2.3). In columns (3)-(4) we add the variable proxying for the similarity in the 
production structure, while in columns (5)-(6) we additional control for the log of bilat­
eral trade. Finally, in the last two columns we also control for: correlation in GDP per 
capita growth, the two financial correlations previously used, and the two information 
controls (log of time difference and similarity in real GDP per capita).
Throughout all eight specifications based on the full sample, we observe that our 
theory holds independently of the investor’s level of financial development. The coef­
ficient on the dummy for large host countries is always positive and statistically sig­
nificant at the 1% level, while the dummy for small host countries is never statisti­
cally significant. Interestingly, in terms of the significance of control variables, the role 
played by stock market correlation seems to be much more important than in previous 
regressions.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Recent explanations of the international portfolio positions of countries are based 
on commodity and asset trade frictions: a country invests more in countries with which 
goods and assets are traded more freely. This paper complements these theories by 
pointing out that international portfolio decisions are also influenced by the similarity 
of the capital-labour ratios of countries.
In particular, we introduce a model of international portfolio choice in which coun­
tries have varying degrees of similarity in their factor endowment ratios, and are subject 
to country-specific productivity shocks. The change in relative factor prices after a pos­
itive shock in a particular country provides insurance to countries that have dissimilar 
factor endowment ratios, but harms countries with similar ones. Therefore, countries
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with similar relative factor endowments have got a stronger incentive to invest in one 
another for insurance purposes than countries with dissimilar endowments. Since the 
effect of a shock on relative prices depends on the size of the country, in a generalisation 
of our model we study how factor endowment similarity interacts with country size.
Our empirical work lends support to this hypothesis: the similarity in relative capital- 
labour ratios has got a positive effect on the source country’s investment position in the 
host country. The magnitude of this effect depends on the host country’s GDP size, as 
larger countries have a stronger impact on world prices.
Future work should try to elucidate whether and how other sources of comparative 
advantage also affect the international portfolio decisions of countries.
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2.A Appendix A: Proofs
2.A.1 The Role of Endowment Similarity
Assume 0 • =  1 for all j  e  J.
Proof 1: Yk (l) > Y k {kr)
Since r ( l ) = w  (k') > r (k') =  w (/),
Yk(i) =  Q + ^ V » + Q - m W ) >
> G+G r  ^ +(s ~ Gw  ^ = Y k  ^  ■
Tedious algebra yields
Yk (I) -  Yk (k’) =  (2.22)
Yw
Proof 2: ±YW > Yk (I)
Since we have factor price equalization (a la Trefler (1993)), we can find Yw from 
the integrated equilibrium:
Yw — Yw (/) - [yiw (012 [vzw (012 —
=  ( ^ K k + +  aK\ \ 2 ( j L k + +  a h  “ .
Concerning Yk (/),
Yk (l) = r ( l ) K k + w ( l ) L k =
_ 1 /  \ L k +  ^ Li +  a h  \  2
“ 2 [ i K k  + lKt  +  aKi )
V2W (0 
Uiw (0 .
Kk + k Viw (0 
,V2W (0 .
u  =
K k +
i K k  + ^Kt  + aKt
o^k +  i h  +  a h
Lk
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Tedious algebra yields
Yw -  JYk (I) =  V  (a2 +  Ja) LkL, = Y ^ 1 (a2 +  Ja)  Q -  A  > 0. (2.23)
Proof 3: Yk (k ) > j Yw
Recall ±YW = (s) =  Since ±YW > Yk (l) > Yk (k'), it
follows that Yk (k) > yTV*
Proof 4: B k (kf) , B, {kf) , B v (k')
From (2.1)-(2.4), (2.13), and (2.23),
Bk (I) = B, (k ') =  Y ^ 1 ( j  +  a )  ( \  -  A  > 0. (2.24)
As for B k (k '), from (2.13), (2.22), and (2.24),
Bk ( k ' ) = Y w i > o. (2.25)
Asset market clearing and equations (2.24) and (2.25) yield
Bw (kf) = - Y , - lw 7  +  a j V 4 _ / i  ) ( J - l ) + 2aV ( 2 _ 1 < 0.
2.A.2 The Role of Size
We allow for cross-country differences in size. We assume that the distributions of 
the scaling factor ^  within Jk and J/ are symmetric.
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Proof 5: Lw  (k') < Kw (kf)
K w (k')
L w ( k ' )  =
X] ( 2 + w  + ( o _  ^ ( 2 + ^
fceJfc '  '  leJi ' '  '
X] + f^c'a ( 2 +  ^) ’
fceJfe '  '
( 5  -/*) +X^< ( \ +,j) +^,a ( 5
fcejfe '  '  leJt  ^ '
= s  ^ +^ ,a Q ~ ^ )< ^  w  •
Proof 6 : Sufficient Condition for p(k") [Bk (k") — Bi (&")] > p(k') [Bk (k') -
K w (kf) -  K w (kf) =  (<j>k„ -  0*,) a ( i +M) > 0 ,  
Lw (k f) — Lw (A/) =  {4>w — <f>k>) a — p )  > 0. 
Notice p (k") [Bk (k") -  Bi (*")] -  p (k') [Bk (kf) -  B, (fc')l >  0 if
1 1 i i
1
£1£ L w (kf) K w (kf)\
K w ( k " ) - K w (kf)1 rL w (L ")-L w (L ') l
K w ( k f ) K w (kf) J Lw (kf) Lw (k1)
> 0,
which is equivalent to
\  +  P EfceJfc +  $k"a  (2 +  &)] EfceJfc $ k +  (2 +  ^ ) ]
5 -  A* [EkeJ* 4>k +  (5 -  ^)] [EifeeJt & +  0*'a ( \  ~  A*)]
Condition (2.17) is sufficient condition for this inequality to hold.
(2.26)
(2.27)
Bi (k1)}
(2.28)
(2.29)
(2.30)
(2.31)
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2.B Appendix B: A Many-Good Model
This appendix discusses a many-good generalization of the model in section 2. Our 
purpose here is to show that the model’s key feature driving international portfolio 
choice is relative factor endowment similarity. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, pro­
duction structures are undefined in the presence of more goods than factors. Therefore 
factor endowment similarity does not necessarily imply similar production structures. 
On the other hand, a country will still be interested in investing a larger share of its 
international portfolio in countries with similar factor endowments for insurance pur­
poses.
We maintain most of the model’s assumptions, but for the ones we mention here:
1. The final good C  is now defined over a continuum of goods, which are aggregated 
in a Cobb-Douglas fashion:
where C  (z ) denotes consumption of freely traded intermediate good z , z£ .  [0,1].
2. Each industry employs the two production factors, K  and L, which are freely 
mobile between industries. Production functions are also of the Cobb-Douglas 
type:
where yj (z) denotes production of good z in country j; and a {z) £ [0,1]. For 
simplicity, we assume a {z) = z.33
3. There is an upper limit jl < 1/2 to the differences in relative factor endowments 
we can allow for, as we focus (for simplicity) on the factor price equalization 
case.
33 Any symmetric distribution of a  (z ) such that a (z) =  1 — a  (1 — z) would yield similar results.
(2.32)
Vi (z) =  \A ,K , (*)]“«  [AjLj (z)]1- ^ )
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4. We assume equal size for all countries: <pj — 1 for all j  G J.
2.B.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
We again assume factor price equalization a la Trefler (1993). We will therefore 
find equilibrium prices by solving for the integrated equilibrium; i.e., we assume both 
commodities and factors are freely mobile in the world, as if the latter were a single 
(closed) economy.
The integrated equilibrium conditions are the following:
• Pricing:
p (z )
b(z,r,w)
= b(z , r ,w ),
r a(z) W
1 — a (z)
1—u(z)
p  = exp /  In p(z)  
Jo
dz
(2.33)
(2.34)
(2.35)
where b (z, r, w) denotes industry z ’s cost function; r  and w are, respectively, the 
prices of capital and labour in efficiency units; and P  denotes the price of the final 
good, which we will use as numeraire: P  =  1.
Commodity market clearing:
/ \ P(-J\y , .
Cw (z) =  —-r-r- =  yw (z) , p(z)
Cw  : Yw =  ^ Pw  T  wLwi
(2.36)
where K w = J2jej  AjK j and Lw  =  Ai Lr  
Factor market clearing:
a db(z,r,w)
Jo dr
■yw (z) dz = K w-, (2.37)
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f l db(z:r,w)
J   ~dw-----^ w  = (2.38)
Putting conditions (2.33), (2.34), (2.36), (2.37), and (2.38) together, w/r  = K w / L w , 
and P  — e 2r 2'u;2. These last two equations and the choice of numeraire yield 
r = e~5 (Kw/Lw)~*  and w = e~s (K w / L w )5. It is easy to show that the results 
we discussed in section 2.1 also hold here. Defining country j ’s gross domestic product 
as Yj =  r {AjKj)  +  w (Aj L j ), we obtain Yk (k ) > j l V  > ^  (0 > ^  (A/). The 
model’s symmetry implies Y^ / (fc') > j Y w  > Yi (kf) > Yk (k ').
2.B.2 Asset Market Equilibrium
The following results are the counterpart to the results discussed in section 2.3.1:
1. Assume n > 0. Consider state of nature k', k' G Jk: Bk (kf) > (k ') > 0 > 
B k> (kf). By symmetry, B k (kf) > B k (I) > 0 > B k (k).
2. For fi = 0, B k (kf) = Bi (kf) .
3. d(3/dn> 0.
2.C Appendix C: International Portfolio Choice with­
out Arrow-Debreu Securities
This appendix discusses a model without Arrow-Debreu securities that yields results 
comparable to those we obtained in section 2. We assume the same setup as in section 
2 on the goods side (including our assumptions on productivity shocks and states of 
nature), but consider a completely different asset side.
1. Let us simplify by assuming J  = 4, : =  1 for all j  G J , and complete special­
ization (/i =  1/2).
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2. We assume quadratic utility
bu  (Cj) = C , -  -C~, (2.39)
where b > 0.34
3. Before uncertainty is realized countries can only exchange ownership claims on 
their GDPs.
4. International asset trade is costly: a fraction Tjj< = r  e  (0,1) of the payoff that 
country j  receives from its claims on country-j/ GDP, /  j ,  is wasted as a cost 
of keeping foreign assets in country / s portfolio (r^  =  0 for all j) .35
Let Vj be the market value of country j ’s uncertain GDP Yj =  'PjVj- The problem’s 
budget constraints can be written as follows:
j
Vj  =  Y x j y y f ’ (2'4°)
? = i  
J
Cj = (2-41)
j' = 1
where Xjf  denotes country j*s share of ownership claims on country-/ income.36 Asset 
market clearing requires Ylj=i xjj' — 1 f°r all /  G J. Country / s utility maximization 
problem can be expressed as:
max E u ^  ^x j j ' (1 Tj f )  Yj '  
L j ' = l
(2.42)
346 must be small enough so that U' (C ) > 0.
35This is the classical ‘iceberg’ assumption due to Samuelson (1954), which has been used in interna­
tional finance by Martin and Rey (2000,2004).
36Country j ’s ‘total consumption’ of the final good (that is, inclusive of the resources wasted in keeping 
its international portfolio) is Y2j'=i xjj'Yj>-
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subject to Vj =  Yij'XjjrVj’. The first-order conditions with respect to Xjy, f  = 1 , J,  
yield
XjVf - E [ U ' { C j )Yj ,) = cm1[U'(Cj ) ,Y j ,) + E[U'{Cj )}E(Yy ),  (2.43)
1 Tjj
f  G J , and where Aj is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint. Due to the 
model’s symmetry, Aj =  A, E  (Yj) = E ( Y) ,  and Vj = V  for all j .  The presence of 
international asset market frictions thus implies cov \U' (Cj),  Yj] < cov \U' (Cj) , Yj>] 
for all f  ^  j.  With quadratic utility, this is equivalent to cov [Cj, Yj] > cov [Cj, Yj>]. 
Thus, portfolios will be home-biased due to the presence of frictions.
We now show xkkr > %ki- Consider first k, k' G Jk: since cov [Ck, Yk] > cov [Ck, Yk>] 
and var (Yk) =  var (Yk>),
Is** -  %kk' (1 -  7*)] var (Yk) > [xkk ~ x kk> (1 -  t)] cov (Yk, Yk>). (2.44)
Since cov (Yk, Yk>) <  0,37 xkk > xkkt (1 — r). Consider now k,k'  G Jk and l,V G J/: 
since, from the first-order condition (2.43), cov \Ck, Yk>] =  cov [Ck, Y{\9
xkk' (1 -  r) var (Yk>)+xkkcov (yfc, Ykr) =  xki (1 -  r) var (Yfi+xw (1 -  r) cov (Yh Yv)
(2.45)
By symmetry, var(Yk/) =  var(Yt) > 0, cov(Yj,Yk) =  cov(Yt,Yi>) < 0, and xki =  
xki>. Solving for xkl (1 -  r),
x xkk> (1 -  t) var (Yk,) +  xkkcov (Yk, Y&) 
af« ( 1 - T) =   <
< xw ( i - r ) K r ( n o  +  co ,(y t ,y ,) ]  =  (1 _  T) (2 46)
var (Yk') +  cov (Yk, Yk/)
37Under complete specialization, it is easy to prove that cov(Yk, Yk>) < cov (Yk,Yi) =  0.
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since Xkk > x kk> (1 — r ) and cov <  0- Hence, Xkk• > x ki- country k invests a
larger share of its wealth in country k' than in country Z.38
This setup is correctly spelt out only for the case Xkk > x kk' > %ki > 0. How can 
we make sure that we have no shortselling in equilibrium? Notice that in the absence 
of asset trade frictions (r =  0), countries would be able to insure fully by choosing 
%kk — x kkr =  x ki =  1/4. We can show that x m is a continuous function of r. Hence, by 
continuity, for a small positive r , Xki > 0. (In any case, we do not observe shortselling 
in the data.)
2.D Appendix D: Sources and Definitions of Variables
1. Bilateral portfolio equity holdings (in millions of US dollars): Portfolio equity 
instruments issued by host country residents and held by source country residents. 
Source: 2002 Coordinated Portfolio Survey (IMF). Year: 2002.
2. GDP (in millions of year-2000 US dollars). Source: Penn-World Tables. Year: 
2001.
3. Total population. Source: World Development Indicators. Year: 2001.
4. Log of bilateral trade. Source: Glick and Rose (2001).
5. Distance: Logarithm of great circle distance in miles between the capital cities of 
source and host countries. Source: Glick and Rose (2001).
6. Common border: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host coun­
tries share a border. Source: Glick and Rose (2001).
38 According to our computer simulations, allowing for CRRA utility and a higher elasticity of substi­
tution between goods, as well as for a less restrictive distribution of states of nature, yields similar results. 
These results are available upon request.
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7. Regional trade agreement (RTA): Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source 
and host countries share the same regional trade agreement. Source: Glick and 
Rose (2001).
8. Currency area: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host countries 
are in the same (strict) currency union. Source: Glick and Rose (2001). (Updated 
for the euro area by the authors.)
9. Colony/Colonizer: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host coun­
tries ever had a colonial relationship. Source: Glick and Rose (2001).
10. Common language: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host 
countries share a common language. Source: Glick and Rose (2001).
11. Common legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host 
countries have a legal system with a common origin (common law, French, Ger­
man, or Scandinavian). Source: La Porta et al. (2003).
12. Correlation in GDP growth rates: Correlation between the real GDP growth rate 
in the source and host country. Authors’ own computations based on real GDP 
growth rates. Source: World Development Indicators. Period: 1981-2000.
13. Correlation of stock returns. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Period 
1980-96.
14. Correlation of growth-stock returns. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). 
Period 1980-96.
15. Capital-labour ratios. Source: Caselli (2005) and Caselli and Feyrer (2007). Year: 
2000 .
16. Time difference. Variable constructed as ln(0.001 +  t ime_dif  ference).  Au­
thors’ calculation.
17. Exports by sector to the world at the 2-digit level. Source: Feenstra (NBER 
database). We only include countries that have at most 4 missing sectoral values.
18. Stock market capitalization (average 1985-2000). Source: Beck et al. (2000).
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Figure 2.1. Scatter plot for small host countries
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Figure 2.2. Scatter plot for large host countries
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Table 2.1. Information on countries in the sample
Countries Total source equity Total host equity KL ratio Stock market GDP
United States 1010832 700712 146391 0.97 9766702
United Kingdom 382012 532698 98998 1.25 1475473
Canada 184005 92856 137800 0.68 834418
Netherlands 179561 181611 134941 0.85 426979
Japan 169489 267749 145955 0.83 3061726
France 135612 217040 142196 0.45 1505280
Ireland 116098 84961 106142 - 101163
Italy 99302 82264 148889 0.25 1321779
Sweden 66628 41224 116631 0.75 225143
Australia 59182 67546 132703 0.63 511186
Belgium 48689 23300 156396 0.48 256399
Norway 43142 12885 177840 0.28 152434
Spain 35424 78611 120603 0.38 826115
South Africa 30911 14895 25692 1.43 360227
Finland 17491 63167 131405 0.67 118716
Austria 15726 3806 150438 0.13 220685
New Zealand 7545 4015 102645 0.43 80377
Argentina 6246 909 50699 0.18 402113
Portugal 4006 9354 87457 0.2 180681
Chile 2166 2715 45687 0.61 178883
Greece 1858 4329 94564 0.28 160250
Israel 1607 11797 115771. 0.37 128604
Korea 1098 50235 108017 0.33 762600
Brazil 939 19778 39218 0.18 1269952
Malaysia 377 6272 58274 1.44 251322
Colombia 245 171 15271 0.98 243894
Indonesia 50 3717 14821 0.15 868471
Thailand 33 5465 38127 0.38 418524
Turkey 8 5605 29238 0.15 363847
Mexico - 29874 49067 0.22 809757
Peru - 721 23145 0.12 114061
"GDP" is the real GDP of 2001 in millions of US$ 2000.
"Total source equity" and "Total host equity" are both measured in millions of US$ 2002. 
"K/L ratio" is directly taken from Caselli and Feyrer (2007).
"Stock market" is the average stock market capitalization between 1985-2000
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Table 2.2. Full Sample. Columns (1)-(4): dummy separation. Columns (5)-(8): In(GDP) interaction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS Poisson PoissonOiiA>.’=3crLU Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=i
Similarity in KL ratio (small host countries) 0.732 0.897 0.624 0.605
[0.234]*** [0.156]*** [0.312]** [0.302]**
Similarity in KL ratio (large host countries) 1.030 1.320 0.978 0.942
[0.187]*** [0.251]*** [0.340]*** [0.318]***
Similarity in KL ratio -2.003 -4.157 -5.840 -5.693
[2.697] [2.368]* [3.266]* [3.249]*
Similarity in KL ratio*ln(GDP) 0.108 0.196 0.239 0.233
[0.099] [0.091]** [0.119]** [0.120]*
Observations 687 687 560 687 687 687 560 687
HO: coef[KL_small]=coef[KLJarge]: 0.26 0.05 0.29 0.32
GDP positive combined coefficient 18.5 21.2 24.4 24.4
R-squared 0.86 0.86
Pseudo R-squared 0.38 0.95 0.95 0.38 0.95 0.95
Note: Equity holdings of source/investor country / in host/recipient country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. The 
dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in the Poisson regressions. Regressions 
include source and host country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the source country level and are reported in 
parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. The Pseudo R-squared for Poisson 
is without clustering.
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Table 2.3. Full Sample. Columns (1)-(4): dummy separation. Columns (5)-(8): In(GDP) Interaction.
(1) ( 2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tobit OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>=0 m c Z v o
oIIA>.
3cr111 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of d istance -0.736 -0.602 -0.161 -0.163 -0.731 -0.589 -0.159 -0.159
[0.122]*** [0.134]*** [0.074]** [0.074]** [0.121]*** [0.136]*** [0.077]** [0.077]**
Com mon legal origin 0.459 0.375 -0.092 -0.092 0.455 0.379 -0.056 -0.055
[0.145]*** [0.151]** [0.178] [0.178] [0.144]*** [0.151]** [0.181] [0.182]
Dummy for com m on border 0.271 0.148 0.430 0.432 0.303 0.198 0.469 0.470
[0.297] [0.327] [0.129]*** [0.131]*** [0.297] [0.329] [0.129]*** [0.131]***
Dummy for com m on language 0.396 0.299 0.492 0.498 0.406 0.290 0.494 0.498
[0.223]* [0.242] [0.175]*** [0.175]*** [0.222]* [0.248] [0.174]*** [0.174]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.460 0.537 -0.180 -0.184 0.454 0.538 -0.234 -0.238
[0.293] [0.342] [0.206] [0.205] [0.293] [0.355] [0.199] [0.198]
Dummy. Strict currency a rea 0.055 0.046 0.968 0.975 0.072 0.065 0.976 0.982
[0.270] [0.315] [0.221]*** [0.221]*** [0.270] [0.318] [0.224]*** [0.224]***
Dummy for regional trade agreem ent 0.080 0.217 0.196 0.194 0.094 0.233 0.211 0.209
[0.289] [0.341] [0.183] [0.185] [0.288] [0.348] [0.189] [0.192]
Similarity in KL ratio (small host countries) -0.131 0.284 -0.495 -0.495
[0.222] [0.257] [0.449] [0.448]
Similarity In KL ratio (large host countries) 0.595 1.047 0.770 0.745
[0.179]*** [0.311]*** [0.286]*** [0.269]***
Similarity in exports (small host countries) -0.220 -0.348 -0.866 -0.914
[2.185] [2.008] [2.271] [2.250]
Similarity in exports (large host countries) -0.602 0.216 0.969 0.883
[2.244] [2.365] [2.253] [2.226]
Similarity in KL ratio -7.605 -8.169 -7.816 -7.602
[2.596]*** [2.178]*** [2.198]*** [2.267]***
Similarity in KL ratio*ln(GDP) 0.293 0.330 0.299 0.291
[0,095]*** [0.084]*** [0.075]*** [0.078]***
Similarity in exports 10.137 4.637 -11.219 -11.176
[18.767] [15.829] [7.867] [7.640]
Similarity in exports*ln(GDP) -0.406 -0.195 0.374 0.370
[0.695] [0.588] [0.254] [0.245]
O bservations 650 650 523 650 650 650 523 650
HO: coef[KL_small]=coef[KLJarge]: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GDP positive com bined coefficient 26.0 24.8 26.1 26.1
R -squared 0.88 0.88
P seu d o  R -squared 0.43 0.96 0.96 0.43 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source/investor country /' in host/recipient country j  are m easured  in millions of US dollars. The d ependen t variable is 
ln(1+Equity) in the c a s e  of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in the Poisson regressions. R egressions include source  and host country fixed effects. 
S tandard  errors are  c lustered a t the  source country level and are  reported in parenthesis. * * * * * *  indicate statistical significance 
a t the  10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. The Pseudo  R -squared  for Poisson is without clustering.
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Table 2.4. Full Sam ple. Colum ns (1)-(6): dummy separation . Colum ns (7)-(12): In(GDP) Interaction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ' (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>-0 Equity>0 Equity>»0 Equity>0 Equity>»0
0.008 0.009 -0.042 -0.034 -0.025 -0.021 -0.039 -0.035
[0.106] [0.106] [0.119] [0.119] [0.118] [0.118] [0.113] [0.113]
Log of distance
Common legal origin
Dummy for common border
Dummy for common language
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer
Dummy. Strict currency area
Dummy for regional trade agreem ent
Similarity in KL ratio (small host countries)
Similarity In KL ratio (large h o st countries)
Similarity in exports (small host countries)
Similarity in exports (large host countries)
Similarity in KL ratio
Similarity In KL ratlo*ln(GDP)
Similarity in exports 
Similarity in exports*ln(GDP)
Log of bilateral trade 
GDP growth correlations 
Correlation stock returns 
Correlation GDP growth - stock return 
Similarity in ln(GDP per capita)
Time difference 
Observations
HO: coef[KL_small]=coef[KLJarge]:
GDP positive combined coefficient 
Pseudo R-squared________________________
0.006 0.011 0.026 0.027
[0.110] [0.111] [0.109] [0.109]
-0.121 -0.125 -0.126 -0.129
[0.156] [0.157] [0.158] [0.159]
0.397 0.397 0.386 0.383
[0.130]*** [0.132]*** [0.134]*** [0.136]***
0.502 0.505 0.479 0.483
[0.178]*** [0.177]*** [0.179]*** [0.178]***
-0.171 -0.175 -0.153 -0.157
[0.207] [0.206] [0.210] [0.209]
0.985 9-989 0.991 0.992
[0.243]*** [0.243]*** [0.240]*** [0.240]***
0.223 0.214 0.237 0.225
[0.107]** [0.105]** [0.115]** [0.113]**
-0.538 -0.525 -0.561 -0.550
[0.442] [0.437] [0.431] [0.426]
0.741 0.723 0.741 0.723
[0.283]*** [0.268]*” [0.281]*** [0.266]***
-0.979 -1.079 -1.195 -1.311
[2.141] [2.115] [2.141] [2.118]
0.818 0.681 0.698 0.560
[2.122] [2.081] [2.105] [2.068]
0.181 0.192 0.188 0.198
[0.121] [0.121] [0.118] [0.119]*
-0.256 -0.246 -0.315 -0.304
[0.177] [0.176] [0.209] [0.209]
0.379 0.359
[0.302] [0.304]
-0.093 -0.115
[0.203] [0.204]
523 650 501 624
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
-0.018 -0.021 -0.071 -0.075
[0.147] [0.146] [0.157] [0.158]
0.425 0.417 0.435 0.433
[0.134]*** [0.137]*** [0.131]*** [0.133]***
0.441 0.446 0.492 0.494
[0.165]*** [0.163]*** [0.178]*** [0.177]***
-0.101 -0.111 -0.232 -0.236
[0.206] [0.204] [0.201] [0.200]
0.994 0.995 0.988 0.991
[0.244]*** [0.244]*** [0.249]*** [0.249]***
0.285 0.285 0.186 0.175
[0.142]** [0.133]** [0.131] [0.127]
-0.465 -0.437
[0.409] [0.399]
0.875 0.875
[0.322]*** [0.323]***
-1.140 -1.272
[2.051] [2.012]
0.396 0.202
[1.948] [1.907]
-7.737 -7.465
[2.470]*** [2.493]*“
0.295 0.285
[0.084]*** [0.086]***
-6.591 -6.434
[9.114] [8.876]
0.206 0.196
[0.296] [0.285]
0.207 0.212 0.137 0.150
[0.120]* [0.120]* [0.130] [0.130]
-0.385 ' -0.359 -0.217 -0.209
[0.224]* [0.228] [0.193] [0.192]
0.389 0.408
[0.354] [0.347]
-0.102 -0.125
[0.200] [0.201]
-0.162 -0.286
[0.472] [0.456]
0.037 0.036
[0.024] [0.024]
501 624 523 650
0.00 0.00
26.2 26.2
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
-0.077 -0.079 0.025 0.023
[0.160] [0.161] [0.149] [0.149]
0.431 0.428 0.460 0.450
[0.136]*** [0.138]*** [0.138]*** [0.141]*“
0.475 0.478 0.437 0.438
[0.181]*** [0.180]*** [0.165]*** [0.163]***
-0.221 -0.225 -0.172 -0.181
[0.205] [0.204] [0.203] [0.201]
0.994 0.994 0.996 0.996
[0.246]*** [0.246]*** [0.250]*** [0.249]***
0.199 0.186 0.226 0.217
[0.137] [0.132] [0.148] [0.142]
-7.704 -7.443 -7.356 -7.203
[2.491]*** [2.513]*” [2.551]*“ [2.572]***
0.294 0.284 0.286 0.281
[0.085]“ * [0.087]*“ [0.091]*** [0.093]“ *
-7.262 -7.268 -4.892 -3.391
[8.589] [8.367] [9.828] [9.623]
0.227 0.223 0.137 0.077
[0.277] [0.266] [0.330] [0.322]
0.143 0.154 0.170 0.180
[0.130] [0.129] [0.126] [0.126]
-0.250 -0.241 -0.317 -0.299
[0.229] [0.228] [0.242] [0.244]
0.257 0.239 0.268 0.292
[0.328] [0.330] [0.361] [0.358]
-0.025 -0.047 -0.029 -0.050
[0.221] [0.222] [0.219] [0.219]
-0.177 -0.323
[0.581] [0.557]
0.035 0.035
[0.024] [0.024]
501 624 501 624
26.2 26.2 25.7 25.6
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source/investor country / in host/recipient country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. The dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case  of 
OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in the Poisson regressions. Regressions include source and host country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the source country level 
and are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*“  Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. The Pseudo R-squared for Poisson is without clustering.
Table 2.5, World Bank sample of High Income and Upper Middle Income countries. Columns (1)-(6): dummy separation. Columns (7)-(12): In(GDP) Interaction.
( 1 ) ( 2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) ( 1 1 ) ( 1 2 )
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Equity>0 Equity>-0 Equity>0 Equity>»0 Equity>0
o11A£crLU oA&13CTID Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of distance 0.006 0.008 0.027 0.025 0.008 0.006 -0.042 -0.038 -0.024 -0.023 -0.038 -0.037
[0.110] [0.112] [0.110] [0.111] [0.107] [0.108] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.114] [0.114]
Common legal origin -0.122 -0.125 -0.127 -0.128 -0.015 -0.017 -0.072 -0.075 -0.078 -0.079 0.026 0.026
[0.157] [0.158] [0.159] [0.160] [0.148] [0.148] [0.158] [0.159] [0.161] [0.162] [0.151] [0.151]
Dummy for common border 0.401 0.396 0.390 0.383 0.428 0.417 0.442 0.436 0.439 0.431 0.466 0.455
[0.132]*** [0.134]*** [0.137]*** [0.138]*** [0.137]*** [0.140]*** [0.133]*** [0.135]*** [0.138]*** [0.140]*** [0.140]*** [0.143]***
Dummy for common language 0.504 0.507 0.480 0.484 0.443 0.447 0.494 0.496 0.475 0.478 0.437 0.439
[0.181]*** [0.180]*** [0.182]*** [0.181]*** [0.169]*** [0.167]*** [0.180]*** [0.179]*** [0.184]*** [0.183]*** [0.167]*** [0.166]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer -0.168 -0.174 -0.149 -0.154 -0.098 -0.108 -0.226 -0.232 -0.213 -0.219 -0.166 -0.175
[0.211] [0.211] [0.214] [0.214] [0.210] [0.209] [0.205] [0.205] [0.210] [0.210] [0.207] [0.206]
Dummy. Strict currency area 0.987 0.992 0.992 0.995 0.995 0.997 0.988 0.993 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.998
[0.244]*** [0.245]*** [0.241]*** [0.241]*** [0.245]*** [0.245]*** [0.250]*** [0.250]*** [0.247]*** [0.247]*** [0.251]*** [0.250]***
Dummy for regional trade agreem ent 0.234 0.224 0.249 0.237 0.303 0.298 0.205 0.195 0.220 0.208 0.249 0.240
[0.110]** [0.108]** [0.118]** [0.116]** [0.145]** [0.138]** [0.133] [0.130] [0.139] [0.135] [0.150]* [0.145]*
Similarity in KL ratio (small host countries) -0.556 -0.521 -0.582 -0.547 -0.484 -0.438
[0.446] [0.441] [0.435] [0.430] [0.415] [0.407]
Similarity in KL ratio (large host countries) 0.724 0.731 0.721 0.730 0.862 0.880
[0.295]** [0.298]** [0.295]** [0.299]** [0.339]** [0.349]**
Similarity in exports (small host countries) -0.982 -1.066 -1.204 -1.304 -1.139 -1.252
[2.153] [2.125] [2.150] [2.126] [2.057] [2.023]
Similarity in exports (large host countries) 0.819 0.710 0.696 0.585 0.389 0.241
[2.131] [2.086] [2.109] [2.068] [1.948] [1.906]
Similarity in KL ratio -7.843 -7.560 -7.815 -7.541 -7.484 -7.293
[2.510]*** [2.512]*** [2.535]*** . [2.537]*** [2.585]*** [2.602]***
Similarity In KL ratlo*ln(GDP) 0.298 0.289 0.297 0.288 0.290 0.284
[0.086]*** [0.086]*** [0.087]*** [0.088]*** [0.093]*** [0.094]***
Similarity in exports -7.118 -7.082 -7.855 -8.000 -5.108 -4.224
[9.176] [9.046] [8.635] [8.522] [9.925] [9.897]
Similarity in exports'ln(GDP) 0.225 0.220 0.248 0.249 0.144 0.108
[0.299] [0.292] [0.279] [0.273] [0.334] [0.332]
Log of bilateral trade 0.179 0.188 0.185 0.193 0.202 0.207 0.133 0.143 0.138 0.147 0.164 0.173
[0.122] [0.123] [0.119] [0.120] [0.121]* [0.122]* [0.132] [0.132] [0.131] [0.131] [0.128] [0.127]
GDP growth correlations -0.266 -0.252 -0.328 -0.314 -0.399 -0.376 -0.224 -0.213 -0.259 -0.248 -0.329 -0.312
[0.179] [0.180] [0.214] [0.215] [0.229]* [0.233] [0.196] [0.197] [0.235] [0.236] [0.248] [0.251]
Correlation stock returns 0.386 0.370 0.407 0.414 0.274 0.258 0.293 0.306
[0.316] [0.316] [0.365] [0.360] [0.344] [0.344] [0.374] [0.373]
Correlation GDP growth - stock return -0.099 -0.121 -0.111 -0.135 -0.028 -0.051 -0.035 -0.057
[0.206] [0.207] [0.202] [0.204] [0.224] [0.224] [0.220] [0.221]
Similarity in ln(GDP per capita) -0.198 -0.274 -0.209 -0.308
[0.480] [0.462] [0.591] [0.574]
Time difference 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.035
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Observations 471 546 449 521 449 521 471 546 449 521 449 521
HO: coef[KL_s mall]=coef [KLJarge]: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GDP positive combined coefficient 26.3 26.2 26.3 26.2 25.8 25.7
Pseudo R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source/investor country /' in host/recipient country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. The dependent variable is ln(1 +Equity) in the case  of 
OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in the Poisson regressions. Regressions include source and host country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the source country level 
and are reported in parenthesis. *,” ,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. The Pseudo R-squared for Poisson is without clustering.
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Table 2.6. Full sample. Separation of source countries based on financial development (FD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
S o u rce  countries: High FD Low FD High FD Low FD High FD Low FD High FD Low FD
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson P o isson
Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Similarity in KL ratio (sm all host countries) 0.489 0.345 -0.417 -0.266 -0.371 -0.483 -0.137 -0.989
[0.452] [0.875] [0.417] [1.074] [0.396] [1.220] [0.309] [0.993]
Similarity in KL ratio (large host countries) 1.024 1.497 0.843 1.477 0.820 1.263 0.821 1.534
[0.171]*** [0.441]*** [0.313]*** [0.550]*** [0.323]** [0.457]*** [0.274]*** [0.565]***
Log of d is tan ce -0.082 -0.527 0.009 -0 .125 0.069 -0.463
[0.083] [0.110]*** [0.118] [0.356] [0.135] [0.266]*
C om m on legal origin 0.013 0.157 -0.017 -0.002 -0.040 0.234
[0.129] [0.228] [0.109] [0.200] [0.129] [0.166]
Dummy for com m on border 0.746 -0.093 0.667 -0.065 0.645 -0.135
[0.257]*** [0.111] [0.265]** [0.237] [0.264]** [0.308]
Dummy for com m on language 0.375 0.732 0.349 0.689 0.339 0.979
[0.149]** [0.444]* [0.140]** [0.500] [0.153]** [0.544]*
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer -0.265 0.379 -0.272 0.367 -0 .225 0.411
[0.173] [0.143]*** [0.174] [0.166]** [0.180] [0.196]**
Dummy. Strict currency  a re a 0.909 0.851 0.890 0.992 0.983 0 .472
[0.355]** [0.303]*** [0.359]** [0.313]*** [0.358]*** [0.302]
Dummy for regional trad e  ag reem en t 0.325 0.016 0.118 0.440 0.199 0.526
[0.201] [0.226] [0.238] [0.311] [0.182] [0.309]*
Log of bilateral trad e 0.183
[0.145]
0 .488
[0.371]
0.212
[0.141]
0 .353
[0.338]
GD P growth correlations -0.029
[0.105]
-0.667
[0.101]***
-0.064
[0.195]
-0.545
[0.405]
C orrelation stock  re tu rns 0.221
[0.521]
-0.856
[1.126]
C orrelation GD P growth - stock  return 0.244
[0.227]
-0.174
[0.487]
Similarity in exports (small host countries) -2 .277
[4.037]
6 .918
[2.119]***
Similarity in exports (large host countries) 6.099
[4.409]
3 .483
[2.244]
O b serva tions 294 202 294 202 294 202 286 189
HO: coef[KL_small]=coef[KL_large]: 0.33 0.36 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.04
P seu d o  R -squared 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Note: Equity holdings of sou rce/investo r country / in host/recipient country j  a re  m easu red  in millions of US dollars. T he d e p en d en t 
variable is ln(1+Equity) in th e  c a s e  of OLS and  Tobit, while it is Equity in th e  Po isson  reg ress io n s . R eg ressio n s include so u rce  
and  host country fixed effects. S tan d ard  e rro rs a re  c luste red  a t th e  so u rce  country level and  a re  reported  in p a ren th es is . W * *  indicate 
sta tistica l significance a t the  10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. T he P seu d o  R -squared  for Po isson  is without clustering.
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Chapter 3 
Bureaucratic Start-up Costs, External 
Finance, and a Country’s Production 
Structure
3.1 Introduction
Market economies are characterised by a continuous process of resources being 
reallocated across agents. One key policy instrument influencing this reallocation of re­
sources is deregulation. Even if at the aggregate level it may be beneficial, deregulation 
usually comes with strong distributional effects that are not always well understood. In 
this paper we aim to explore the distributional effects of one specific deregulation in­
strument: bureaucratic start-up costs to open up new businesses. In particular, the goal 
is to understand how two main barriers faced by entrepreneurs interact in equilibrium: 
limited access to external capital and bureaucratic start-up costs.
Understanding how these effects interact is important for a number of reasons. First, 
it will contribute to assess how entrepreneurs react to the economic environment, which 
is important from a Schumpeterian perspective of “creative destruction”. Second, as
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many countries are in the process of deregulation, it may contribute to understand the 
implications of this process. Third, from a political economy perspective, it may help 
to identify the winners and losers of deregulation.
I adapt the framework by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to incorporate start-up costs 
and where sectors only differ in their need for external capital. In this increasing returns 
to scale setup, producers’ net worth is key to access external capital. The share of value 
added of each industry is determined by its relative price. In our comparative statics, 
we obtain the following theoretical prediction: a reduction in the fixed cost faced by 
entrepreneurs when starting a new firm shifts the number of firms and the share of 
value added towards the sector with more need for external capital.
Intuitively, a reduction in the bureaucratic start-up cost leads to an equivalent in­
crease in entrepreneurial net worth. Entrepreneurial collateral is especially beneficial in 
sectors that need to borrow from external lenders, i.e. in sectors with a relatively low 
level of internally generated cashflow. This is because under asymmetric information 
between a lender and a borrower, a firm’s internal assets will determine the amount of 
external capital that the lender is willing to provide under the financial contract (for 
example, see Bemanke and Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). As a con­
sequence, the relative price of goods produced by sectors with high need of external 
capital goes down, leading to a proportional increase in their share of value added in the 
economy.
In the empirical testing of the theoretical prediction, I make use of country-level 
variation in the bureaucratic cost of starting new firms together with sector-level vari­
ation in the need for external finance. In analysing which sectors benefit more from a 
reduction in the cost of starting a new company, I focus on two dependent variables at 
the sector-country level: (i) number of establishments; (ii) share of value added. The 
main empirical finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction: countries with low 
bureaucratic start-up costs tend to have both a greater share of value added and a greater
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number of establishments in sectors that are more dependent on external sources of cap­
ital.
These findings have two interesting implications. First, reductions in bureaucratic 
costs to start a business and improvements in the financial sector might work as com­
plements. If lower start-up costs shift production towards sectors that have to rely more 
on capital supplied by the financial sector, then reforms improving the financial system 
would have a greater positive impact on the economy. Therefore, reductions in bureau­
cratic start-up costs could bring the right incentives to reform and improve the efficiency 
of the financial system.
Second, the previous literature on start-up costs found that reductions in the regula­
tory cost for new companies had a growth effect (i.e. higher growth rate in value added). 
In this paper we find an additional level effect, since it also affects the production struc­
ture in the long run, both the share of value added and the number of establishments. 
Therefore, policymakers can use start-up costs to influence the relative importance of 
sectors across the economy, i.e. the industrial structure of the country.
Regarding the importance of the number of establishments in a given sector, reduc­
tions in bureaucratic start-up costs could induce growth by improving the prospects of 
smaller and younger firms. This could possibly trigger "waves of creative destruction" 
in the spirit of Schumpeter1, as data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Re­
port 2003 show that 50 percent of employment in the U.S. is accounted for by firms 
with less than 500 employees, and they account for 75% of job turnover. Furthermore, 
we know from Acs and Audretsch (1988, 1990) that small firms are more innovative 
than large firms in a significant number of industries.
In terms of related literature on the role of start-up costs and growth, Ciccone and 
Papaioannou (2007) find that countries where it takes less time to register new busi­
nesses have more entry in industries that experienced expansionary global demand and
1 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a similar argument on financial development.
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technology shifts. Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) show that countries with more 
costly product market regulation see slower entry in industries with growth opportu­
nities as proxied by U.S. industry sales growth. With firm-level data, Klapper et al. 
(2006) focus on European countries and find that costly entry regulation especially re­
duces growth in the number of new establishments in industries with high entry in the 
U.S.
In another strand of literature, the correlation between financial development and 
economic growth is often associated with the work of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon 
(1973), and Shaw (1973). In a next step beginning with King and Levine (1993a,b), 
a number of empirical papers have provided support for financial development leading 
to economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998), hereafter RZ, find that sectors more 
dependent on external finance grow faster in countries with better financial systems. 
Aghion et al. (2007) use firm-level data of 16 developed and developing countries and 
find a variety of results confirming that financial development helps potential entrants 
and small firms.2
On the theoretical front, the literature on financial development and economic growth 
provides mechanisms under which financial development induces faster long run growth, 
and in many of these papers financial development is modelled as an endogenous out­
come. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) present a model where financial intermediation 
and economic growth are both determined endogenously. Saint-Paul (1992) analyses a 
mechanism which can give rise to multiple equilibria in financial and economic devel­
opment. In the ‘low equilibrium’, the underdevelopment of the financial system leads to 
an inefficient (i.e. less specialised) productive structure which, in turn, justifies the ab­
sence of financial development. Similarly, in the book by Hermes and Lensink (1996), 
Saint-Paul presents a model which explains financial development as being triggered by
2 Other references include, for example, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksi- 
movic (1996), Levine and Zervos (1998), Braun (2003) or Levine et al. (2000).
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an unusual increase in the demand for financial services.3 I build on this line of reason­
ing when claiming that shifts in production towards high external finance sectors, that 
increase the demand for the provision of financial services, can trigger reforms in the 
financial system.
In a related way, the law and finance literature initiated by LaPorta et al. (1997) 
focuses on the relationship between financial development and the institutional frame­
work of a country4. Financial development is higher in countries with better legal sys­
tems and stronger creditor rights. Beck et al. (2003) show that both the legal system and 
the initial endowment are important determinants of financial development and private 
property protection.5 And in a recent speech, Mishkin (2007) describes the steps that 
must be taken to build an institutional infrastructure that will ensure a well-functioning 
financial system. He explicitly mentions the bureaucratic cost of starting a new business 
as one of the main concerns to address, together with other aspects like strong property 
rights or improvements in corporate governance.6
Before moving on to a more rigurous theoretical and empirical analysis, Figures
(3.1)-(3.3) give a visual idea of the empirical finding. I calculate the weighted external 
finance dependence for each country by multiplying each industry’s dependence on 
external finance by the fraction that this industry contributes to total value added in the 
manufacturing sector in 1990. I then regress this variable against country-level start­
up costs. The correlation is negative and strongly statistically significant for the three 
measures of start-up costs that will be described in more detail in Section 3.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical
3Other references include Blackburn and Hung (1998), Deidda (2006), and Zilibotti (1994). In Dei- 
dda (2006), financial development occurs endogenously as the economy reaches a critical threshold of 
economic development. Also, in Zilibotti (1994), an economy with a capital level over a certain threshold 
has a ‘thick’ financial market, which in turn means lower intermediation costs. For a survey, see Levine 
(1997).
4See also LaPorta et al. (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
5 See also Claessens and Laeven (2003).
6Other interesting references on the regulatory environment and firm growth include Kumar et al. 
(2002), Fonseca and Utrero (2003 and 2004).
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framework. In Section 3.3,1 present the data and the empirical methodology. In Section 
3.4, the empirical results are discussed. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this closed economy model based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), hereafter 
HT, there is a continuum of risk-neutral homogeneous agents in the space [0, K], each 
of them endowed with A  units of capital.7 All agents are protected by limited liability 
and have access to the same technology.
There are two goods produced, one by each sector. A producer faces a fixed cost 5 £ 
(0, A) of starting a firm before production can take place.8 Once the fixed cost is paid, 
production follows a continuous-investment function in which each unit of investment 
Ii in sector i yields a return of Ri with probability 7r, and yields zero return otherwise. 
The only difference across sectors is in the need of external finance. Sector H  has a 
high need of external finance due to a lower return per unit of investment: R h  < R l-  
Even though there is idiosyncratic risk at the project level, there will be no aggregate 
risk considerations in this model.
There are two periods. In the first period, capital is allocated between internal and 
external capital, i.e. each agent optimally either becomes a producer or a lender. The 
producer's remaining capital A —S is the net worth of the firm. A lender lends her assets 
A  to producers at an endogenously determined interest rate r. The allocation of agents 
in period 1 is symultaneous.9 In the second period, production takes place, lenders are 
repaid, and agents consume. Lender’s capital will incur an iceberg cost a  reflecting the
7The value of K  can be arbitrarily large. Firms will not have any market power.
8A possible interpretation is that S is the bureaucratic start-up cost that every firm has to pay before 
running a business. This cost will have a direct mapping in our empirical analysis.
9Before firms are established and production takes place, agents can switch between becoming lenders 
and producers until noone has incentives to move again. Therefore, I eliminate any first-mover advantage 
of a sequential entry model.
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well-established fact that external capital is more costly than internal capital.10
3.2.1 Consumer Maximisation
Each risk-neutral agent faces a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility func­
tion over the two goods, and solves the following maximisation problem:
H  and L, and Pt is the price of good i.n From standard CES maximisation, optimal 
relative consumption is given by:
where q  denotes an individual’s consumption of good i. Due to the assumed pref-
I
erences, this condition also holds at the aggregate level:
K
where Ci = f  Cidi. Under these preferences, a reduction in the relative price of a 
o
good leads to a more than proportional increase in consumption of this same good.
nally generated ones. For example, asymmetric information can lead to a monitoring cost (Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1997). Alternatively, to ex-ante differenciate good producers from bad ones, a screening cost 
has to be incurred (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). See also Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) for references in which outsiders have less knowledge than insiders.
11 Income takes different formulations for producers and lenders, but it is of secondary importance at 
this point.
max E  (U) s.t. Income = PlCl +  Ph Ch , (3.1)
C L , C H
where U = (cLe + c  . e > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods
(3.2)
(3.3)
,0From the corporate finance literature we know that external funds are generally costlier than inter-
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3.2.2 Optimal Allocation of Agents
In period 1, the allocation of agents becoming either producers or lenders takes 
place. In equilibrium, each agent has the same expected rate of return.
Analysis of a given sector
Producer Once the fixed cost 5 is paid, each unit of investment Ii gives a return Ri in 
case the project is successful, and zero otherwise. Producers may deliberately reduce 
the probability of success by exerting low effort and obtaining a private benefit B li in 
units of the same good.12 As in the benchmark model of HT, I formalise this moral 
hazard problem in the following way: the probability of success depends on whether 
the producer exerts high (7f) or low (7r) effort, with A n  = n — n > 0. Effort is non­
observable and non-verifiable for a lender, and the project is only economically viable 
under high effort:
WPiRili > ArP}i +  (1 +  a) (5 +  -  A) n ti > nPiRih  +  PiBIi
where is the lender’s rate of return per unit of capital in good i, rp>* is the pro­
ducer’s rate of return per unit of capital in good i, and a  is the iceberg cost of external 
capital.
A necessary condition for the producer to exert high effort is given by the following 
incentive constraint:
7TPiRpjli > 7TPiRptiIi +  PiBIi
where Rpj is the return of good i (per unit of investment) that the producer of sector 
i gets in case of successful outcome. After rearranging, we obtain the same equation
12 We can think of it as an alternative less productive technology function with a safe return that is not 
observable by the lender.
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as in HT, where the producer must be paid at least the following amount to exert high 
effort:
^  > £  (3.4)
Consequently, if the producer puts all his capital into the project, the expected pro­
ducer’s rate of return per unit of capital in good i under high effort must be at least
„ , x TvPiFL i l i  T lP iB T
E (r „ )  = - ^  = -E ^ I t (3.5)
Lender Lenders allocate external capital into a firm as long as their participation con­
straint is satisfied:
WPJi (FLi -  Rp,i) > E(riti) (1 +  a) (Ii -  A  +  S ), (3.6)
Due to increasing returns to scale (caused by the fixed cost 5), the producer will 
maximise the firm’s size, /*, by borrowing as much capital as possible. Competitive 
lenders make no economic profit on the contract that is most advantageous for the bor­
rower. Consequently, in equilibrium the lender’s participation constraint will bind, and 
the upper bound on investment that satisfies the participation constraint is given by:
I t = ---------     (3.7)
E ( n , i ) ( i+ o )
By plugging (3.7) into (3.5) we obtain:
t?< \ _  nPiB  A ~ 5 r?
(rp>i) A 7tA 1 *ft(«,-&) (3-8)
£ ( r t, i ) ( l+ a )
where E (rPyi) is expressed as a function of Pi, E(riyi), and parameters.
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Equilibrium interest rate E  (r)
In equilibrium, the expected rates of return to all agents, either producers or lenders, 
have to be equal within and across sectors. The intuition is that agents allocate them­
selves simultaneously into the different tasks and nothing stops them from reallocat­
ing to another more profitable task before production takes place. As an illustration, 
take sector i. If E (rPyi) > E(riyi), nothing hinders a lender from becoming a pro­
ducer. Incentives to deviate stop when E (r) = E  (rPj) = E(ri^). The outside 
option of a lender is to become a producer, and viceversa, so that any situation in 
which either E  (rPyi) ^  E (r^ ) cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, we also require 
the same expected return across sectors for a given task: E  (r) =  E  (rp^) =  E(rpj ), 
and E {r)  =  E  (r/jt-) =  E(riJ) where i ^ j .
This framework can be traced back to Kiyotaki (1998). In his model, the real interest 
rate is determined by the outside option of the lender, which in his scenario is to become 
a producer at a predetermined productivity rate. But in my setting of increasing returns 
to scale, the productivity of the firm rises with its size. Therefore, the outside option of 
a lender is not to open a new firm without any external capital, but rather to additionally 
attract external capital until the borrowing constraint binds.13
Equilibrium investment levels and market clearing conditions
Let us define sector L as the numeraire, P l — 1. Equation (3.8) becomes:
^ . ivB A — 5
{rp’L) = A wA. ( }
(1+a)E(r i>L)
13In this equilibrium allocation E (rPti) — E(riyi), the lender does not get her marginal product of 
capital as a return, but rather less. If each lender obtained her marginal product of capital, the fixed cost 
would only be paid by the producer, leading to a situation in which E  (rPti) < E(riti). The method 
of obtaining the equilibrium interest rate is similar to Krugman (1979), who also makes use of the zero 
profit condition, together with the fact that all agents in the economy obtain the same wage rate and share 
the payment of the fixed cost.
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By setting E  {tPjl ) — E{t^l) = E(r*)9 we obtain the equilibrium rate of return per 
unit of investment:
(3.10)
This rate depends negatively on the fixed cost 8 and the financial iceberg cost a, and 
positively on the probability of success iT. The equilibrium investment size is found by 
plugging (3.10) into (3.7),
These investment sizes depend positively on the producer’s net worth (>1 — 5), and 
negatively on the financial iceberg cost a. Since RjJ > R h , we observe that the invest­
ment size in the sector with high need of external finance is lower, since /£ > I#.
The relative price of the two goods is obtained by using the equilibrium condition 
E  (rPjL) = E (tP)h ) = E(r*) together with equation (3.5):
Finally, let us solve for the equilibrium ratio of firms across the two sectors, un/riL, 
where n* is the number of firms in sector i} 4 This ratio is the first variable that will have 
a direct mapping in our empirical specification. For a given good i, the market clearing 
condition for good i is given by
(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)
u rii includes firms with both successful and unsuccessful outcomes. In other words, not all n* firms 
contribute to output in sector i.
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Ci =Wn’y ’ = W n'(RlI ’) (3.14)
where all successful firms are of equal size y*, and C* is the aggregate demand for 
good i. By using (3.13), the consumption ratio, Cx/C#, is defined as:
Ch n*H Rh
Cl _  n*L R l r);
4 iH (3.15)
and using the optimal consumption ratio provided by equation (3.3) leads to the 
equilibrium ratio of firms across the two sectors:
~  =  ( n r (£_1) - J r  <3 1 6 >nL R h
The second variable in our empirical specification is proxied by the share of value 
added, PhCh /C l . We can easily obtain this ratio from (3.15) and (3.16):
our empirical specification, shown in (3.16) and (3.17): a reduction in the relative price 
of a good leads to an increase in the relative number of firms and the share of value 
added in the sector producing that same good.
3.2.3 Comparative Statics
In this subsection we aim to derive the theoretical predictions that will drive our 
empirical analysis. From equations (3.16) and (3.17) we see that the key variable to 
consider is P J, i.e. the price of sector H  in terms of the numeraire price of sector L. Its 
derivative with respect to the start-up cost 6 is:
(3.17)
Since ^  is a constant, there is a one-to-one relation between the two variables of
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9Ph iT S ir  (Rl - R h ) : 0
m  [ ( ^ - * )  +  T T s ( 1 r ^ - i ) ] 2 
Recall that sector H  has a high need of external finance, so that it yields a lower 
output level per unit of investment: (R l — R h ) > 0- Consequently, a reduction in the 
fixed cost 5 leads to a reduction in the relative price of good H.  The direct implication is 
that a reduction in 8 leads to an increase in the relative share of value added and number 
of firms in the sector with the high need of external finance:
This is the theoretical prediction we will test in our empirical analysis. Intuitively, 
sector H  experiences a relatively greater improvement in economies of scale, and thereby 
in productivity, after a reduction in the start-up cost 8. This leads to a reduction in its 
relative price, which in turn shifts more production towards this sector. In other words, 
a reduction in the fixed cost increases entrepreneurial net worth, which is especially 
beneficial in sector that needs to borrow more.
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3.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Data
In this subsection we will describe the two main regressors of our analysis: sectoral 
external finance and country-level bureaucratic start-up costs.
External finance at the sectoral level is measured as the mismatch between invest­
ment and cashflow averaged over the 1980-89 period from U.S. publicly traded firms 
in COMPUSTAT data (from Kroszner et al., 2007). This measure was first used by 
RZ and is based on the assumption that an industry’s external finance dependence has 
a time-invariant technological aspect that allows to construct a sectoral ranking that is 
valid across countries. For example, the project’s gestation period or the requirement 
for continuing investment differ substantially across sectors. The index is constructed 
using publicly listed U.S. firms; under the assumption that they face minor frictions in 
accessing external capital, the actual and the desired amount of investment and exter­
nal finance should be similar, which allows us to ameliorate any supply side effects. 
In other words, by looking at the large listed firms in the most financially developed 
country, their level of external finance is supposed to mainly capture the demand com­
ponent.15
Our country-level measures of bureaucratic start-up costs come from the Doing 
Business (2006) dataset constructed by the World Bank for the year 2005. Between the 
moment in which an agent decides to start a company and the moment in which produc­
tion takes place, it seems plausible to argue that at least three country-level bureaucratic 
costs must be incurred: (1) cost of starting up a business, including the completion of 
inscriptions for the company and obtaining the permission to open a brand; (2) cost of 
registering the property on which the production plant will be built; (3) cost of dealing
15See Table (3.3) for some sectoral measures. For a more detailed explanation on how this variable 
was constructed, see also RZ.
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with licenses while building the production plant.
The literature has mainly focused on the first cost when proxying for bureaucratic 
frictions to start a business. But just having a company legally registered is clearly not 
the full representation of all the bureaucracy that has to be incurred before running a 
business. It is usually also necessary to buy the land on which production will take 
place, and finally also build the production plant.16 All the measures are defined as a 
percentage of income per capita. The final data for these three variables is listed in 
Tables (3.1)-(3.2).
Our proxy for the first measure of start-up cost is a combination of the cost of pro­
cedures and the cost of time to start a business according to the definition of the Doing 
Business report. These include "...all procedures that are officially required for an en­
trepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. These 
include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and completing any required no­
tifications, verifications or inscriptions for the company and employees with relevant 
authorities." The cost of procedures alone ignores the opportunity cost of the entrepre­
neur’s time and the foregone profits associated with bureaucratic delay. To address this 
concern, the constructed cost measure adds up the official expenses and an estimate of 
the value of the entrepreneur’s time, valuing his or her time at the country’s per capita 
income per working day, where we assume that there are 250 working days per year, 
as Djankov et al (2002) assume in the construction of a similar variable. Even within 
OECD countries we find significant differences: while an entrepreneur in Spain needs 
to follow 10 different procedures, pay $3,500 in fees and wait 47 days to acquire the 
necessary permits, an entrepreneur in Canada can finish the process in 3 days by paying 
$280 in fees and completing 2 procedures.
The cost (of procedures and time) o f registering property17 on which the firm will
16 What I am capturing with the second and the third costs are only the bureaucratic costs of dealing 
with these two additional activities.
17It includes "...the full sequence ofprocedures necessary when a business purchases land and a build­
ing to transfer the property title from the seller to the buyer so that the buyer can use the property."
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be locating its production plant and the cost (of procedures and time) o f dealing with 
licenses while building the production plantx% will also be considered by potential pro­
ducers. Once these three pre-production bureaucratic costs are added up, we again find 
large differences between countries: while the bureaucratic cost raises to almost 9 times 
the GDP per capita in Belgium or Greece, it is only around 2 times the GDP per capita 
in Denmark or Norway.
Due to data availability, the main disadvantage of these start-up cost measures is 
that they are posterior in time to the period covered by our dependent variables. This 
may raise concerns of endogeneity in our specifications in case start-up costs evolved 
in response to economic performance. However, RZ and Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
argue that measures of institutional frameworks are quite stable over time. In any case, 
we will also address this concern by using instrumental variables.
3.3.2 Empirical Methodology
The methodology simultaneously exploits cross-country variation in costs to start a 
business and cross-industry variation in the level of external finance dependence. In this 
generalised difference-in-difference approach, exogenous industry-country variation on 
these two indicators provides identification to assess the differential impact of business 
start-up costs on industries that vary in their degree of dependence on external sources of 
finance. This approach has the appealing characteristic that it allows identification even 
after controlling for both country and industry characteristics, which will be captured 
by the fixed effects. Therefore, this methodology will be less subject to criticism about 
an omitted variable bias or model specification. Additionally, problems of collinearity 
will arise less often, since for two variables to be very correlated we would need both
18 It includes "...allprocedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a standard­
ized warehouse as an example o f dealing with licenses. These procedures include obtaining all necessary 
licenses andpermits, receiving all required inspections and completing all required notifications and sub­
mitting the relevant documents (for example, building plans and site maps) to the authorities.".
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a high correlation in the sectoral component together with a high correlation in the 
country-level component.
Our first dependent variable is (the log of) the share of a sector’s value added over 
total manufacturing value added in 1990. Our second dependent variable is (the log 
of) the number of establishments in each of these sectors in 1990.19 The data comes 
from the Industrial Statistics of the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza­
tion (INDSTAT 3 Revision 2 database). The econometric specification is:
m  n
ln(£ +  DepVarij) =  f j  +  * ExtFirij * StartUpi -f Uij (3.18)
i=i j=i
where DepVarij stands for dependent variable (i.e. either share of value added or 
number of establishments) in sector j  of country i, ExtFirij is RZ’s sectoral external 
finance dependence variable, and StartUpi is the country-level business start-up cost. 
fi  and f j  are country and sector fixed effects, respectively. The disturbance term Ujj 
is clustered at the country-level, so that standard errors are corrected for a correlation 
between observations belonging to the same country, e takes the value of 0.1, which 
is non-distorsionary given the values that our dependent variable takes20. We limit the 
sample to countries with value added data for at least 10 sectors.
Based on our theoretical prior, we expect (3 to be negative: a reduction in the 
country-level start-up cost will increase the share of value added and the number of 
establishments especially in sectors that have a high dependence on external sources 
of finance. We use three different econometric specifications: Ordinary Least Squares 
estimator, Tobit estimator, and Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator, as suggested 
by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2005).
19Since the external finance variable is constructed for the 1980s, using the dependent variable for 
1990 reduces endogeneity concerns.
20We have also defined e as 0.01 and 0.001 and the results remain unchanged.
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Econometric specifications in the spirit of gravity equations are usually log-linearised 
and estimated by OLS21, but this practice might be inappropriate for a number of rea­
sons. First, log-linearisation is unfeasible when the dependent variable can be zero. 
(This problem is often solved by adding a small positive number to all observations 
before taking logs, in our case e = 0.1.) Second, as Santos-Silva and Tenreyro pointed 
out, under heteroskedasticity, the expected value of the log-linearised error will in gen­
eral be correlated with the regressors, and OLS will therefore be inconsistent. The 
reason is that the non-linear transformation changes the properties of the error term, 
as the conditional expectation of In depends on the shape of the conditional distri­
bution of the error term u^j. For these reasons, it might be necessary to additionally 
estimate the equations in its non-linear form. Santos-Silva and Tenreyro propose the 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator for this task. This estimator turns out to 
be consistent under very weak assumptions (mainly that the model is well specified). It 
also provides a natural way to deal with zero values, as it can be implemented without 
needing to do any logarithmic transformation.
3.4 Empirical Results
In Tables (3.4)-(3.11) we present the results for the share of value added as our 
dependent variable, while Tables (3.12)-(3.19) repeat exactly the same regressions with
the number of establishments.
21 Both of our dependent variables are truncated at zero. We both observe zeroes and positive values 
for both share of value added and number of establishments. Therefore, I link the interpretation of our 
regression to the gravity equation.
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3.4.1 Share of Value Added
Benchmark specification
Table (3.4) presents results for the full sample of countries without including any ad­
ditional control variables beyond the base specification. Our three measures of start-up 
costs are: (i) narrow measure: only includes the bureaucratic cost of opening a busi­
ness, see columns (1), (4), and (7); (ii) intermediate measure: additionally includes the 
cost of registering property on which the production plant has to be built, see columns
(2), (5), and (8); (iii) broad measure: on top of it, also incorporates the cost of dealing 
with licenses while this production plant is built, see columns (3), (6), and (9).22 In 
columns (l)-(3) we use the OLS estimator. Columns (4)-(6) use the Poisson estimator, 
while columns (7)-(9) show results under the Tobit estimator. Columns (1), (4), and (7) 
include our narrow measure of start-up cost; columns (2), (5), and (8) present results 
with the intermediate measure, while columns (3), (6), and (9) incorporate the broad 
measure of start-up costs.
Already at this initial stage of analysis, we find that the coefficient interacting the 
country-level start-up cost with the sectoral external finance dependence is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of coefficient values, they are similar 
across econometric specifications for each given measure of start-up costs.
In Table (3.5), we rerun the same regressions after eliminating the low income coun­
tries based on the World Bank Classification in 198723. The coefficient of our interac­
tion term remains significant at the 1% level, and we observe a slight increase in the 
coefficient values for all three measures of country-level start-up costs.
22 To control for outliers, (i) for our narrow measure, we only include countries satisfying start-up 
cost<3*GDP per capita; (ii) for our intermediate measure, we only include countries satisfying start­
up cost<12*GDP per capita; (iii) for our broad measure, we only include countries satisfying start-up 
cost<25*GDP per capita.
23 The low income countries in our sample are Bangladesh, China, Central African Republic, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania.
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Main control variables
In Table (3.6), we focus on the full sample and control for a series of alternative 
theoretical channels previously proposed by the literature. Our first three control vari­
ables come from the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. First, our interaction term of inter­
est might simply be capturing that more capital-abundant countries tend to specialise 
in capital-intensive industries. Our country-level measure of capital abundancy is the 
capital-labour ratio in 1980 from Caselli and Feyrer (2007), while our sector-level mea­
sure of capital-intensity comes from Braun (2003). It is determined as the median of 
the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to value added in the U.S. for the 1986-1995 
period in each industry using UNIDO data.
Second, it might be reasonable to think that countries with low start-up costs are also 
the ones with high levels of education. We control for the fact that more skill-intensive 
sectors have a greater share of value added in countries with greater abundance of hu­
man capital. Our sectoral variable on human capital intensity comes from Ciccone and 
Papaioannou (2006). It is the average years of schooling of workers for each industry 
in the U.S. in 1980. Our country-level measure of human capital is taken from Barro 
and Lee (1993), which compute the average years of schooling in the population over 
25 years of age in 1980.
And third, following Braun (2003), countries abundant in natural resources might 
be specialising in sectors that intensively use these resources. Our measure for country- 
level natural resource abundance comes from the World Bank’s Expanding the Measure 
o f Wealth publication, and includes minerals and fossil fuels, timber, nontimber forest 
benefits, cropland, and pastureland, net of what is labeled as protected areas. The nat­
ural resource intensity is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the following 
industries (and 0 otherwise): wood products, except furniture; paper and products; pe­
troleum refineries; miscellaneous petroleum and coal products; other nonmetallic min­
eral products; iron and steel; and nonferrous metals.
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We control for two further interaction terms proposed by the more recent litera­
ture: (i) RZ and Fisman and Love (2004) find that sectors in greater need of exter­
nal finance will grow faster and have greater shares of value added in countries with 
well-functioning financial markets, respectively. Our proxy of financial development 
is the ratio of domestic credit to GDP in 1980, while our sectoral variable comes from 
Kroszner et al. (2007) and is exactly the one we interact with start-up costs; (ii) Braun 
(2003) finds that countries with well-functioning financial markets tend to specialise in 
sectors that have a small fraction of tangible assets. Our proxy of financial development 
is the same as before, while our sectoral variable comes directly from Braun (2003) and 
is measured as the median tangibility of assets (i.e. net property, plant, and equipment 
over book value of assets) at the sectoral level using COMPUSTAT’s annual industrial 
files for the 1986-1995 period.
After including these five control variables, the coefficient on our interaction term 
is still always significant at the 1% level: countries with lower start-up costs tend to 
specialise in sectors with greater need of external sources of capital. The results hold 
across all econometric specifications for all our measures of start-up costs. Among the 
control variables, the human capital interaction and the measure proposed by RZ seem 
to be the most relevant ones from a statistical viewpoint.
On the economic significance of our results, let us use the broad measure of start-up 
costs for an illustration. A move from Colombia, the country at the 75th percentile of 
the distribution of start-up costs, to Thailand, the country at the 25th percentile, would 
increase the difference between the share of value added in Transport Equipment (75th 
percentile of external finance) and in Beverages (25th percentile in external finance) by 
14.5%24. For example, if in Colombia the share of value added in Transport Equipment 
was 2% greater than the share in Beverages, this difference would increase to 2.29% in 
Thailand. For comparison purposes, the median sectoral share of value added is around
24We obtain this number from: 0.059*(9.84-4.11)*(0.47-0.04) being approximately 0.145, i.e. 14.5%. 
We obtain similar results with the two other measures of start-up costs.
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2%.
In Table (3.7), we present the results of Table (3.6) without including the low income 
countries. Two regularities arise again: our coefficients of interest become larger in 
absolute value and are still significant at the 1% level. An interesting feature is that the 
control variable regarding the tangibility of assets becomes statistically significant at 
the 5% level in all regressions.
Additional control variables
In Table (3.8)-(3.10) we add additional controls into our main specification. First, 
we control for labour market regulation. We expect countries with little bureaucratic 
frictions to have well-developed labour market institutions. Therefore, we interact the 
rigidity of employment index from the Doing Business database with the sectoral mea­
sure of external finance dependence.
Second, we control for property rights enforcement, as another measure of regula­
tion we might be capturing with our start-up cost. The cost of enforcing contracts is 
the log of the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts and comes 
from Djankov et al. (2007). It is the cost of procedures and time of the judicial system 
in resolving a commercial dispute. We again interact this country-level measure with 
RZ’s sectoral measure of external finance.25
Third, based on Braun (2003), we also control for the results not being driven by 
either differences in preferences or the general level of economic development. It is 
possible for differences in preferences to affect the composition of manufactures. Sec­
toral external finance might be correlated with the income elasticity of demand for the 
goods produced by each sector. As Braun (2003), we compute the GDP elasticity of
each industry’s value added based on the change in their real value added in the U.S.
25There is a priori no theoretical foundation for interacting these country-level terms with sectoral 
external finance. We still decide to use these terms, because the goal is rather to verify that our measure 
of bureaucratic start-up costs is not proxying for neither labour market regulations nor property rights 
enforcement.
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between 1974 and 1994, and interact it with the log of GDP per capita.26
Fourth, a concern has been raised that RZ’s sectoral variable might not only be cap­
turing external finance dependence, but also sectoral growth opportunities in the U.S. 
during the 1980s (see Fisman and Love, 2004). Under this alternative interpretation, 
our interaction term of interest would partly be capturing that sectors with high growth 
opportunities have a greater share of value added in countries with low start-up costs. 
Even though this concern is more problematic when having the growth rate as the de­
pendent variable27, we still interact the country-level measure of start-up costs with the 
direct U.S. sectoral growth opportunities at the sectoral level. The variable captures the 
sectoral growth in capital during that period and comes from Ciccone and Papaioan- 
nou (2006). It was constructed with data from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity 
Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). Our interaction term, which now should only 
be capturing the external finance component remains significant at the 1% level.
In Table (3.8) we only focus on OLS regressions. Again, we work with all three 
measures of start-up costs and we add one control at a time. Our result is robust to 
the inclusion of these additonal control variables and the economic significance is very 
similar to the one in previous tables. The control variable on the GDP elasticity is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in all three specifications, thereby showing that 
the level of economic significance can help to explain the manufacturing production 
pattern of our sample of countries.
In Table (3.9) we present results for our preferred Poisson estimator. All three mea­
sures of start-up costs remain statistically significant throughout all specifications, as is 
also the control variable suggested by Braun (2003). In the same spirit as in previous 
regressions with the Poisson estimator, both the interaction term introduced by RZ and 
also the human capital interaction are always very significant.
Finally, in Table (3.10) we use the Tobit estimator. Our interaction term is always
26For a more extended motivation for this interaction term, see Braun (2003).
27Recall that our dependent variables are in levels and not in differences.
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significant at the 1% level, and the main change with respect to the previous two tables 
is that the property rights enforcement interaction is significant at the 5% level.
Instrumental Variables
The cost of starting a business, calculated for the first time for the year 2005, in 
the Doing Business dataset could be the outcome of the production structure of the 
economy, thereby leading to endogeneity concerns. Under this channel, countries that 
have historically been specialising in sectors with a high demand for external sources of 
finance might have put more effort into reducing their cost of starting new businesses.
To make sure that this mechanism is not the driver of our results, in Table (3.11) 
I instrument the cost of opening a business by two measures which are related to the 
legal environment and that have been used previously by the literature28: (i) legal origin;
(ii) rule of law. A variety of papers by Djankov, LaPorta, and Shleifer argue that a 
country’s legal origin is a historically predetermined variable with long-lasting effects 
on regulation policies. Legal origin can therefore be seen as an exogenous variable in 
our framework. Additionally, the rule of law variable is an assessment of the law and 
order tradition in the country. Both measures can be found in LaPorta et al. (1998) 29
In columns (l)-(3) we include the standard controls from Table (3.6) with the full 
sample; again, we look at what happens with all three measures of start-up costs. In 
columns (4)-(6) we redo the same regressions but eliminate the low income countries 
based on the World Bank classification. Our interaction term of interest remains statisti­
cally significant at the 1% or 5% level, while the financial interaction term proposed by 
RZ loses significance. In terms of economic significance, the coefficients are slightly 
higher than in Table (3.6).
28 For the choice of the same or similar instrumental variables, see RZ, Guiso et al. (2004), Ciccone 
and Papaioannou (2006).
29The instruments satisfy the test of overidentifying restrictions based on Wooldridge’s (1995) robust 
score test. The results of this test are available upon request.
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3.4.2 Number of Establishments
We found that reductions in country-level start-up costs lead to shifts in the share 
of value added towards sectors with high levels of external finance. Increases in value 
added can either occur through the intensive margin (growth of already existing firms) 
or the extensive margin (creation of new firms). Given that start-up costs especially 
affect smaller and younger firms, we will analyse whether a significant part of the in­
crease in value added is due to the extensive margin. In Tables (3.12)-(3.19) we rerun all 
the regressions with the number of establishments as our dependent variables. To avoid 
becoming repetitive, the following subsections briefly highlight the main differences 
with respect to the previous regressions.
Benchmark specification
Table (3.12) show the results for the full sample of countries without any additional 
control variables beyond the base specification. The coefficient interacting country- 
level start-up costs and sectoral external finance is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level for all regressions. Interestingly, the coefficient values across all spec­
ifications are similar to the ones we obtained in Table (3.4), the equivalent table with 
share of value added as the dependent variable.
Table (3.13) repeats the same exercise without including the low income countries 
based on the World Bank Classification in 1987. The coefficient remains statistically 
significant mostly at the 1% level, and we again observe a slight increase in the absolute 
value of the coefficient.
Main control variables
Table (3.14) presents full sample results including the same five control variables 
that were already introduced in Table (3.6). The statistical significance of our results 
remains unchanged across econometric specifications and measures of start-up costs.
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Regarding the economic significance of our results with number of establishments 
as the dependent variable, a move from Colombia, the country at the 75th percentile of 
start-up costs, to Thailand, the country at the 25th percentile, would increase the differ­
ence between the number of establishments in Transport Equipment (75th percentile in 
external finance) and in Beverages (25th percentile) by 22%.30
In Table (3.15) we repeat the regressions of Table (3.14) after eliminating the low 
income countries and the statistically significance is unchanged. The coefficient values 
become larger in absolute value.
Additional control variables
In Tables (3.16)-(3.18) we also include the additional control variables into our main 
specification. These controls were already described in length for Tables (3.8)-(3.10). 
The results again are robust to the inclusion of these control variables. Our coefficient 
of interest is mostly significant at the 1% level.
Interestingly, three of the additional control variables are very significant across the 
different measures of country-level start-up costs: columns (4) to (6) tell us that coun­
tries with better property rights enforcement have relatively more establishments in sec­
tors with greater demand of external capital. In columns (7) to (9) our interaction term 
on the level of economic development and sectoral elasticity of demand is again very 
significant. Columns (10) to (12) reveal that countries with low start-up costs tend to 
have relatively more establishments in sectors with high sectoral growth opportunities.
Instrumental variables
In Table (3.19) we instrument our start-up cost measures with legal origin and rule 
of law, as we did in Table £3.11). Columns (l)-(3) present results for the full sample 
with the five main controls, while columns (4)-(6) eliminate low income countries. The
30We obtain this number from: 0.091 *(9.84-4.11)*(0.47-0.04) being approximately 0.22, i.e. 22%.
133
coefficient interacting start-up costs and external finance remains statistically signifi­
cant at the 1% or 5% level, and the magnitude of the economic significance increases 
considerably.31
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to understand the effects of a reduction in the bureaucratic 
start-up cost to open a new business on an economy’s industrial production structure. 
We introduce a theoretical framework based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) that gives 
us the following theoretical prediction: reductions in country-level bureaucratic start­
up costs for entrepreneurs shift the production structure towards sectors with greater 
need of external sources of capital. We confirm our hypothesis in the empirical part of 
the paper: using different econometric specifications and various measures of start-up 
costs, we find that countries with lower bureaucratic costs tend to have a greater share of 
value added and number of establishments in sectors that rely more on external sources 
of capital.
Understanding how these different barriers to entrepreneurship (i.e. costly access 
to external capital and bureaucratic start-up costs) interact can be helpful not only to 
better assess how entrepreneurs react to changing incentives, but also to identify the 
winners and losers of deregulation processes that are occurring at a large scale in many 
countries.
31 The instruments again satisfy the test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Wooldridge (1995). 
The results are available upon request.
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Description of variables
1. Ext Fin: Industry-dependence on external finance. The median of the ratio of 
capital expenditure minus cashflow to capital expenditure for U.S. firms averaged 
over the 1980-1989 period. Source: Kroszner et al. (2007).
2. Start-up: Country-level'start-up cost. Combination of the cost of time and proce­
dures to start a business, according to the definition of the Doing Business report. 
We assume 250 working days per year and data is for 2005. Source: World Bank- 
Doing Business (2006).
3. Start-up+Reg: In addition to the cost of Start-up previously described, we add the 
cost of time and procedures of registering property, according to the definition of 
the Doing Business report. We assume 250 working days per year and data is for 
2005. Source: World Bank-Doing Business (2006).
4. Start-up+Reg+Deal: In addition to the cost of Start-up+Reg previously described, 
we add the cost of time and procedures of dealing with licenses while building the 
production plant, according to the definition of the Doing Business report. We as­
sume 250 working days per year and data is for 2005. Source: World Bank-Doing 
Business (2006).
5. Number o f establishments: Log number of establishments in industry i in country 
n in 1990. Source: Industrial Statistics of the United Nations Industrial Develop­
ment Organization (INDSTAT 3 Revision 2 database).
6. Share o f value added: Share of value added in industry i in country n over total 
value added in country n in 1990. Source: Industrial Statistics of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (INDSTAT 3 Revision 2 database).
7. Labour rigidity: Rigidity of employment index. It is defined as the average of 
the difficulty of hiring a new worker, restrictions on expanding or contracting the
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number of working hours, and difficulty and expense of dismissing a redundant 
worker. Source: World Bank-Doing Business (2006).
8. Enforcement (Days): Number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. 
Source: Djankov et al. (2007).
9. HK intensity: Average years of schooling of workers for each industry in the U.S. 
in 1980. Source: Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006).
10. Total years o f schooling: Average years of schooling in the population over 25 
years of age in 1980. Source: Barro and Lee (1993).
11. Growth opp. : Annual change of log real capital stock in each industry in the U.S. 
in 1980-1989 period. Source: Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006).
12. GDP: GDP per capita in 1980. Source: World Bank-World Development Indica­
tors
13. Private Credit: Domestic credit to the private sector over GDP in 1980. Source: 
IMF-IFS
14. Legal Origin: Colonial origin of a country’s legal system. Source: Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)
15. Rule o f Law: Index for the efficiency and integrity of the legal system produced 
by Business International Corporation (a country-risk rating agency). Source: 
Rajan and Zingales (1998)
16. KL ratio: Capital-labour ratio in 1980. Source: Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
11. K  intensity: Median of the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to value added in 
the U.S. for the 1986-1995 period in each industry using UNIDO data. Source: 
Braun (2003)
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18. Nat. Res.: Minerals and fossil fuels, timber, nontimber forrest benefits, cropland 
and pastureland, net of what is labeled as protected areas. Source: World Bank’s 
Expanding the Measure o f Wealth (1997), Braun (2003)
19. NatResJntensity: Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the following indus­
tries (and 0 otherwise): wood products, except furniture; paper and products; pe­
troleum refineries; miscellaneous petroleum and coal products; other nonmetallic 
mineral products; irin and steel; and nonferrous metals. Source: Braun (2003)
20. Tangibility: Median tangibility of assets (i.e. net property, plant, and equipment 
over book value of assets) at the sectoral level using Compustat’s annual industrial 
files for the 1986-1995 period. Source: Braun (2003)
21. Elasticity o f demand: GDP elasticity of each industry’s value added based on the 
change in their real value added in the U.S. between 1974 and 1994. Source: 
Braun (2003)
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Figure 3.1. Correlation between External Finance and Start-up Cost (Start-up,
Registering Property, Dealing with Licenses), beta = -1.1. t-stat = -22.15
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Figure 3.2. Correlation between External Finance and Start-up Cost
(Start-up, Registering Property), beta = -1.6. t-stat = -18.83
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Figure 3.3. Correlation between External Finance and
Start-up Cost (Start-up), beta = -11.4. t-stat = -28.2
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Table 3.1. Country-level start-up c o s ts , m easured a s  a percentage of incom e per capita (Part 1)
C o u n try S ta r tu p
C o s t
C o u n try S ta r tu p  C o s t  
& R e g is te r in g  P ro p e r ty
C o u n try S ta r tu p  C o s t  
& R e g is te r in g  P ro p e r ty  
& D ealin g  w ith  L ic e n s e s
D enm ark 0 .020 New Z ealand 0.108 New Z ea lan d 0.661
C a n a d a 0.021 Sw itzerland 0.431 D enm ark 1.481
A ustralia 0 .027 Denm ark 0.488 Sw itzerland 1.631
S in g ap o re 0 .035 Kuwait 0 .762 Iceland 1.929
F ran ce 0 .044 Italy 0 .767 S in g ap o re 2.227
Iceland 0 .049 C a n a d a 0.911 Norw ay 2.260
N ew  Z ea lan d 0 .050 Chile 0.985 M ongolia 2 .308
Finland 0 .068 Iceland 1.265 C a n a d a 2.489
S w ed en 0.071 Nonway 1.333 J a p a n 2.832
Hong Kong 0 .078 M ongolia 1 .336 Chile 3.001
Norway 0 .079 Bulgaria 1.450 Finland 3.110
UK 0 .079 S in g ap o re 1.471 S w ed en 3.239
R om ania 0 .097 S w ed en 1.579 P a n a m a 3.355
Ja m a ic a 0.119 P a n a m a 1.700 UK 3.375
M ongolia 0 .142 R om ania 1 .777 Italy 3.376
G erm any 0 .143 V en ezuela 1 .803 M alaysia 3.782
Ireland 0 .149 Poland 1.934 G erm any 3.845
T unisia 0 .156 Turkey 1.949 Poland 4.053
Kuwait 0 .162 C hina 2 .006 T hailand 4.112
M orocco 0 .164 M alaysia 2.051 K enya 4.120
Sw itzerland 0 .167 Finland 2 .124 A ustria 4.147
A ustria 0 .173 Pakistan 2.136 Kuwait 4 .147
N etherlands 0 .174 UK 2.213 A ustralia 4 .204
Israel 0 .189 Colom bia 2.267 H ong Kong 4.215
T hailand 0 .193 J a p a n 2 .287 C o sta  R ica 4.413
Italy 0 .209 G erm any 2.357 C hina 4.718
Chile 0.211 C o sta  R ica 2 .430 R om ania 4.818
Bulgaria 0 .224 Albania 2 .463 S loven ia 5 .020
Ja p a n 0.231 Peru 2 .520 Sri Lanka 5.214
Sou th  Africa 0 .238 Austria 2.551 Philippines 5 .375
K orea 0 .240 Iran 2 .895 N eth erlan d s 5.445
Belgium 0 .247 Brazil 2 .897 Bulgaria 5 .549
Iran 0.251 Slovenia 2 .905 F ran ce 5.549
A rgentina 0 .262 Hong Kong 2 .910 E cu ad o r 5 .687
M auritius 0 .272 K enya 3 .0 4 0 Mexico 5.812
Sri L anka 0 .304 Sri Lanka 3 .106 S p a in 5.932
T urkey 0 .313 N etherlands 3 .2 8 2 U ruguay 5.967
Zam bia 0.321 Mexico 3 .334 K orea 6.000
T ab le  1 reports v a lu e s  for th e  c o s t an d  tim e of starting  up  a  b u s in e ss , w h ere  it is a s su m e d  th a t a  p e rso n  w orks 
250  d a y s  p e r y ear. T h e  d a ta  c o m e s  from WB-WDI Doing B u sin e ss  for 2005 . T he  first m e a su re  only includes th e  
c o s t of p ro ced u re s  an d  tim e of open ing  a  b u sin e ss . T h e  s e c o n d  m ea su re  a d d s  to  it th e  c o s t of p ro ced u re s  an d  tim e 
of registering  property. Finally, th e  third m ea su re  a d d s  to  it th e  c o s t of p ro c ed u re s  an d  tim e of dealing  with licen ses 
while building a  production  plant. W e restrict ou r sam p le  of co u n tries  to  StartU p<3*G D P p e r  cap ita ,
S tartU p & R egistering  Property<12*G D P per cap ita , an d  S ta r tu p  & R egistering  P roperty  & D ealing with L icenses<25*G D P 
p e r  cap ita  in o rd e r to  control for outliers. T herefore, w e  e lim inate  Syria for S ta r tu p  * R egistering  Property, a n d  w e 
elim inate T an zan ia  a n d  Burundi for S tartU p & R egistering  Property  & Dealing with L icen ses .
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Table 3.2 . Country-level start-up c o s t s ,  m easured  a s  a p ercen tage of in com e per capita (Part 2)
Country Startup Country StartUp Cost Country Startup Cost
Cost & Registering Property & Registering Property
___________________________________________________________________________________& Dealing with Licenses
P a n a m a 0 .3 2 4 T hailand 3.351 A lbania 6 .1 1 3
C h in a 0 .3 2 8 Philippines 3 .3 7 7 A rgen tina 6 .2 1 9
M alaysia 0 .3 2 9 K orea 3 .4 3 4 P ortugal 6 .2 6 7
C ro a tia 0 .3 3 0 T un isia 3 .4 3 4 Israel 6 .3 2 6
P a k is tan 0 .3 4 0 M orocco 3 .5 4 2 Ireland 6.411
S lo v en ia 0.341 A ustra lia 3 .5 9 7 T urkey 6 .5 6 4
P o lan d 0 .3 4 6 Malawi 3 .7 0 8 Brazil 6.581
P o rtugal 0 .3 5 0 N epal 3.891 S o u th  Africa 6 .9 0 9
S p a in 0 .3 5 3 H o n d u ras 3 .9 3 3 Malawi 6 .9 7 5
H ungary 0 .3 7 6 F ra n c e 4 .0 2 6 P eru 6 .9 8 7
M exico 0 .3 8 8 S p a in 4 .0 5 3 T unisia 7 .4 5 0
Philipp ines 0 .3 9 5 E cu a d o r 4 .091 Fiji 7.481
G re e c e 0 .3 9 8 P ortugal 4 .3 8 2 N epal 7 .6 2 6
C o lo m b ia 0 .4 2 5 U ruguay 4 .4 3 3 Bolivia 8 .0 4 6
Fiji 0 .4 6 8 Israel 4 .5 1 5 V en ezu e la 8 .3 7 9
A lban ia 0 .4 7 5 A rgen tina 4 .5 8 8 Belgium 8 .5 5 2
Syria 0 .5 3 3 Bolivia 4 .6 1 6 G re e c e 8 .7 6 3
C o s ta  R ica 0 .5 4 6 Egypt 5 .0 0 7 H ungary 9.831
Jo rd a n 0 .6 0 3 India 5 .1 1 9 C olom bia 9 .8 4 0
U ruguay 0 .6 1 9 Z am b ia 5.401 M auritius 1 0 .0 5 7
V e n ez u e la 0 .621 Ireland 5.451 Jo rd a n 11 .242
E c u a d o r 0 .6 5 7 Jo rd a n 5.691 B an g lad esh 1 1 .555
K enya 0 .6 9 8 S o u th  Africa 5 .8 3 0 In d o n esia 11 .8 3 4
Brazil 0 .7 0 9 H ungary 6 .1 8 8 H o n d u ras 1 2 .325
E thiopia 0 .7 7 9 E thiopia 6 .2 0 3 India 1 2 .984
N epal 0 .7 8 3 C roa tia 6 .6 5 4 S e n e g a l 13 .270
P eru 0 .7 8 8 Fiji 6 .6 6 0 Ja m a ic a 13 .314
H o n d u ra s 0 .8 8 9 Ja m a ic a 7 .0 8 5 Iran 1 3 .747
India 0.901 Belgium 7 .1 7 5 P ak is tan 1 4 .715
B a n g la d esh 0 .9 5 4 Ind o n esia 7 .2 8 9 E gypt 16 .730
E gypt 1 .185 G re e c e 7 .3 4 0 M orocco 1 7 .438
S e n e g a l 1 .315 B a n g la d esh 7 .9 0 6 Syria 2 0 .0 0 3
Malawi 1 .536 T an z an ia 8 .0 9 7 C ro a tia 2 0 .1 3 3
In d o n e s ia 1.621 M auritius 9 .3 6 2 Z am b ia 2 2 .7 7 3
Bolivia 1 .748 S e n e g a l 10.771 E thiopia 2 4 .2 0 0
T a n z a n ia 1 .753 C a m e ro o n 11 .748 C a m e ro o n 2 4 .4 6 6
C a m e ro o n 1 .876 Burundi 12 .005 T an z an ia 50.451
Burundi 2 .1 7 9 Syria 15 .869 B urundi 1 2 0 .618
T ab le  1 re p o rts  v a lu e s  for th e  c o s t  a n d  tim e of s ta rtin g  up  a  b u s in e ss , w h e re  it is a s s u m e d  th a t a  p e rso n  w orks 
2 5 0  d a y s  p e r  y e a r. T h e  d a ta  c o m e s  from  W B-W DI Doing B u s in e ss  for 20 0 5 . T h e  first m e a s u re  only in cludes th e  
c o s t  of p ro c e d u re s  a n d  tim e of o p en in g  a  b u s in e ss . T h e  se c o n d  m e a su re  a d d s  to  it th e  c o s t  of p ro c e d u re s  a n d  tim e 
of reg is te rin g  property . Finally, th e  third m e a s u re  a d d s  to  it th e  c o s t  of p ro c e d u re s  a n d  tim e of d ealing  with l ic e n se s  
w hile building a  p roduction  p lan t. W e  restric t o u r sa m p le  of c o u n trie s  to  S tartU p<3*G D P p e r  c ap ita ,
S ta rtU p  & R eg iste ring  P r o p e r ty d  2*G D P p e r  cap ita , a n d  S ta rtU p  & R egistering  P ro perty  & D ealing with L icenses< 25*G D P  
p e r  c a p ita  in o rd e r  to  contro l for ou tlie rs. T h ere fo re , w e  elim inate  Syria  for S ta r tu p  * R eg is te rin g  P roperty , an d  w e  
e lim in a te  T a n z a n ia  a n d  B urundi for S ta rtU p  & R eg is te rin g  P ro perty  & D ealing with L icen ses .
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Table 3.3. Main industry-level variables
ISIC Industry Name External Finance Human K intensity K intensity Natural Resources Tangibility
314 Tobacco -0.45 11.51 0.02 0 0.22
361 Pottery, china, earthenware -0.15 11.24 0.05 0 0.07
323 Leather products -0.14 10.14 0.03 0 0.09
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic -0.08 10.26 0.02 0 0.12
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.01 11.55 0.10 1 0.38
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.03 10.19 0.02 0 0.13
353 Petroleum refineries 0.04 13.20 0.20 1 0.67
369 Other non-metallic products 0.06 11.66 0.07 1 0.42
313 Beverages 0.08 11.97 0.06 0 0.28
371 Iron and steel 0.09 11.43 0.10 1 0.46
311 Food Products 0.14 11.26 0.06 0 0.38
341 Paper and products 0.17 11.69 0.13 1 0.56
321 Textiles 0.19 10.40 0.07 0 0.37
342 Printing and publishing 0.20 12.79 0.05 0 0.30
355 Rubber products 0.23 11.73 0.07 0 0.38
332 Furniture, except metal 0.24 10.76 0.04 0 0.26
381 Fabricated metal products 0.24 11.58 0.05 0 0.28
351 Industrial chemicals 0.25 12.70 0.12 0 0.41
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.28 10.79 0.07 1 0.38
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.33 11.92 0.07 1 0.30
384 Transport equipment 0.36 12.35 0.07 0 0.25
390 Other manufactured products 0.47 11.35 0.04 0 0.19
362 Glass and products 0.53 11.48 0.09 0 0.33
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.60 12.27 0.06 0 0.18
352 Other chemicals 0.75 13.03 0.06 0 0.20
383 Machinery, electric 0.95 12.36 0.08 0 0.21
385 Prof and scient equipment 0.96 12.52 0.05 0 0.15
356 Plastic products 1.14 11.68 0.09 0 0.34
Table 2 reports values for each 3-digit ISIC manufacturing industry for human capital intensity (Human K intensity), capital growth (Capital 
growth), sales growth (Sales growth), value added growth (VA growth), and external-finance dependence (External Finance). These 
measures are all based on U.S. data.
149
Table 3.4. Share in value added. Full sample
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(£+Share VA) Share VA ln(e+Share VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.894 -1.207 -1.006
[0.120]*** [0.148]*** [0.125]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.130 -0.154 -0.126
[0.034]*** [0.039]*** [0.024]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin 0.088 -0.092 0.083
[0.016]*** [0.020]*** [0.011]***
Observations 1946 1909 1892 1946 1909 1892 1946 1909 1892
R-squared 0.54 0.52 0.53
Pseudo R-squared 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.26
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and sector 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. \  **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. £=0.1 .
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Table 3.5. Share in value added. No low income countries.
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(£+Share VA) Share VA ln(e+Share VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.997 -1.429 -1.178
[0.179]*** [0.202]*** [0.157]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.110 -0.129 -0.106
[0.042]** [0.046]*** [0.026]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.087 -0.092 0.079
[0.017]*** [0.022]*** [0.012]***
Observations 1682 1645 1655 1682 1645 1655 1682 1645 1655
R-squared 0.54 0.53 0.54
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.27
N ote: T h e  s h a r e  of v a lu e  a d d e d  is m e a s u re d  for 1 9 9 0  a n d  d a ta  c o m e s  from  th e  UNIDO d a ta s e t .  R e g re s s io n s  in c lu d e  c o u n try  a n d  s e c to r  
fixed e ffe c ts . S ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  c lu s te re d  by co u n try  a n d  re p o rte d  in p a re n th e s is . *, **, *** in d ica te  s ig n ifican ce  a t 10% , 5% , a n d  1%  leve ls, 
re sp ec tiv e ly . T h e  P s e u d o  R -sq u a re d  av a ilab le  for th e  P o is so n  e s tim a to r  is c a lc u la te d  w ithout c lu s te rin g . 6=0.1 .
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Table 3.6. Share in value added. Full sample
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(e+Share VA) Share VA ln(e+Share VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.572
[0.149]***
-0.798
[0.191]***
-0.623
[0.152]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.087
[0.032]***
-0.114
[0.034]***
-0.095
[0.026]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.059
[0.017]***
-0.063
[0.020]***
-0.060
[0.015]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.014 0.014 0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 0.003 0.004 0.005
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.036 0.039 0.035 0.039 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.041
[0.017]** [0.017]** [0.017]** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.017
[0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.009] [0.008]* [0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.006]***
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.985 1.249 1.026 1.091 1.369 1.222 0.961 1.222 1.007
[0.414]** [0.367]*** [0.392]** [0.388]*** [0.344]*** [0.365]*** [0.302]*** [0.285]*** [0.300]***
Private Credit * Tangibility -1.131 -1.168 -1.153 -1.879 -1.771 -1.798 -1.359 -1.360 -1.370
[0.807] [0.801] [0.806] [1.038]* [1.039]* [1.041]* [0.797]* [0.801]* [0.800]*
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57
Pseudo R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.3 0.3 0.3
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and sector fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. e=0.1.
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Table 3.7. Share in value added. No low income countries.
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(e+Share VA) Share VA ln(E+Share VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.732
[0.185]***
-1.109
[0.230]***
-0.839
[0.180]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.087
[0.039]**
-0.116
[0.039]***
-0.099
[0.028]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.065
[0.018]***
-0.075
[0.023]***
-0.064
[0.016]***
KL ratio * K-intensity -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.036 -0.039 -0.037 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.034 0.039 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.033 0.037 0.042 0.038
[0.021] [0.021]* [0.021] [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.013
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006]** [0.006]* [0.006]**
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.815 1.112 0.820 0.929 1.229 1.008 0.722 1.030 0.768
[0.422]* [0.371]*** [0.403]** [0.391]** [0.338]*** [0.361]*** [0.297]** [0.286]*** [0.300]**
Private Credit * Tangibility -1.574 -1.613 -1.579 -2.498 -2.440 -2.454 -1.862 -1.867 -1.880
[0.744]** [0.743]** [0.750]** [1.119]** [1.144]** [1.130]** [0.800]** [0.807]** [0.804]**
Observations 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196
R-squared 0.60 0.59 0.60
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and sector fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. e = 0.1 .
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Table 3.8. Share in value added. Full sample. Additional controls. Ordinary Least Squares.
Dependent variable: ln(e+Share VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.497
[0.165]***
-0.597
[0.157]***
-0.597 
[0.15Q]***
-0.659
[0.145]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.071
[0.035]**
-0.090
[0.034]**
-0.090
[0.032]***
-0.103
[0.031]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.051
[0.016]***
-0.056
[0.017]***
-0.062
[0.017]***
-0.064
[0.018]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.010 0.012
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.037 0.038 0.035 0.053 0.055 0.052 0.044 0.044 0.039
[0.017]** [0.017]** [0.017]* [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.018]* [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]** [0.016]*** [0.017]**
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.015
[0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008] [0.008]* [0.007]* [0.008] [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]*
Private Credit * ExtFin 1.049 1.289 1.082 0.980 1.185 0.983 1.127 1.399 1.167 0.984 1.245 1.024
[0.392]*** [0.354]*** [0.371]*** [0.453]** [0.412]*** [0.426]** [0.425]** [0.379]*** [0.400]*** [0.409]** [0.364]*** [0.389]**
Private Credit * Tangibility -1.124 -1.156 -1.139 -1.279 -1.304 -1.293 -1.086 -1.126 -1.107 -1.143 -1.170 -1.156
[0.805] [0.801] [0.804] [0.791] [0.785] [0.789] [0.805] [0.799] [0.804] [0.803] [0.796] [0.804]
Labour rigidity * ExtFin -0.005
[0.005]
-0.006
[0.005]
-0.006
[0.004]
Ln(Enforcement Days) * ExtFin 0.028
[0.168]
-0.065
[0.163]
-0.051
[0.161]
Ln(GDPpc) * Elasticity -0.107
[0.049]**
-0.105
[0.050]**
-0.110
[0.050]**
Start-up * Growth opp. 4.154
[3.888]
Start-up+Reg * Growth opp. 0.700
[0.801]
Start-up+Reg+Deal * Growth opp. 0.239
[0.436]
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1406 1406 1406 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and sector fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. e=0.1.
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Table 3.9. Share in value added.
Dependent variable: Share VA
Start-up * ExtFin 
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin 
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin 
KL ratio * K-intensity 
Schooling * HK intensity 
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens.
Private Credit * ExtFin 
Private Credit * Tangibility 
Labour rigidity * ExtFin 
Ln(Enforcement Days) * ExtFin 
Ln(GDPpc) * Elasticity 
Start-up * Growth opp. 
Start-up+Reg * Growth opp. 
Start-up+Reg+Deal * Growth opp. 
Observations
Pseudo R-squared_____________
jll sample. Additional controls. Poisson estimator.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.721 -0.867 -0.728 -0.794
[0.207]*** [0.207]*** [0.189]*** [0.189]***
-0.097 -0.100 -0.108 -0.114
[0.038]** [0.035]*** [0.032]*** [0.034]***
-0.053 -0.058 -0.060 -0.063
[0.018]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]*** [0.021]***
-0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.037 -0.040 -0.039 -0.018 -0.019 -0.015
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024]
0.038 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.055 0.059 0.058 0.040 0.042 0.039
[0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]**
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.014
[0.008]* [0.009]* [0.008]* [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]* [0.009] [0.009]*
1.133 1.391 1.267 0.969 1.204 1.060 1.245 1.513 1.372 1.094 1.369 1.214
[0.390]*** [0.358]*** [0.376]*** [0.411]** [0.394]*** [0.400]*** [0.410]*** [0.360]*** [0.384]*** [0.386]*** [0.342]*** [0.361]***
-1.850 -1.740 -1.760 -2.220 -2.121 -2.141 -1.797 -1.669 -1.694 -1.892 -1.773 -1.781
[1.047]* [1.045]* [1.047]* [1.014]** [1.021]** [1.024]** [1.048]* [1.046] [1.048] [1.046]* [1.046]* [1.047]*
-0.006 -0.007 -0.008
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
0.035 -0.110 -0.093
[0.162] [0.160] [0.159]
-0.132 -0.143 -0.145
[0.045]*** [0.048]*** [0.049]***
1433
0.34
1433
0.34
1433
0.34
1406
0.35
1406
0.34
1406
0.34
1433
0.34
1433
0.34
1433
0.34
0.675
[2.811]
1433
0.34
0.022
[0.566]
1433
0.34
-0.125
[0.343]
1433
0.34
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and sector fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. e=0.1.
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Table 3.10. Share in value added. Full sample. Additional controls. Tobit estimator.
Dependent variable: ln(e+Share VA)
(11) (12)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.547 -0.658 -0.633 -0.636
[0.162]*** [0.164]*** [0.151]*** [0.155]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.080 -0.098 -0.097 -0.101
[0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.026]*** [0.027]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.053 -0.058 -0.063 -0.062
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.015]*** [0.016]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 0.002 0.001 0.003
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] . [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.040 0.042 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.040 0.054 0.057 0.054 0.042 0.046 0.042
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.017
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.006]***
Private Credit * ExtFin 1.026 1.266 1.069 0.934 1.145 0.945 1.083 1.349 1.127 0.961 1.223 1.008
[0.306]*** [0.287]*** [0.303]*** [0.306]*** [0.297]*** [0.308]*** [0.305]*** [0.289]*** [0.303]*** [0.302]*** [0.285]*** [0.300]***
Private Credit * Tangibility -1.333 -1.328 -1.333 -1.551 -1.538 -1.547 -1.300 -1.302 -1.307 -1.365 -1.366 -1.374
[0.798]* [0.802]* [0.801]* [0.788]** [0.794]* [0.793]* [0.793] [0.798] [0.796] [0.797]* [0.800]* [0.800]*
Labour rigidity * ExtFin -0.005
[0.004]
-0.006
[0.004]
-0.007
[0.004]*
Ln(Enforcement Days) * ExtFin 0.022
[0.092]
-0.081
[0.086]
-0.066
[0.087]
Ln(GDPpc) * Elasticity -0.096
[0.036]***
-0.095
[0.036]***
-0.100
[0.036]***
Start-up * Growth opp. 0.924
[2.166]
Start-up+Reg * Growth opp. 0.359
[0.401]
Start-up+Reg+Deal * Growth opp. 0.087
[0.227]
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1406 1406 1406 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433
Pseudo R-squared 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and sector fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, * \  *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. e=0.1.
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Table 3.11. Share in value added. Full sample & No low income countries. Instrumental variables.
Dependent variable: ln(e+Share VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Start-up * ExtFin -2.254
[0.917]**
-1.738
[0.536]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.464
[0.199]**
-0.315
[0.126]**
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.181
[0.069]***
-0.154
[0.050]***
KL ratio * K-intensity -0.026 -0.026 -0.023 -0.053 -0.053 -0.051
[0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024]** [0.024]** [0.024]**
Schooling * HK intensity 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.017 0.009
[0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023]
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.012
[0.008]** [0.008]* [0.008]** [0.007]* [0.008] [0.007]*
Private Credit * ExtFin -0.160 0.950 0.222 0.119 0.859 0.208
[0.822] [0.454]** [0.532] [0.644] [0.391]** [0.527]
Private Credit * Tangibility -1.374 -1.449 -1.419 -1.603 -1.672 -1.640
[0.780]* [0.770]* [0.781]* [0.801]** [0.798]** [0.802]**
Observations 972 972 972 836 836 836
R-squared 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.65 0.66
Note: The share of value added is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions 
include country and sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Pseudo R-squared available 
for the Poisson estimator is calculated without clustering. e=0.1.
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Table 3.12. Number of establishments. Full sample
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(e+Establishments) Establishments ln(s+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.863 -1.991 -0.833
[0.193]*** [0.434]*** [0.124]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.134
[0.046]***
-0.281
[0.062]***
-0.134
[0.025]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.085
[0.021]***
-0.159
[0.040]***
-0.080
[0.012]***
Observations 1732 1705 1677 1732 1705 1677 1732 1705 1677
R-squared 0.86 0.85 0.85
Pseudo R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.45 0.44 0.45
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and 
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. e=0.1.
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Table 3.13. Number of establishments. No low income countries.
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(£+Establishments) Establishments ln(£+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.943 -3.052 -0.897
[0.288]*** [0.806]*** [0.149]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.123
[0.056]**
-0.305
[0.094]***
-0.124
[0.027]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.084
[0.022]***
-0.199
[0.058]***
-0.079
[0.012]***
Observations 1503 1476 1476 1503 1476 1476 1503 1476 1476
R-squared 0.85 0.84 0.84
Pseudo R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.45 0.44 0.44
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and 
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. £=0.1.
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Table 3.14. Number of establishments. Full sample
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(e+Establishments) Establishments ln(s+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.663
[0.285]**
-1.710
[0.451]***
-0.646
[0.165]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.112
[0.048]**
-0.264
[0.055]***
-0.113
[0.028]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.091
[0.020]***
-0.152
[0.049]***
-0.080
[0.016]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.013 0.013 0.015 -0.110 -0.097 -0.104 0.013 0.014 0.015
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.038]*** [0.038]** [0.039]*** [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.017 0.020 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.028 0.020 0.023 0.018
[0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.012] [0.012]* [0.012]
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.007
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.821 1.060 0.694 0.563 0.613 0.316 0.787 0.996 0.711
[0.424]* [0.354]*** [0.379]* [0.277]** [0.294]** [0.316] [0.320]** [0.302]*** [0.315]**
Private Credit * Tangibility -0.814 -0.840 -0.792 0.720 0.628 0.688 -0.796 -0.813 -0.777
[1.205] [1.195] [1.202] [0.615] [0.627] [0.620] [0.815] [0.814] [0.812]
Observations 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88
Pseudo R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.47 0.46 0.48
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and 
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1 %  levels, respectively. e= 0 .1 .
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Table 3.15. Number of establishments. No low income countries.
Estimator: OLS Poisson Tobit
Dependent variable: ln(£+Establishments) Establishments ln(e+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.740
[0.415]*
-2.381
[0.845]***
-0.724
[0.182]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.116
[0.056]**
-0.264
[0.072]***
-0.116
[0.028]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.098
[0.020]***
-0.181
[0.058]***
-0.086
[0.016]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.020 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.007
[0.032] [0.032] [0.031] [0.078] [0.081] [0.083] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.028 0.031 0.022 0.065 0.077 0.070 0.030 0.033 0.026
[0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.013]** [0.013]*** [0.013]**
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.529 0.749 0.287 0.684 0.550 0.298 0.489 0.701 0.325
[0.413] [0.338]** [0.381] [0.287]** [0.309]* [0.314] [0.313] [0.300]** [0.314]
Private Credit * Tangibility -1.118 -1.145 -1.079 0.933 0.986 0.949 -1.141 -1.172 -1.124
[1.243] [1.231] [1.238] [0.678] [0.676] [0.682] [0.814] [0.813] [0.810]
Observations 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.88
Pseudo R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.48 0.48 0.48
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and 
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. e= 0 .1 .
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Table 3.16. Number of establishments. Full sample. Additional controls. Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: ln(£+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.626 -0.461 -0.751 -0.893
[0.307]** [0.309] [0.295]** [0.278]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.103
[0.050]**
-0.119
[0.052]**
-0.121
[0.048]**
-0.146
[0.039]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.087
[0.019]***
-0.082
[0.019]***
-0.097
[0.021]***
-0.107
[0.018]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.004 0.003 0.005
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.017 0.019 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.047 0.049 0.044 0.035 0.031 0.024
[0.022] ’ [0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.023]* [0.020]* [0.018] [0.021]
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.853 1.088 0.724 0.691 0.728 0.463 1.063 1.336 0.960 0.811 1.044 0.678
[0.422]** [0.348]*** [0.371]* [0.403]* [0.367]* [0.365] [0.458]** [0.400]*** [0.422]** [0.409]* [0.344]*** [0.369]*
Private Credit * Tangibility -0.812 -0.831 -0.785 -0.895 -0.886 -0.855 -0.769 -0.803 -0.752 -0.839 -0.848 -0.808
[1.206] [1.198] [1.203] [1.221] [1.218] [1.220] [1.189] [1.178] [1.184] [1.197] [1.182] [1.193]
Labour rigidity * ExtFin -0.002
[0.006]
-0.004
[0.006]
-0.004
[0.005]
Ln(Enforcement Days) * ExtFin -0.328
[0.138]**
-0.396
[0.114]***
-0.349
[0.115]***
Ln(GDPpc) * Elasticity -0.196
[0.068]***
-0.188
[0.069]***
-0.193
[0.068]***
Start-up * Growth opp. 9.727
[3.918]**
Start-up+Reg * Growth opp. 1.365
[0.828]
Start-up+Reg+Deal * Growth opp. 0.633
[0.408]
Observations 1238 1238 1238 1211 1211 1211 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. e=0.1.
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Table 3.17. Number of establishments. Full sample. Additional controls. Poisson estimator.
Dependent variable: Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Start-up * ExtFin -1.158 -1.532 -1.740 -1.766
[0.413]*** [0.468]*** [0.469]*** [0.376]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.178
[0.042]***
-0.267
[0.053]***
-0.260
[0.057]***
-0.285
[0.056]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.088
[0.051]*
-0.138
[0.050]***
-0.151
[0.051]***
-0.168
[0.043]***
KL ratio * K-intensity -0.103 -0.094 -0.099 -0.109 -0.098 -0.104 -0.108 -0.096 -0.102 -0.112 -0.098 -0.111
[0.038]*** [0.037]** [0.039]** [0.038]*** [0.037]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]** [0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.037]*** [0.040]***
Schooling * HK intensity 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.021 0.025 0.022 0.033 0.038 0.034 0.028 0.036 0.035
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025] [0.023] [0.024]
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.496 0.509 0.364 0.152 -0.068 -0.167 0.645 0.660 0.388 0.560 0.606 0.319
[0.195]** [0.222]** [0.257] [0.291] [0.335] [0.329] [0.311]** [0.324]** [0.364] [0.278]** [0.292]** [0.315]
Private Credit * Tangibility 0.710 0.653 0.686 0.731 0.661 0.710 0.796 0.671 0.754 0.719 0.613 0.659
[0.615] [0.624] [0.619] [0.613] [0.618] [0.616] [0.568] [0.568] [0.567] [0.622] [0.637] [0.643]
Labour rigidity * ExtFin -0.014
[0.006]**
-0.015
[0.006]**
-0.014
[0.007]*
Ln(Enforcement Days) * ExtFin -0.288
[0.177]
-0.444
[0.173]**
-0.346
[0.189]*
Ln(GDPpc) * Elasticity -0.050
[0.066]
-0.024
[0.074]
-0.040
[0.069]
Start-up * Growth opp. 3.106
[7.433]
Start-up+Reg * Growth opp. 0.834
[0.986]
Start-up+Reg+Deal * Growth opp. 0.808
[0.558]
Observations 1238 1238 1238 1211 1211 1211 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238
Pseudo R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. e=0.1.
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Table 3.18. Number of establishments. Full sample. Additional controls. Tobit estimator.
Dependent variable: ln(e+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Start-up * ExtFin -0.576 -0.439 -0.713 -0.812
[0.181]*** [0.179]** [0.163]*** [0.171]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.102
[0.029]***
-0.124
[0.029]***
-0.119
[0.027]***
-0.139
[0.029]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.074
[0.017]***
-0.071
[0.016]***
-0.084
[0.016]***
-0.096
[0.017]***
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.015 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.000 0.006 0.006
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.049 0.052 0.047 0.034 0.031 0.028
[0.012] [0.012]* [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]** [0.013]**
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Private Credit * ExtFin 0.846 1.033 0.757 0.648 0.660 0.466 1.031 1.268 0.971 0.790 0.986 0.699
[0.326]*** [0.303]*** [0.317]** [0.326]** [0.313]** [0.323] [0.320]*** [0.304]*** [0.316]*** [0.319]** [0.301]*** [0.314]**
Private Credit * Tangibility -0.792 -0.801 -0.767 -0.823 -0.810 -0.789 ' -0.735 -0.758 -0.718 -0.819 -0.820 -0.793
[0.814] [0.813] [0.811] [0.814] [0.810] [0.810] [0.806] [0.806] [0.804] [0.811] [0.812] [0.810]
Labour rigidity * ExtFin -0.004
[0.004]
-0.006
[0.004]
-0.005
[0.004]
Ln(Enforcement Days) * ExtFin -0.332
[0.109]***
-0.398
[0.101]***
-0.359
[0.102]***
Ln(GDPpc) * Elasticity -0.193
[0.038]***
-0.187
[0.038]***
-0.191
[0.038]***
Start-up * Growth opp. 8.147
[2.437]***
Start-up+Reg * Growth opp. 1.125
[0.434]***
Start-up+Reg+Deal * Growth opp. 0.658
[0.245]***
Observations 1238 •1238 1238 1211 1211 1211 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238
Pseudo R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions include country and
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. e=0.1.
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Table 3.19. Number of establishm ents. Full sam ple & No low incom e countries. Instrumental variables.
Dependent variable: ln(£+Establishments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Start-up * ExtFin -2.902
[1.031]***
-2.318
[0.826]***
Start-up+Reg * ExtFin -0.802
[0.377]**
-0.608
[0.278]**
Start-up+Reg+Deal * ExtFin -0.306
[0.119]**
-0.227
[0.093]**
KL ratio * K-intensity 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.010 0.013 0.013
[0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035]
Schooling * HK intensity 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.039 0.042 0.036
[0.032] [0.034] [0.032] [0.030] [0.032] [0.031]
Nat. Res. * NatRes-intens. 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.009
[0.008] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
Private Credit * ExtFin -0.723 0.201 -0.581 -0.295 0.458 -0.412
[0.790] [0.746] [0.610] [0.537] [0.440] [0.495]
Private Credit * Tangibility -0.980 -0.937 -0.937 -0.622 -0.570 -0.598
[1.164] [1.163] [1.153] [1.125] [1.128] [1.128]
Observations 897 897 897 790 790 790
R-squared 0.85 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.87
Note: The number of establishments is measured for 1990 and data comes from the UNIDO dataset. Regressions 
include country and sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. e=0.1.
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